Later decisions that cite Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch
ViscounT MauGcHam. My Lords, I have had the advantage
of reading the opinion of my noble friend on the Woolsack
and, except in one matter which I regard as of importance, I
agree with his summary of the facts. With the greatest
respect I am of opinion that the embargo is proved to have
been imposed in pursuance of a combination between Mr.
Veitch and the millowners. My grounds for this view are
precisely those set out in the opinion of Lord Fleming in the
Second Division, to which I find I cannot usefully add any-
thing. I also find myself in substantial agreement with what
my noble friend has said as to the law in so far as it relates
to combinations resulting in injury to others, that being the
only subject with which I for my part think it necessary to
deal on this appeal. If I add some remarks of my own, it is
448 HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) partly because of the great importance of this case and partly +
1941 aS a recognition of the able and candid arguments which
Crozer Were addressed to us. I will add by way of preface that it
Hany seems to me beyond dispute that Lord Macnaghten's state-
hoon ment as to a conspiracy to injure giving rise to civil liability in
Tweev Quinn v. Leathem (1) is now well-settled law. I have never
oa myself felt any difficulty in seeing the great difference between
Verrcu. the acts of one person and the acts in combination of two
enw OLrolaimultitude.
pee. As appears from the statement of facts which is contained
in the opinion referred to, there is a peculiarity in the case
which should be remembered. The appellants, who are small
producers, carried on their somewhat humble businesses in
the Isle of Lewis, where they were weaving a tweed called
Harris tweed from yarn spun on the mainland. The
respondents were officials of the Transport and General
Workers' Union, a duly registered trade union. The only
shipping services between the mainland and the Isle of Lewis
are provided by Messrs. David MacBrayne, Ld., and Coast
Lines, Ld. They ply to and from Stornoway. The dockers
at that port are all members of the trade union and it is
admitted that they act on the instructions of the respondents,
who are or were the Scottish area secretary and the Stornoway
branch secretary of the trade union. Orders were given on
January 20 and 21, 1938, by the respondents to the dockers
at Stornoway to refuse to handle any consignments of yarn
from the mainland to the appellants and any consignments of
tweed from the appellants to the mainland. These orders
were carried out (without any breach of contract) and the
business of the appellants was thus brought to a complete
standstill. It is evident that the power of the trade union
officials in the circumstances which exist in the island is so
great that the business and the means of subsistence of every-
one who resides there are at the mercy of the trade union
officials. If they should be so disposed, an event which I hope
is unlikely, a tyranny of the most serious character might
follow unless the case happened to be one in which the court
could properly interfere. It accordingly seems to me to be
very desirable that the reasons which determine the con-
clusion of this House on the present appeal should be stated
with great clearness.
The Lord Ordinary and some of the Lords in the Inner
(1) [1g01] A. C. 495, 510.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
449
House have used phrases which seem to suggest that once it H. L. (Sc.)
is found that the infliction of injury on the petitioners was
not the real purpose or object of the embargo that is the end
of the matter. I must say plainly that I disagree with this
view and I do not think the decision in Sorrell v. Smith (x)
justifies it. To suppose that it follows from an absence of
malice or ill will that the true motive of the acts done in
combination was to further the legitimate interests of the |
parties to the combination seems to me to be a non sequitur. |
For example, there was a possibility that the respondents |
were taking the action they did merely to demonstrate the
power of the trade union to control the trade of the island in
every detail, or again because they had been induced by some
valuable consideration coming from the millowners on the
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WovVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham.
wi
island to put the petitioners out of business in order to secure Fe
for the millowners a complete monopoly in relation to the
spinning and finishing of Harris tweed. I will give some other |
illustrations later. Moreover, there are the cases of mixed
motives which might have to be considered.
My Lords, Lord Cave L.C., in delivering his judgment in
Sorrell v. Smith (2) remarked as follows: 'I deduce as
"material for the decision of the present case two propositions
"of law, which may be stated as follows :—(1.) A combination
"of two or more persons wilfully to injure a man in his trade
"is unlawful and, if it results in damage to him, is actionable.
"(2.) If the real purpose of the combination is, not to injure
"another, but to forward or defend the trade of those who
"enter into it, then no wrong is committed and no action
"will lie, although damage to another ensues. The distinction
"between the two classes of case is sometimes expressed by
"saying that in cases of the former class there is not, while in
"cases of the latter class, there is, just cause or excuse for the
"action taken.'"' I do not think there is any doubt that Lord
Cave's two propositions are sound, and they were accepted as
correct by Lord Atkinson and also, as I read his judgment in
the same case, by Lord Sumner. In Sorrell v. Smith (1), in
my opinion no new law was laid down by this House. It was
merely in the view of their Lordships an unusual illustration
of the proposition decided in the Mogul case (3), that a
combination to do acts the purpose and object of which is to
forward or defend the trade or business interests of the
(1) [1925] A. C. 700. (3) [1892] A. C. 25.
(2) Ibid. 712.
A. C. 1942. 3 Za J
450
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H.L. (Sc.) defendants is not actionable even though the necessary effect
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WoVEN
Harris
TWEED
Co,
v:
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham.
is to cause damage to the plaintiffs (Sorrell v. Smith (1)
per Lords Cave (2) and Atkinson (3), and per- Lord
Sumner (4), and per Lord Buckmaster (5)). If I correctly
understand Lord Dunedin's opinion, he took a somewhat
different view from that of the majority, and disputed the
accuracy of the opinion so often expressed and still more often
assumed by various judges that a just cause or excuse must be
shown and that if the real purpose of the combination is not
to forward or defend the trade or the interests of those who enter
into it, the defendants generally speaking must show some other
just cause or excuse for the action taken in combination.
Lord Cave after stating the two propositions of law above
cited proceeded to classify the more important of the judgments
on which he relied for his propositions, in several of which the
reference to "' just cause or excuse"' will be found. I need
not repeat these authorities; but I think it is desirable to
point out that it is implicit in the Mogul case (6), both in the
Court of Appeal and in this House that the acts done in
combination by the shipowners who were defendants were done
(to use the language of Lord Watson) " with a single view to
"the extension of their business and the increase of its
"profits" (7). The headnote to that case, which in my opinion
is accurate, is in these terms (8): '' Held, that since the acts
"of the defendants were done with the lawful object of pro-
"tecting and extending their trade and increasing their profits,
"and since they had not employed any unlawful means, the
"plaintiffs had no cause of action." The speeches of the
seven noble lords who attended are directed to showing that
any form of competition in trade is legitimate and lawful,
that is, formed a just excuse, provided that illegal means
are not used. No one suggested that if malevolence was not
in question, the action must necessarily fail, and I agree with
my noble friend Lord Wright in thinking that malevolence as a
mental state is not the test of liability. It was implicit, as
I think, that lawful competition was the true and necessary
answer to the action in Sorrell v. Smith (1). Moreover general
approval was expressed of the opinions of Bowen and
(1) [1925] A. C. 700. (6) 23 Q. B. D. 598; [1892]
(2) Ibid. 715. ATC. 25,
(3) Ibid. 716. (7) [1892] A. C. 25, 42.
(4) Ibid. 733, 743. (8) Ibid. 26.
(5) Ibid. 746.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 451
Fry L.JJ. in the Court of Appeal (xz). I can see no reason H. L. (Sc.)
for doubting the correctness of the well-known statements of He
Bowen L.J. in the Court of Appeal (2). His judgment is Cares
essentially devoted to the inquiry whether the acts of the Hanp
defendants were done " without any just cause or excuse." ene
_ If, adopting another mode of approach, it is said that the acts' Twexp
in combination must in Jaw be "' malicious "' if, being acts which oe
necessarily injure the plaintiff, they are done without just verrcn.
cause or excuse, we are reduced to a mere question of words. yoo,
Quacunque via the acts in combination are unlawful unless "sham.
there is just cause or excuse. For myself on this point, which
Lord Dunedin describes as " hypercritical"' (3), I must say
that I prefer Bowen L.J.'s method of dealing with the matter,
approved, as I think it is, by the majority of the noble Lords
who decided Sorrell v. Smith (4). I must add that I do not
think it possible (as Lord Dunedin seems to have thought)
that Bowen L. J. was influenced in using his phrases by Bowen v.
Hall (5), which related to the different case of the inducing
of a person under personal contract to break it; nor do I
think that the judgments in Allen v. Flood (6) would have
altered his view since that case had nothing to do with a
question of combination.
