Later decisions that cite Kent Coal Concessions Ltd v Duguid
Lorp Loresurn L.C. My Lords, the question here is whether this House should interfere with a discretion exercised by the Master, confirmed by the learned judge at chambers and con- firmed by the Court of Appeal. I do not think myself that in the present case there is any real question of principle involved, such as Vaughan Williams L.J. thought he perceived. The facts are that an action for libel is brought, and issues, whatever they may be, arise in the course of the action. One, at all events, of the issues was whether this company was in a sound condition or not. Thereupon the plaintiff makes an affidavit of documents, and he includes as relevant the report and the balance-sheet which is attached to and explained by the report; and the Court of Appeal, confirming the learned judge and the Master, think that the books, which are the foundation of the balance-sheets are also relevant. I think that is true. In any case it is the exercise A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL of a discretion. The learned judge decided that on the informa- tion before him there was ground for going behind the former affidavit. 4538 H. L. (E.) 1910 Sam KENT COAL My Lords, the law laid down in the case of Jones v. Monte-Video CONCESSIONS, Gas Co.(1) has been referred to, but it is very familiar. It merely, as I understand it, reaffirms the practice and rule LIMITED wv DUGUID. which have been acted upon constantly by Courts in matters of "7°? 7°°"™ discovery. In regard to the exercise of the discretion here, so far as I can see, 1 agree with it; but I do wish to say this: This House is of course open for the reconsideration of an exercise of discretion, but it is a very exceptional case in which the House will entertain the revisal of a discretion exercised by the Court of Appeal confirming the opinion of the learned judge. Even if I were disposed not to agree with it, I see no question of principle here, and I should not be at all prepared to differ from the solution arrived at by the Court of Appeal. Lorp Macnacuten. My Lords, I agree. Lorp James or Hererorp. My Lords, | entirely concur in every word which has been uttered by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack. I should be very jealous indeed to concur in any course which would support what in former days was called a "fishing"' application—that a party should set himself to work, without any case of his own, to endeavour to discover some case from his opponent. But when one comes to look at these reports and books upon which our judgment is asked, I cannot see any danger whatever, even if this application were a fishing application, that the plaintiff can sustain any injury. We are not here positively deciding whether these books must be admissible or not. All that is asked is that a further affidavit shall state what documents are in the possession of the plaintiff. When this affidavit is made, questions may arise which I do not think Sir Edward Carson quite answered, and I do not think Mr. Simon admitted® (1) (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 536. A. ©. 1910. 3 2H 454 . HOUSE OF LORDS [1910] H.L.(&.) the difficulty would arise. But that will be determined in a way 1910 Iam sure that will inflict no injustice upon the plaintiff, and Kenr coat Under those circumstances, my Lords, I entirely agree that our aan discretion cannot be called in to overrule the discretion of the v. Court. DUGUID. Lorp 'Arxinson. My Lords, I concur, but entirely upon the "ground that this is a matter of discretion, and that it has not been established to my satisfaction that the Master or the Court of Appeal have gone upon a wrong principle. Lorp Suaw or Dunrermuine. My Lords, I agree. Order of the Court of Appeal affirmed and appeal dismissed with costs. Lords' Journals, June 21, 1910.