It seems to me, therefore, and with the greatest deference
to those who perhaps think otherwise, a mistake to hold that
combinations to do acts which necessarily result in injury to
the business or interference with the means of subsistence of |
a third person are not actionable provided only that the true
or predominant motive was not to injure the plaintiff and | py../ %.
that no unlawful means are used. For instance, the se pee tenis
of the combination may be a dislike of the religious views or | | a tere 4 y
the politics or the race or the colour of the plaintiff, or a mere \ gfe Bey, wh
demonstration of power by busybodies. Again the persons | | Sesyeert fe jek
joining in the combination may have been induced so to act) ""**"* %~
by payment of money or by some other consideration. There hel ,
is, | think, no authority to be found which justifies the view
that a combination of such a character, causing damage to the |
plaintiff, would be lawful. Since there are many cases of
combinations which directly result in injury to others, but do |
not fall within either of those two categories mentioned by
ce
ol ) [1892] A. C. 25, 37, 43, 47, (4) Ibid. 700.
I, 57. (5) (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333.
4) ) 23 Q. B. D. 598, 613, 617. (6) [7898] A. C. 1.
(3)
iT925 | MAEC™ 70051720.
2 ey AN 22
452 HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) Lord Cave, one question is whether in the present case we are
1941 'not confronted with facts which, admittedly not within the
CRosrer first proposition, are or are not within the second. We may
Hanp formulate the question thus: Was the real or predominant
uae purpose of the combination to forward or defend the trade or
Twrrep _ business interests of the trade union and its members and of
Le the millowners? If the answer is in the negative it would
Verrcx. be necessary very carefully to examine '"' the real purpose "
Vicomt OF 'the true motive' (which I think is the same thing) of
Maugham. +he combination and to consider whether there was in the eyes
of the law a just cause or excuse for taking or directing acts
in combination which will destroy the present means of |
subsistence of the appellants. On this point, if it arises, there
is little authority to guide us, but I will add that when the
question of the real purpose is being considered it is impossible
to leave out of consideration the principle that men are in
general to be taken as intending the direct consequences of
their acts: see the summing up of Fitzgibbon L.J. in Quinn v.
Leathem (1), which was approved in this House. It may be
worth noting that in the days of Erle J. there was often no
other way of ascertaining the purpose of a conspiracy. I
should add that "' motive "' is clearly not the same thing as
"intention," but in many cases the one is the parent of the
other, and they are so closely related that they cannot be
separated. (See for some interesting remarks on this subject
Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 7th ed., pp. 62 to 64.)
If there are mixed purposes or motives the difficulties that
arise on the question of fact may be very great and it may be
impossible to answer the question above stated in the
affirmative. It is worth while to note that Quinn v.
Leathem (1) is an example of a mixed motive; for there the
defendants, being officials and members of a trade union,
combined to call out the union workmen of the plaintiff
Leathem if he would not discharge some non-union men in
his employ, and also to call out the union workmen of a
customer of Leathem called Munce if he did not cease to deal
with Leathem. It is true that there was the finding of the
Belfast jury that what the defendants had done was done
with malice in order to injure the plaintiff ; but it can scarcely
have been in doubt that one at least of the motives actuating
the defendants was the benefit of their trade union. As
Lord Lindley remarked (2): '' That they (the defendants)
(t) [1901] A. C. 495, 499. (2) Ibid. 536.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
453
"acted as they did in furtherance of what they considered H. L. (c.)
"the interests of union men may probably be fairly assumed
"in their favour." The facts as set out in detail in Lord
Brampton's speech show clearly that the whole dispute
between Leathem and the trade union originated in Leathem's
refusal to dismiss non-union workmen. It must, however,
be assumed from the findings of the jury that the main object
or purpose of the defendants was to punish or injure Leathem
and that this was " malicious,' whatever the precise evidence
of malice may have been. It was never suggested by anyone
that if the defendants' acts were at least partly in furtherance
of trade union interests that would be a defence to the action.
The case of Conway v. Wade (1) may usefully be referred to
in this connection.
An obvious difficulty arises at the outset if we accept, as I
do (as above stated), the view that the combination was
between the respondents and the millowners. The interests
of these two groups were very different and indeed they were
in some respects conflicting. If it is proved, as the Lord
Ordinary held, that the object of the respondents was to
benefit the trade union and its members and if it is to be
inferred that the object of the millowners was to benefit
themselves by obtaining a species of monopoly in the matter of
milling, is that sufficient to bring the case within the principle
of the Mogul case (2)? It was argued with force that, accept-
ing the doctrine laid down in Sorrell v. Smith (3), you must
look at the joint object of the parties combining and if they
have substantially different objects, the decision in the Mogul
case (2) will not apply. I have carefully considered this point,
which is not unattractive, and I cannot find it has ever been
precisely dealt with in any of the cases. On the whole,
however, I have come to the conclusion that following the
principle of the Mogul case (2), it is sufficient if all the various
combining parties have their own legitimate trade or business
interests to gain, even though these interests may be of
differing kinds. If indeed some of these parties were actuated
merely by hate or vindictive spite or with no just excuse at all,
I should doubt very much whether the defence would succeed.
But I think reasonable self-interest in trade or business is "a ,
1941
CROFTER
HANnpD
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham.
'just cause or excuse '' for those combining even though each ~
of them '' has his own axe to grind." For instance, I cannot
(x) [1909] A. C. 506. (3) [1925] A. C. 700.
(2) [1892] A. C. 25.
454
H. L. (Sc.)
" 1941
——
CROFTER
Hanp
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
think that the Mogul case (1) would have had a different result
if tea merchants had joined in the combination of shipowners.
And it is easy to imagine a case where shipowners and railway
companies might wish to combine to get business though their
interests were in some respects conflicting ; and other examples
will occur to everyone with a knowledge of competitive trade.
In my opinion the principle of the Mogul case (1) will protect
persons who combine for their respective business interests
if there is a certain identity of object, that whether they do or
not is a question of motive or object, and that the circumstance
that their business interests are by no means the same is not a
ground for holding that the combination is illegal.
My Lords, in my opinion, when it is proved or admitted that
the respondents had no personal ill-will towards the appellants,
the difficulties of this case begin. I do not propose to
recapitulate the facts, but it is to be remembered that there
are a number of circumstances which might have justified a
very adverse view of the respondents' motives. I will
summarize the most important of them. First, what was done
was not "in furtherance of' or "in contemplation of" a
trade dispute. Secondly, as I have said, I accept the view
of Lord Fleming and, I should add, very forcibly expressed
by Lord Mackay, that there was a combination between Mr.
Veitch and Mr. Skinner and some at least of the millowners
to procure the embargo. Thirdly, the acts complained of
were obviously in the interests of the millowners on the island
since they secured a species of monopoly. Fourthly, Mr.
Veitch's letter of January 19, to Mr. Mackenzie is, I think,
only consistent with the view that there was a "' deal "' between
Mr. Veitch, Mr. Skinner, and some at least of the millowners
with regard to the laying-on of the embargo, the general
understanding being that if an embargo were to be imposed
by Mr. Veitch, the millowners would concede the union
demand for 100 per cent. union membership in the mills of the
island. Fifthly, Mr. Veitch apparently accepted as true
certain statements of Mr. Skinner as to the condition of the
industry and as to the effect of the importation of mainland
yarn, which the least inquiry would have shown to be in-
accurate. Sixthly, Mr. Veitch's elaborate report to Mr.
Bevin (the general secretary of the union at that time) as to his
grounds for imposing the embargo is so extravagant, abusive
and inaccurate in its terms that I find it difficult to understand
(1) [1892] A, C. 25,
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
455
how it can have been written with a legitimate purpose. It H. L. (Sc.)
was a carefully considered document composed between
January 14 and February 3. It suggested (untruly) that the
appellants were evading the "' stamp,'' deceiving the public,
ruining the industry, and bringing distress to the Outer
Hebrides, that they were " get-rich-quick merchants '' who
cared nothing about the distress on the islands, that the
importation of mainland yarn was "killing the industry,"
and that they were an "unscrupulous lot'? who were
importing " blackleg yarn." There was nothing said in the
letter about the "deal'' with the millowners; indeed, it
was asserted (inaccurately) that in the mills they already had
roo per cent. "organization." The document was com-
pletely misleading, and in fact it misled the general council
of the union when it was read on March 8, 1938. Seventhly,
it should be observed that no notice was given to the appellants
as to the intention to apply the embargo and no opportunity
given to them to cease using mainland yarn if they were so
advised. Lastly, it is a strange feature in the case that one
at least of the avowed purposes of the acts of the respondents
was to secure the 100 per cent. membership of the union in the
mills, whilst the appellants, who were attacked, were com-
pletely unable to secure or to influence such a result, since
they had nothing whatever to do with the management of the
mills, andthe result was to be secured, if at all, by the " deal "
with the millowners.
My Lords, there are certain explanations offered as regards
these facts and no doubt some other circumstances to be borne
in mind, but I must confess that, if I were entitled to form a
conclusion simply from the documents and the shorthand
notes of the trial, I should find it impossible to hold that the
respondents had established that they and the millowners
had combined simply or mainly for the purpose of promoting
their own interests, that is, those of the trade union and of
the millowners respectively. This House, however, is always
most reluctant to differ from the findings of the trial judge
on a question of fact and a fortiori when the appellate court
has come to a like conclusion. The question here is mainly
one relating to the objects or motives of the respondents, both
of whom were called as witnesses and elaborately cross-
examined. It has been well observed that if they were, as
seems probable from the shorthand notes, both stupid and
wrong-headed, the circumstance may afford an explanation
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
Uv.
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham,
456
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) of acts and writings which in the case of persons of greater
v.
VEITCH.
Viscount
Maugham.
acuteness would tend strongly in favour of a sinister motive.
The Lord Ordinary appears to have believed these persons,
though he was not very pleased with them as witnesses. The
majority of the Inner House agreed with him. I do not feel
at liberty to differ. My conclusion therefore must be based
on these facts: On the one hand it is proved that the
respondents and the millowners were not actuated by an )
intention to injure as a predominant motive in their minds.
On the other hand they were acting, or must be taken to have
been acting, with the main object of benefiting themselves
in this sense, that the respondents were seeking to advance
what they conceived to be the interests of their trade union
and their members, and the millowners were seeking to obtain
an obvious trade advantage for themselves, and no doubt in
a rather general sense they all had a common interest in the
prosperity of the Harris tweed industry. The case, therefore,
is brought, though I think with difficulty, within the principle
of the Mogul case (1), as explained in later cases, and the~
appeal must fail.
As regards the ultimate result, I must add this warning.
The only question before the Lord Ordinary was whether
the then petitioners were entitled to have the respondents
interdicted from instructing members of the trade union at
Stornoway to refuse to load or unload consignments of yarn
or unfinished tweeds consigned to or dispatched by the
petitioners. The original embargo was directed on January 19,
1938, and extended to the loading of finished and unfinished
tweeds dispatched by the petitioners, but on January 25,
1938, it was modified by permitting the exportation of finished
tweeds. An interim interdict was granted to the appellants
on February 24, 1938, and the embargo then dropped. When
the interim interdict was recalled on March 8, 1939, it appears
that the embargo was not re-imposed. The only question
on appeal to the Inner House and to this House has necessarily
been whether the interdict should have been continued by the
Lord Ordinary. On that matter the courts were bound to
consider the propriety of the action of the respondents and
the millowners in the light of the views honestly entertained
by them at that time as to their respective interests and as
to the actions and conduct of the appellants. In so far as
those views have since been shown to have been ill-founded,
(1) [1892] A. C. 25.
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
457
they would not now justify the re-imposition of the embargo. H. L. (Sc.)
If such a step as that is contemplated, the matter ought to be
reconsidered in view of the circumstances and facts as they ~
are now known to exist.
My Lords, for the reasons above stated I concur in the
proposed motion.
LoRD THANKERTON. My Lords, the appellants are seven
out of the original petitioners in a petition and complaint
by nine small producers of Harris Tweed in the Isle of Lewis,
presented on February 24, 1938, seeking to have the present
respondents interdicted from interference with the consign-
ments of yarn or unfinished tweeds consigned to or dispatched
by the petitioners at the port or harbour of Stornoway. The
petition and complaint was dismissed, after proof, on the
merits by the Lord Ordinary (Lord Jamieson) on March 8,
1939, and his interlocutor was adhered to by the Second
Division (Lord Mackay dissenting) on December 22, 1939,
and the reclaiming motion by the nine petitioners was refused,
but, in respect of an undertaking by the respondents not to
continue the embargo against the petitioners, William MacLeod
and Donald Campbell, the latter were awarded the expenses
incurred by them in the reclaiming motion. The remaining
petitioners appeal against these interlocutors.
While the respondents are cited as individuals, they are
respectively the Scottish area secretary and the Stornoway
branch secretary of the Transport and General Workers'
Union at Stornoway, and the terms of the interdict sought for
are '"'to interdict, prohibit and discharge the respondents
'from instructing, procuring, persuading or inciting, or
"continuing to instruct, procure, persuade or incite members
'"'of the Transport and General Workers' Union at Stornoway,
"to refuse to load or unload on to or from vessels in the port
"or harbour of Stornoway consignments of yarn or unfinished
"tweeds consigned to or dispatched by the petitioners, or
"any of them, or from interfering in any manner or way with
"the consignment to or dispatch by the petitioners, or any
"of them, of consignments of yarn or unfinished tweeds
'consigned to or dispatched by them at the port or harbour
"of Stornoway." In the record the appellants. plead two
grounds of action in their first and fourth pleas-in-law, which
are as follows: ''(1.) The respondents having illegally conspired
"together to interfere with and damage the petitioners'
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WovEN
HarrRISs
TWEED
Co.
v
VEITCH.
458
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942)
H. L. (Sc.) "legitimate rights to trade as condescended upon, interdict
v.
VEITCH.
Lord
Thankerton,
"should be granted as craved. (4.) Separatim, and, in any
"event, the respondents having by their actings wilfully
"interfered with and obstructed the petitioners' contractual
'relations and liberty to exercise their trade, and having
"thereby caused injury to the petitioners, interdict should be
"eranted as craved." Any evidence bearing on the fourth
plea was negligible, and the appellant made no case on it
before this House, but confined his contentions to the first
plea. The Lord Ordinary says: "The petitioners aver on
"record that the laying on of the embargo was the result of a
"conspiracy between the respondents and representatives of
"companies owning spinning mills on the island to injure the
"
- 'petitioners' trade and unlawfully to force them to use island
"spun yarn in the manufacture of their tweed. Alternatively
"they aver that the respondents were acting in concert for the
"purpose of injuring their legitimate trade. Their plea is that
"the respondents conspired together. The plea is not very
"happily expressed, but in my view it is sufficient to cover the
"wider conspiracy and the case was argued on both alterna-
"tives." I may say at once that, in my opinion, the first
plea is quite inapt to cover the wider conspiracy, and should
have been amended, which could have been done, without
difficulty, as the case on the wider conspiracy has been fully
dealt with, apparently without objection on this point. The
Lord Ordinary held that the narrower conspiracy had been
proved in the sense of joint action by the respondents, but he
held that the wider conspiracy had not been proved, and that
the alleged intent of the respondents to injure the petitioners'
trade had not been proved. In the Inner House, the learned
judges of the Second Division held that the wider combination
had been proved, but (Lord Mackay dissenting) that the intent
to injure had not been established. Before your Lordships
the appellants confined their case to the wider combination,
as regards which they had the favourable decision of the
Second Division. The evidence was very fully dealt with in
the opinions of the learned judges, and I find it unnecessary to
deal with it in detail. My Lords, as regards the proof of the
wider combination, I am prepared—using the words of the
late Lord Justice Clerk (1)—''to hold that there was some kind
"of understanding more or less defined between Mr. Veitch
'"'and Mr. Skinner that, 7f the union took action and imposed
(1) 1940S, C. 141, 153.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
459
"an embargo against the importers of yarn, the union in turn H. L. (c.)
"would be assisted by the millowners to get their 100 per cent.
'membership. But I am not satisfied by the evidence that
"there was any decision taken by Mr. Skinner and Mr. Veitch
"that deprived Mr. Veitch of the liberty to decide for himself
"in consultation with his own officials whether and when an
"embargo should be imposed. I shall, however, take the
"case on the assumption that a definite arrangement to
"impose an embargo was reached."
This leaves the crucial question whether the appellants have
proved that the respondents' intention was to injure the
appellants' trade, as to which the appellants have the findings
of both the lower courts against them. The reluctance of
this House to interfere with such findings, and in particular
with the findings of the trial judge, who has had the advantage
of seeing the witnesses, which has repeatedly been expressed,
is all the stronger in a case such as the present, in which the
intention of the respondents, both of whom gave evidence,
was in issue. That Veitch, for instance, was stupid or wrong-
headed, or acted without making proper inquiries may be
quite consistent with the absence of any intention to injure,
and the Lord Ordinary has so found; indeed, stupidity or
wrongheadedness might tend to disprove any such intention.
The Lord Ordinary sums up the evidence thus (1): "In the
"present "case the immediate purpose of Mr. Veitch and
"Mr. Mackenzie was to force producers to come to an agree-
"ment regarding the selling price of tweed and the exclusive
"use of island spun yarn. The means adopted necessarily
"inflicted injury on the petitioners. But was the infliction
"of injury Mr. Veitch's motive ? Lord Dunedin in Sorrell v.
"Smith (2), suggested a test as follows. 'Was such a purpose
""the real root of the acts that grew from it, or was the true
'""motive of the acts something else, as such, for instance,
"« the furtherance of the defendant's own business?' Applying
"this test the answer must be in the negative. There is no
"evidence that Mr. Veitch had evinced any malice or ill-will
"towards any of the petitioners, or that he was prompted by a
"desire to destroy the trade of any persons who were employing
"weavers and paying them the union rate of wages. The
'purpose at the root of his action was to advance the position
"of the union and its members, however mistaken he may
"have been in the means he adopted to secure that end. It
(1) 1940S. C. 146, 147. (2) [1925] A. C. 700, 717.
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord
Thankerton.
460
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H.L. (Sc.) '""may be that the benefits hoped to be obtained would have
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WovEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
vu,
VEITCH.
Lord
Thankerton.
"been an ultimate and not an immediate consequence of the
"action taken, but I do not think it would have been any more
'"'remote than in the cases of Sorrell v. Smith (1) and Ware and
"De Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade Association (2)."
My Lords, the critical examination of the evidence by the
appellants' counsel and his able argument, have entirely failed
to satisfy me that I am in a position to set aside the conclusion
of the Lord Ordinary ; on each point of criticism in regard
to which there appeared to be ground for argument, I felt
satisfied that a personal observation of the witness under
examination would have been a material help to the solution
of the point, and this is the very foundation of the reluctance
of an appellate court to interfere in such circumstances. In
this view of the facts I find it unnecessary to deal further with
the previous decisions on this branch of the law, as there can be
no doubt that the appeal fails. But I desire to refer to one
aspect of this case in order to make clear that, in my opinion,
this case does not raise a question of law which is of importance
and may come up for consideration in the future, and that is
as to what limit is to be placed as to the means by which the
pressure is operated in these cases. In the present case the
pressure was applied by means of action by the dockers, who
were in no sense employees in, or directly connected with, the
trade in Harris tweed; but employees in this trade were
members of the same union, and the interest of the dockers
and the trade employees in the union and its welfare were
mutual, and I can see no ground for holding that it was not
legitimate for the union to avail itself of the services of its
docker members to promote the interests of the union. On
the other hand, I doubt if it would be legitimate for a union
to use a means of pressure with which it had no connection
except that which was constituted by a money payment, for
instance. However, I have referred to this question only in
order to make clear that, in my opinion, it does not arise for
decision in this case, and that I express no opinion on it.
Lorp WricHt. My Lords, I have had the opportunity of
considering in print the account of the facts which my noble
and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has given in his opinion,
which I agree with and adopt. I should, however, observe
that, in regard to the issue whether certain millowners, in
(1) [1925] A. C. 700. (2) [1921] 3 K. B. 4o.
A. ¢. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
461
particular Mr. Skinner, were parties to the combination, I am H. L. (Sc.)
prepared, like the Lord Justice Clerk, for purposes of this case
to assume that they were. This view was strongly pressed in
argument by counsel for the appellants. It is obviously the
assumption which is most favourable to them. Lord Mackay,
in his dissenting judgment, forcibly relied on his conclusion
that there was a compact between the respondents and the
millowners. On the whole I think it is fairer to the appellants
to proceed on that assumption. In the end it does not appear
to me to affect the issue. There was clearly, in any case,
combination between the two respondents, who were both
responsible trade union officials.
The cause of.action set out in the appellants' claim is for a
conspiracy to injure which is atort. The classical definition of
conspiracy is that given by Willes J. in advising the House of
Lords in Mulcahy v. Reg. (1): "A conspiracy consists not
"merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement
"of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act
"by unlawful means." This must be supplemented by
observing that though the crime is constituted by the agree-
ment, the civil right of action is not complete unless the
conspirators do acts in pursuance of their agreement to the
damage of the plaintiffs. The concept of a civil conspiracy
to injure has been in the main developed in the course
of the last, half century, particularly since the great case of
the Mogul "Steamship Co. v. McGregor & Co.(2). Its essential
character is described by Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v.
Leathem (3), basing himself on Lord Watson's words in Allen v.
Flood (4): "'a' conspiracy to injure might give rise to civil
"liability even though the end were brought about by conduct
"and acts which by themselves and apart from the element of
"combination or concerted action could not be regarded as a
"legal wrong." In this sense the conspiracy is the gist of
the wrong, though damage is necessary to complete the cause
of action. The opposite view had been expressed by Palles C.B.
in Kearney v. Lloyd (5). He held that the gist of the
action was not the conspiracy itself, but the particular wrongful
acts done in pursuance of it, and that the cause of action must
exist if the allegation of conspiracy were struck out. Later
cases, however, have decisively held the contrary, as I shall
(1) (1868) L. R. 3 H.L. 306,317. (4): [1898] A. C. 1, 108.
(2) [1892] A. C. 25. (5) (1889) 26 L. R. Ir. 268.
(3) [1901] A. C. 495, 510.
IQ41
CROFTER
HAND
WoOvEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
462
H. L. (Sc.)
Ig41
CROFTER
HAND
WOVEN
HarRIS
TWEED
Co.
uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS {1942}
show. The rule may seem anomalous, so far as it holds that
conduct by two may be actionable if it causes damage, whereas
the same conduct done by one, causing the same damage,
would give no redress. In effect the plaintiff's right is that
he should not be damnified by a conspiracy to injure him, and
it is in the fact of the conspiracy that the unlawfulness resides.
It is a different matter if the conspiracy is to do acts in them-
selves wrongful, such as to deceive or defraud, to commit
violence, or to conduct a strike or lock-out by means of conduct
prohibited by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, or which contravenes the Trade Disputes and Trade
Unions Act, 1927. But a conspiracy to injure is a tort which
requires careful definition, in order to hold the balance between
the defendant's right to exercise his lawful rights and the
plaintifi's right not to be injured by an injurious conspiracy.
As I read the authorities, there is a clear and definite distinction
which runs through them all between what Lord Dunedin in
Sorrell v. Smith (1) calls 'a conspiracy to injure "' and "'a set of
"acts dictated by business interests.'"' I should qualify
"business "' by adding "or other legitimate interests,'' using the
convenient adjective not very precisely. It may be a difficult
task in some cases to apply this distinction. It depends largely
on matters of fact, but also on a legal conception of what is
/meant by "intention to injure." The appellants contend
that there was here an intention to injure even though it is
negatived that the respondents were actuated by malice or
malevolence. In substance what the appellants say is that
the issue between the millowners and the yarn importers was
one between two sets of employers, in which the men were not
directly concerned, and that the union's action was an un-
justifiable and meddlesome interference with the appellants'
right to conduct their own businesses as they pleased, and that
the union were pushing into matters which did not concern
them. The appellants further say, as I understand their
case, that this unjustifiable intrusion was due to the union's
desire to secure the assistance of the millowners towards the
union's object, which was to get I00 per cent. membership in
the textile workers, and thus there was no common object
among the two main parties to the combination; each set
had its own selfish object. In effect, it was said, the union
were bribed by the millowners to victimize the appellants
in their trade by the promise of help in the matter of the union
(1) [1925] A. C. 700, 730.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 463
membership, which was entirely foreign to the question of H. L. (Sc.)
the importation of yarn. These considerations, it was said, 1941
constituted "malice "' in law, even if there was no malevolence, Canteens
and prevented the respondents from justifying the injury Hanp
which they wilfully did to the appellants' trade, because they ie
could not assert any legitimate interest of their union which Twerp
was relevant to the action taken. Actual malevolence or spite ee
was, it was said, not essential. There was no genuine intention VEITCH.
to promote union interests by the stoppage of importation. 1.4 Wrignt.
The interference with the appellants' trade by stopping import
of yarn was wilful and ultroneous action on the part of the
union supported by no relevant union interest. It was
malicious or wrongful because it was intentionally and
unjustifiably mischievous, even though not malevolent.
Before I refer to the authorities, there are some preliminary
observations which I desire to make. I shall avoid the use
of what Lord Bowen described as the "slippery" word
"malice'"' except in quotations. When I want to express
spite or ill will, I shall use the word malevolence. When I
want to express merely intentional tortious conduct I shall
use the word wrongful. As the claim is for a tort, it is necessary
to ascertain what constitutes the tort alleged. It cannot be
merely that the appellants' right to freedom in conducting their
trade has been interfered with. That right is not an absolute
'or unconditional right. It is only a particular aspect of the
citizen's right to personal freedom, and like other aspects of
that right is qualified by various legal limitations, either by
statute or by common law. Such limitations are inevitable
in organized societies where the rights of individuals may
clash. In commercial affairs each trader's rights are qualified
| by the right of others to compete. Where the rights of labour
are concerned, the rights of the employer are conditioned
by the rights of the men to give or withhold their services.
The right of workmen to strike is an essential element /
in the principle of collective bargaining. It is true that
under the Combination of Workmen Act, 1800, it was
a criminal offence for workmen to combine together for
the purpose of securing higher wages or shorter hours of
'work or of controlling employers in the conduct or
management of their business. That Act was repealed
by the Acts of 1824 and 1825, but these Acts introduced
various restrictions on the conduct of strikes. But as
Lord Bramwell said in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor &
464
H. L. (Sc.)
IQ4I
CROFTER
HanpD
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942}
Co., Ld. (1), ""a combination of workmen, an agreement among
"them to cease work except for higher wages, and a strike in
"consequence, was lawful at common law; perhaps not
"enforceable inter se, but not indictable." In the report of
Reg. v. Rowlands (2) (a criminal case, but the same principles
apply in a civil suit), Erle J. directed the jury: "The law is
"clear, that workmen have a right to combine for their own
"protection, and to obtain such wages as they choose to agree
"to demand. I say nothing at present as to the legality of
"other persons, not workmen, combining with them to assist
'in that purpose. As far as I know, there is no objection, in
"point of law, to it."" He added that while the law allowed
them to combine for the purpose of obtaining a lawful benefit
for themselves, it gave no sanction to combinations which had
for their immediate purpose the hurt of another. I attach
great value to that clear and simple statement, which has
not been superseded but confirmed by the more elaborate
'
_ later discussions. It is clear that this right of workmen cannot
be generally exercised without interfering with the employers'
free conduct of their own business. Erle J. added that either
side had the right to study to promote their own advantage
and to combine with others for that purpose. His summing
up was quoted with approval by Bowen L.J. in Mogul Steamship
Co.'s case (3), as applying equally to traders as to employers and
workmen. It was also approved in the same case by Fry L.J.(4).
The same principle is again stated in Allen v. Flood (5), Quinn
v. Leathem (6), Ware and De Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade
Association (7), and in Sorrell's case (8). The language of
Erle J. is certainly a clear statement-of a far-reaching principle.
The same idea is more elaborately enunciated by Lord
Herschell in Allen v. Flood (9): "I understood it to be
"admitted at the Bar, and it was indeed stated by one of the
"learned judges in the Court of Appeal, that it would have
"been perfectly lawful for all the ironworkers to leave their
"employment and not to accept a subsequent engagement
"to work in the company of the plaintiffs. At all events I
"cannot doubt that this would have been so. I cannot
"doubt either that the appellant [the trade union official]
(1) [1892] A. C. 25, 47.
(2) (5857) 27, QO. Bao 7 1 2086,
(5) [1898] A. C. 1.
(
b) 2. (
(
(
[1901] A. C. 495.
)
)
n. ) [921] 3 K. B. go.
)
)
—=
) 23 Q. B. D. 598, 618, 619.
> a Nie [1925] A. C. 700.
4 1d. 625.
[1898] A. C. 1, 129.
A. G. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
465.
"or the authorities of the union would equally have acted H. L. (Sc.)
"within his or their rights if he or they had ' called the men
"" out.' They were members of the union. It was for them
"to determine whether. . . . they would follow or not follow the
"instructions of its authorities, though no doubt if they had
"refused to obey any instructions which under the rules of
"the union it was competent for the authorities to give, they
"might have lost the benefits they derived from membership.
"It is not for your Lordships to express any opinion on the
"policy of trade unions, membership of which may undoubtedly
"influence the action of those who have joined them. They
"are now recognized by law; there are combinations of
"employers as well as of employed. The members of these
"unions, of whichever class they are composed, act in the
"interest of their class. If they resort to unlawful acts they
"may be indicted or sued. If they do not resort to unlawful
"acts they are entitled to further their interests in the manner
"which seems to them best, and most likely to be effectual."
This statement was criticized adversely by Lord Lindley in
Quinn's case (I), but in my opinion it states the law correctly.
It is thus clear that employers of workmen or those who
like the appellants depend in part on the services of workmen,
have in the conduct of their affairs to reckon with this freedom
of the men and to realize that the exercise of the men's rights
may involye some limitation on their own freedom in the
management of their business. Such interference with a
person's business, so long as the limitations enforced by law
are not contravened, involves no legal wrong against the
person. In the present case the respondents are sued for
imposing the ' embargo,'"' which corresponds to calling out
the men on strike. The dockers were free to obey or not to
obey the call to refuse to handle the appellants' goods. In
refusing to handle the goods they did not commit any breach
of contract with anyone; they were merely exercising their
own rights. But there might be circumstances which rendered
the action wrongful. The men might be called out in breach
of their contracts with their employer, and that would be
clearly a wrongful act as against the employer, an interference
with his contractual right, for which damages could be claimed
not only as against the contract-breaker, but against the
person who counselled or procured or advised the breach.
This is the principle laid down in Lumley v. Gye (2), which
(1) [rgo1] A. C. 495, 537. (2) (1853) 2B) & Bu2z16,
AN CLO42: % 3 2K
1941
CROFTER
HAanbD
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
U.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
466
Hal. (Se?)
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v. Leathem (1), defined to be that
"a violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause
"of action, and it is a violation of legal right to interfere with
"contractual relations recognized by law if there be no
"sufficient justification for the interference."" That is some-
thing substantially different from a mere interference with
a person's qualified right to exercise his free will in con- ~
ducting his trade. A legal right was violated and that
violation needed justification, if it could be justified. This
distinction was drawn by the majority of the Lords in
Allen v. Flood (2), who disapproved of the dicta in Bowen
v. Hall (3) and Temperton v. Russell (4), that every person
who persuades another not to enter into a contract with
a third person may be sued by that third person if the
object were to benefit himself at the expense of such
person. But in Allen v. Flood (2), this House was considering
a case of an individual actor, where the element of combination
was absent. In that case, it was held, the motive of the
defendant is immaterial. Damage done intentionally and
even malevolently to another, thus, it was held, gives no
cause of action so long as no legal right of the.other is infringed.
That I take to be the English rule laid down by this House in
Bradford Corporation v. Pickles (5), and in Allen v. Flood (2),
though in Sorrell v. Smith (6) Lord Cave doubts the proposition
and says that in general what is unlawful in two is not lawful
in one. But this seems to be inconsistent with the express
rulings in Allen v. Flood (2). Though eminent authorities
have protested against the principle, it must, I think, be
accepted at present as the law in England. The precise issue
does not arise in this case, which is concerned with com-
bination or conspiracy. I need not consider whether any
qualification may hereafter be found admissible.
Thus for purposes of the present case we reach the position
that apart from combination no wrong would have been
committed. There was no coercion of the dockers. There
were no threats to them. They were legally free to choose
the alternative course which they preferred. In Quinn v.
Leathem (1) a wide meaning was given to words like threats,
intimidation or coercion, especially by Lord Lindley, but
that was not the ratio decidendi adopted by the House.
(1) [1901] A. C. 495, 510. (4) [1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
(2) [1898] A.C. 1. (5) [1895] A. C. 587.
(3) (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333. (6) [1925] A. C. 700, 713.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
467
These words, as R. S. Wright pointed out in his book on H.L. (Sc.)
Criminal Conspiracy, are not terms of art and are consistent
either with legality or illegality. They are not correctly
used in the circumstances of a case like this. In Allen v.
Flood (1), Ware and De Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade Assocta-
tion (2) and Sorrell's case (3), a more accurate definition was
given. I should also refer to the admirable discussion by
Peterson J. in Hodges v. Webb (4). There is nothing unlawful
in giving a warning or intimation that if the party addressed
pursues a certain line of conduct, others may act in a manner
which he will not like and which will be prejudicial to his
interests, so long as nothing unlawful is threatened or done.
In Lord Buckmaster's words in Sorrell v. Smith (5): "A
"threat to do an act which is lawful cannot, in my opinion,
"create a cause of action, whether the act threatened is
"to be done by many or by one." No doubt the use of
illegal threats or the exercise of unlawful coercion would
create by itself a cause of action, but there was nothing
of the sort in this case.
The only ground in this case on which the appellants could
establish a cause of action in tort is by establishing that there
was a conspiracy to injure, which would take the case out of
the general ruling in Allen v. Flood (1) and bring it within the
exception there reserved, e.g., by Lord Herschell, when he
said (6): 'It is certainly a general rule of our law that an
"act prima facie lawful is not unlawful and actionable on
"account of the motive which dictated it. I put aside the
"case of conspiracy, which is anomalous in more than one
"respect."" Lord Watson made a similar reservation (7).
Lord Macnaghten (8) said that the decision in Allen v.
Flood (1) could have no bearing on any case which involved
the element of oppressive combination. These reservations
were acted upon in Quinn v. Leathem (9), to which I shall
refer later. That the decision in that case turned on
conspiracy cannot now be doubted, especially after Ware and De
Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade Association (2) and Sorrell's
case (3). The distinction between conduct by one man and
conduct by two or more may be difficult to justify. Lord
1) [1898] A. C. 1. (6) [1898] A. C. 1, 123.
2) [r92 Tzu) B40: (7) Ibid. 108.
(8) Ibid. 153.
(
[1920] 2 Ch. 7o.
(
(
)
(5) [1925] A. C. 700, 747.
)
)
3) [1925] A. C. 700.
4)
5)
3 2z2K2
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
Uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
———
468
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
VU.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS (1942)
Sumner in Sorrell's case (1) puts the very artificial case of the
owner of a large business who gave a small share to a partner
and ''conspired "' with him. For practical purpeses the
position there is the same as if he had remained a sole trader.
The fact that the sole trader employed servants or agents in
the conduct of his business would not per se in my opinion make
these others co-conspirators with him. The special rule
relating to the effect of a combination has been explained on
the ground that it is easier to resist one than two. That may
appear to be true if a crude illustration is taken, such as the
case of two men attacking another, but even there it would
not always be true if, for instance, the one man was very
strong and the two very weak. And the power of a big
corporation or trader may be greater than that of a large
number of smaller fry in the trade. This explanation of
the rule is not very satisfactory. The rule has been explained
on grounds of public policy. The common law may have
taken the view that there is always the danger that any
combination may be oppressive, and may have thought that
a general rule against injurious combinations was desirable
on broad grounds of policy. Again any combination to injure
involves an element of deliberate concert between individuals
to do harm. Whatever the moral or logical or sociological
justification, the rule is as well established in English law as
I here take to be the rule that motive is immaterial in regard
to the lawful act of an individual, a rule which has béen
strongly criticized by some high legal authorities who would
solve the apparent antinomy by holding that deliberate
action, causing injury, is actionable, whether done by one or
by several.
A conspiracy to injure involves ex vi termini an intention to
injure, or more accurately, a common intention and agreement
to injure. Both "intention" and "'injure"' need definition.
The word "injure" is here used in its correct meaning of
"wrongful harm,' damnum cum injuria, not damnum absque
injuria. That obviously raises the question, when is the harm
wrongful? 'Intention " is generally determined by reference
to overt acts and to the circumstances in which they are done.
It is in this way that an intention to deceive, which is an
essential element in the action of deceit, is ascertained. Lord
Watson in Allen v. Flood (2) warns against the " loose logic
"which confounds internal feelings with outward acts, and
(1) [1925] A. C. 700, 740. (2) [1898] A. C. 1, 98.
A. 0. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 469
"treats the motive of the actor as one of the means employed H. L. (Sc.)
"by him." Erle J., in the passage I have referred to in 1941
Reg. v. Rowlands (1), seems to have in mind an external object Case
when he distinguishes combinations for the purpose of obtain- Hann
ing a lawful benefit for the combiners from combinations A)
which have for their immediate purpose the hurt of another. Twexp
I do not think that Erle J. in these words intended a contrast ae
between what is immediate and what is remote. If he so vurrcu.
intended, the later authorities would, I think, contradict
such a view. A competitive combination of traders to under-
cut prices may be said to have the immediate result of excluding
rivals from the trade, but if its real object is the ultimate
increase of business and profits by the traders it is lawful:
Mogul case (2). A _ perfectly lawful strike may aim at
dislocating the employer's business for the moment, but its
'real object is to secure better wages or conditions for the
workers. The true contrast is, I think, between the case
where the object is the legitimate benefit of the combiners
and the case where the object is deliberate damage without a4
Lord Wright.
such just cause. The courts have repudiated the idea that it is
for them to determine whether the object of the combiners is | e-
reasonably calculated to achieve their benefit. The words | '
"motive," "object," "purpose," are in application to
practical matters difficult strictly to define or distinguish.
Sometimes mere animus, such as spite or ill will, malevolence
or a wanton desire to harm without any view to personal
benefit is meant. But motive is often used as meaning
purpose, something objective and external, as contrasted
with a mere mental state. "' Object" is, I think, the most
appropriate word. How far malevolence is to be regarded as
an essential element in the law of conspiracy has led to
differences of opinion, particularly in Sorrell's case (3).
Proof of malevolent feelings, coupled with proof that the
[embiner had in view no tangible benefit to themselves
would clearly I think be enough to show that the combination
was wrongful. But it does not follow that malevolence is a
necessary element to constitute the tort. Lord Cave in Sorrell's
case (4) stated the law, at least for purposes of that case, in
two propositions. "'(z.) A combination of two or more
'"persons wilfully to injure a man in his trade is unlawful
"and, if it results in damage to him, is actionable. (2.) If
(1) 17 Q. B. 671, 686. (3) [2925] A. C. 700,
(2) [1892] A.C. 25. (4) Ibid. 712,
470
rien Sc;
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co;
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
)
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
'the real purpose of the combination is, not to injure another,
"but to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into
"it, then no wrong is committed and no action will lie although
"damage to another ensues." This double proposition
seems to me to be substantially complete and accurate, though
it is no doubt in need of qualification; for instance, it is
limited to trade and does not in terms refer to mixed objects.
But while it seems to me to emphasize the contrast I have
found throughout the cases, it does not mention malevolence.
I do not think it differs in substance from Lord Dunedin's
view in the same case (1). He states the contrast between
a conspiracy to injure on the one hand and on the other a set
of acts dictated by business interests. When he emphasizes
that a conspiracy to injure involves mens rea, the guilty
intention, he does not necessarily mean that malevolence is
essential. Lord Buckmaster takes the same contrast between
the case where the purpose of the combination is the deliberate
injury of a third person and where it is the promotion of
legitimate trade interests. Lord Sumner, however, seems,
at least in part of his opinion, to regard proof of actual spite,
malevolence or ill will as essential to the cause of action for
conspiracy to injure. He draws a parallel from the law of
defamation (2). '"' Just as defamatory words uttered on a
"privileged occasion cease to be words which the speaker is
"entitled to utter if he is actuated by express malice, so the
"pursuit of one's own interests at a rival's expense which
'pure commercial selfishness would justify, passes the limit
"of legal right and enters the field of actionable wrongdoing,
"if for that purity there is substituted independent malevolence
"towards others." On the other hand he says (3): ''I incline
"to agree that the object or purpose of the aggressive action
"of a combination is the principal thing to be considered,"
though he adds doubts and qualifications principally in
reference to mixed motives.
On this question whether malevolence is a necessary element
in conspiracy to injure there appears to be some opposition
between Lord Sumner and Lord Cave, who not only leaves
out that element in stating his two propositions, but in express
terms says (4) that a motive of spite is not an essential element
of the offence. Lord Atkinson agrees with Lord Cave. Lord
Dunedin does not in terms expressly mention it. He is
(1) [1925] A. C. 700, 730. (3) Ibid. 741.
(2) Ibid. 737, (4) Ibid. 714,
A. 0. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
47t
content to rest upon mens rea, a desire to injure. Lord H.L. (Sc.)
Buckmaster agrees generally with Lord Dunedin though in
one place he says (1), that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove
that the act was spiteful and malicious. I do not read these
opinions as differing on the essential point that where the acts
are per se lawful, the presence or absence of intention to injure
is the determining feature, and that such an intention is
rebutted by a finding that the combiner's real object was to
'advance their interests. On principle I am of opinion that
malevolence is no more essential to the intent to injure, the
mens rea, than it is to the intent to deceive. On practical
grounds also I prefer that view. To leave to a jury to decide
on the basis of an internal mental state, rather than on the
facts from which intent is to be inferred, may be to leave the
issue in the hands of the jury as clay to mould at their will.
After all, the plaintiff has to prove actual damage which can
only result from things done. Mere malevolence does not
damage anyone. I cannot see how the pursuit of a legitimate
practical object can_be vitiated by glee at the adversary's
expected discomfiture. Such glee, however deplorable, cannot
affect the practical result. I may add that a desire to injure
does not necessarily involve malevolence. It may be motivated
by wantonness or some object not justifiable. As to the
authorities, the balance, in my opinion, is in favour of the
view that malevolence as a mental state is not the test. I
accordingly agree with the appellants' contention that they
are not concluded by the finding that the respondents were
not malevolent. It thus becomes necessary to consider the
further arguments on which the appellants base their claim to
succeed. i
I approach the question on the assumption that the appellants
have to prove that they have been damnified by tortious
action. They do not prove that by showing that they have
been harmed by acts done by the respondents in combination,
these acts being apart from any question of combination
otherwise within the respondents' rights. It is not then for
the respondents to justify these acts. The appellants must
establish that they have been damnified by a conspiracy to
injure, that is, that there was a wilful and concerted intention
to injure without just cause, and consequent damage. That
was the view accepted by Lords Dunedin and Buckmaster in
Sorrell's case (1). Lord Sumner proposes the question without
(1) [1925] A. C. 748, (2) Ibid. 700,
1941
CROFTER
Hanpb
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Cos
-
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
472 HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) deciding it. But the form in which he states it seems to me
to suggest the answer. It is not a question of onus of proof.
1941 ; ne
Crosrer it depends on what is the cause of action. The plaintiff has
Hann to prove the wrongfulness of the defendant's object. Of
ae course, malevolence may be evidence tending to exclude a
Twrerp legitimate object or to establish a wrongful object.
I have been attempting to define the legal background of
vertcu. the tort, a conspiracy to injure, before I seek to express my
Lord Wight, OPinion on the appellants' contentions. I have not sought
— to reconcile all that has been said on the question in the
authorities. For various reasons, perhaps obvious enough,
some due to the earlier combination laws, some perhaps
influenced by personal predilections of some judges in the
earlier years of this century, reconciliation of all the
observations is impossible. But after all, law does not depend
on balancing expressions, as R. S. Wright in his work on
Criminal Conspiracy, at p. 51, wisely observed. I have
attempted to state principles so generally accepted as to pass
into the realm of what has been called jurisprudence, at least
in English law, which has for better or worse adopted the test
of self-interest or selfishness as being capable of justifying
the deliberate doing of lawful acts which inflict harm, so long
as the means employed are not wrongful. The common law
in England might have adopted a different criterion and one
more consistent with the standpoint of a man who refuses to
benefit himself at the cost of harming another. But we live
in a competitive or acquisitive society, and the English common
law may have felt that it was beyond its power to fix by any
but the crudest distinctions the metes and bounds which
divide the rightful from the wrongful use of the actor's own
freedom, leaving the precise application in any particular
case to the jury or judge of fact. If further principles of
regulation or control are to be introduced, that is matter for
the legislature. There are not many cases in which the court
has had to consider these problems. Actions of this character
are not of everyday occurrence like actions for negligence. I
must however refer to the details of certain cases.
I shall first refer to Quinn v. Leathem (1), decided by this
House on appeal from Ireland. In outline the facts were very
simple. Leathem, a butcher, had been employing non-union
labour. The policy of the union was that only its members
should be employed. Leathem was willing that his men
(1) [tT90T] A, C..495.
A. 0. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
473
should join the union and offered to pay their fines and entrance H.L. (Sc.)
money. The defendants, the union officials, refused that offer
and said the men could not be admitted to the union but must
walk the streets for twelve months. Leathem refused to dis-
charge the men. A few months later he was warned that if
he continued to employ non-union men, the men who worked
for Munce, one of Leathem's customers, would be called out
unless Munce ceased to take his meat from Leathem. Munce
thought it more prudent to cease to get his meat from Leathem,
who lost the benefit of his customer's trade. This was the
damage claimed in the action in which a conspiracy to injure
was alleged. I disregard the case of the man Dickie who was
called out in breach of his contract with Leathem. Apart
from the savage expressions used by the defendants and
perhaps the desire of the defendants that the men should walk
the streets for twelve months, and the circumstance that
Leathem had offered to satisfy the union's demands, the case
might well have been regarded as one in which ordinary
measures had been taken to promote the union's interests by
excluding non-union labour. In Ware and De Freville, Ld. v.
Motor Trade Association (1), Scrutton L.J. pointed out the
close parallel with Scottish Co-operative Society v. Glasgow
Fleshers' Association (2), a striking case of "' exclusive dealing "'
in trade affairs enforced by threats or warnings by the defend-
ants in concert that they would withhold their custom from
the salesmen if they sold meat to the plaintiff. The object
was to limit competition. The decision in Scottish Co-operative
Society v. Glasgow Fleshers' Association (2) was approved by
this House in Sorrell's case (3) and also by Lord Lindley in
Quinn's case (4). But there was in Quinn's case (4) the special
evidence of vindictive purpose. It was thus a question for
the jury to decide whether there was an intention to injure or
an intention to promote the union's objects, or perhaps more
exactly what was the predominant object. Fitzgibbon L.J.,
who tried the case, put to the jury the question (5): " Did
"the defendants or any two or more of them maliciously
"conspire to induce the plaintiff's customers or servants
'"'named in the evidence or any of them not to deal with the
"plaintiff or not to continue in his employment, and were
'such persons so induced not to doso?" The jury answered,
(1) [1921] 3 K. B. 40, 68. (4) [r901] A. C..495, 539,
(2) (1898) 35 S. L. R. 645. (5) Ibid. 497.
(3) [1925] A. C. 700,
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WOVEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
uv.
VEITCH,
Lord Wright
474
HOUSE OF LORDS (1942)
H. L. (Sc.) yes. The judge told the jury (1) that "acts done with the
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
Vv.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
"object of increasing the profits or raising the wages of any
"combination of persons, such as the society to which the
"defendants belonged .... by reasonable and legitimate
''means, were perfectly lawful, and were not actionable so long
'"'as no wrongful act was maliciously—that is to say, intention-
''ally—done to injure a third party." He put the usual and
correct alternative between acts done to secure or advance
the combiners' own interests and acts intended and calculated
to injure the plaintiff in his trade. He told the jury that
intention was to be inferred from acts and conduct proved.
There is no report of the summing up as a whole. It is useless
to speculate whether the jury might not have properly found
that if the objects or motives were mixed the predominant
motive or object was to advance the union's policy while the
malevolent desire to punish Leathem was subordinate. It
was for the jury to decide; they decided against the
defendants, and there was evidence to support their verdict.
Some may question whether they fully appreciated what
were the actual interests or objects of a trade union. But
this is fact, not law. In the Irish Court of Appeal, where
the case is entitled Leathem v. Craig (2) the judgment which
most appeals to me is that of Holmes L.J., which Lord
Robertson adopted in toto in his speech in this House, and
Lord Macnaghten approved. Holmes L.J. said that if there
was illegality in a combination it must be looked for in the
object proposed. He treated the finding of the jury as
decisive.
It seems to me that much of the discussion which has centred
round Quinn's case (3) merely deals with the issue of fact,
and either approves or disapproves of the justness of the
jury's finding. But the decision of the House is of great
importance as giving the authority of this House to the
principle that a conspiracy to injure gives a cause of action.
That rule was well established and had been applied in
Temperton v. Russell (4), and approved by this House in
Allen v. Flood (5). Quinn's case (3) was in fact the comple-
ment of Allen v. Flood (5). The latter case gave effect to
the rule where there was no combination, the former to the
rule where there was combination. Of the six Lords of Appeal
(t) [1901] A. C. 495, 500. (4) [1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
(2) [1899] 2 I. R. 677. (5) [1898] A, C, 1,
(3) [t901] A. C. 495.
A. 0. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
who took part in the debate in Quinn's case (1) the ratio
decidendi of five was based upon a conspiracy to injure. I
refer to Lord Halsbury (2), Lord Macnaghten (3), Lord
Shand (4), Lord Robertson (5), where he adopts Holmes L.J. ;
Lord Brampton (6). The views of these Lords are enough
to decide what is the ratio decidendi adopted in this House.
Lord Lindley (7) seems to base his judgment on coercion and
threats by numbers, but without clearly defining what he
means by these neutral terms which have since been elucidated
in this House. I do not think it necessary further to consider
the cross currents of observations which are found in some of
the speeches. Lord Shand sums up his view (and, as it appears
to me, the ratio decidendi of the House) very clearly and
accurately (8): 'Their [the defendants'] acts were wrongful
"and malicious in the sense found by the jury, that is to say,
"they acted by conspiracy, not for any purpose of advancing
"their own interests as workmen, but for the sole purpose of
"injuring the plaintiff in his trade."' So understood, Quinn's
case (9) does not help the appellants here unless they can get
rid of the findings of the courts below. Before I examine the
grounds on which they seek to do this I ought to refer to some
other cases.
One is Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union (10)
where the jury found that the defendants' acts in preventing
the plaintiffs from getting employment were done in the
case of the one to prevent him from getting or retaining
employment, and in the case of the other to compel him to
pay arrears of defalcations of which he was guilty. The facts
were somewhat complicated. As Lord Herschell pointed out
in Allen v. Flood (11), the use of the word "' punishment "' may
be misleading ; it may mean mere vindictive vengeance or it
may mean an intention to deter others from similarly offending.
Equally the desire to enforce repayment of defalcations may be
actuated by either of the same motives, to say nothing of
desire to get the money. It is clear that the jury took the
view more adverse to the defendants. Much that was said
by the lords justices in the case would require careful con-
sideration in view of earlier and later decisions of this House.
(1) [tg01] A. C. 495. (7) Ibid. 495, 539.
(2) Ibid. 495, 505. (8) Ibid. 515.
(3) Ibid. 511. (9) Ibid. 495.
(4) Ibid. 513. (10) [1903] 2 K. B. 600.
(5) Ibid. 532. (11) [1898] A.C. 1, 131,
)
(6) [1901] A. C. 527, 258,
475
H. L. (Se.)
1941
CROFTER
HaNnpD
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
476
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS (1942)
Romer L.J., however, wisely observes (1) that in determining
whether the injurious action is "' justified"" regard must be
had to the circumstances of each case as it arises and that it is
not practically feasible to give an exhaustive definition of
the word to cover all cases. The facts in Giblan's case (2)
were so peculiar that I cannot derive any general guidance
from it. I may note in particular that the jury found that
the trouble did not arise because the union men objected to
work with the plaintiffs. I cannot find any analogy between
the facts in that case and the facts as found in the present
case.
On the other hand, two later cases show how far the courts
have gone in upholding the rights of persons to freedom to
pursue their own interests in their trade even at the cost of
seriously impeding the freedom in a practical sense of other
persons in their trade. Perhaps the most striking case of
this nature is Ware and De Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade
Association (3), approved by this House in Sorrell's case (4)
and later applied in Thorne v. Motor Trade Association (5).
The defendants were an association of motor car manu-
facturers who adopted a scheme and rules for maintaining
fixed prices for their goods. These prices were published.
If any person departed from these published prices his name
was put on a "stop list' and thereupon no member of the
association was to supply him. Further, if any person did
supply him, that person's name would also be placed on the
"stop list'? and he would be similarly pilloried. Persons on
the "stop list '' were, however, allowed to purge their offence
by paying a fine if the association accepted it. The plaintiff,
a motor dealer who was not a member of the association,
had been placed on the "stop list' in accordance with the
scheme. The scheme was a most ruthless and efficient system
aimed at securing the mutual benefit of the associated traders
at whatever loss or inconvenience to outsiders. The plaintiff
complained that all he wanted was to exercise his lawful
freedom to buy and sell cars as he desired. It was contended
that the system adopted by the defendants went beyond
any previous decision. The defendants, it was submitted,
were saying, "' If you continue to deal with the plaintiff you
"shall not only cease to deal with us but we shall take steps
(1) [1903] 2 K. B. 600, 618. (4) [1925] A. C. 700.
(2) Ibid. 600. (5) [1937].A. C. 797.
(3) [1921] 3 K, B. 40,
A. ¢. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
477
"to prevent others from dealing with you." But the Court H. L. Gc.)
of Appeal held that no legal wrong was committed, because
the defendants had done nothing unlawful, and the combination
was not a wrongful conspiracy because its object was not to
injure, but was the lawful object of promoting their business
interests, as they understood them, by preventing price
cutting and securing price maintenance. The elaborate
system was devised solely with that object. The Court of
Appeal rejected the contention that the method adopted
amounted to coercion or threats. On this latter topic much
the same opinion was expressed by this House in Sorrell v.
Smith (1), already referred to by me. Apart from the general
exposition of the law of civil conspiracy to injure which it
contains it is important in dealing with the present appellants'
submissions because it placed on a wide basis the business|
interests, protection or advancement of which would preventt
it being held that the defendants' had acted with intention tol
injure the plaintiff. The defendants, an association of news-|
paper proprietors, in the course of a dispute between two}
rival associations of newspaper dealers, had intervened to}
support the policy of one association by stopping supplies|
to the plaintiff, a retail dealer who had adhered to the side!
of the other. Russell J., as he then was, the trial judge,t
held that the defendants had no justification for interfering;
with the plaintiffs' freedom of trade, because they had no
direct interest in the conflict between the two associations.
In Lord Sumner's words (2) the judge's view was "that the
"defendants were well meaning busybodies, who intimidated
"third parties and so meddled with the plaintiff's business
"in a matter which was no business of theirs'' because, as
he held; they wanted a controlling decision in the dispute.
The Court of Appeal and this House reversed the decision of
the judge on the short ground that the real purpose of the
newspaper proprietors was to promote the circulation of their
papers, and that they did so by lawful means.
I think this line of reasoning applies here to answer the
appellants' contention that the respondents or the union
had no direct interest in the importation of yarn. On the
facts found, rightly as I think, they were of opinion that the
prosperity of the industry in Harris tweed was jeopardized
by the importation. It is not for the court to decide whether
this opinion was reasonable or not. It was a genuine opinion.
(1) [1925] A. C. 700. (2) Ibid. 731.
1941
CROFTER
HAnp
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
478
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) It cannot be said that it was a mere sham intended to cloak
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
Uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
a sinister desire to injure the importers. The respondents
had no quarrel with the yarn importers. Their sole object,
the courts below have held, was to promote their union's
interests by promoting the interest of the industry on which
the men's wages depended. On these findings, with which I
agree, it could not be said that their combination was without
sufficient justification. Nor would this conclusion be vitiated,
even though their motives may have been mixed, so Idéng as
the real or predominant object, if they had more than one
object, was not wrongful. Nor is the objection tenable that
the respondents' real or predominant object was to secure the
employers' help to get 100 per cent. membership of the union
among the textile workers. Cases of mixed motives or, as
I should prefer to say, of the presence of more than one object,
are not uncommon. If so, it is for the jury or judge of fact
to decide which is the predominant object, as it may be
assumed the jury did in Quinun's case (xr), when they decided
on the basis that the object of the combiners was vindictive
punishment, not their own practical advantage. A curious
instance of mixed motives or objects is taken by Andrews J.,
in his interesting judgment in the Divisional Court in Leathem
v. Craig (2), from Kearney v. Lloyd (3), where the defendants
were parishioners who had combined to withhold their
subscriptions from the incumbent, partly, as the jury found,
with the intention of promoting the religious interests of the
parish, and partly with the intention of obliging the incumbent
to resign. Andrews J. expressed the view that the former
was the main and ultimate object. The case, however, was
eventually decided on other grounds.
I may here note that the doctrine of civil conspiracy to
injure extends beyond trade competition and labour disputes.
Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of the British Medical
Association (4) shows that it may extend to the affairs of a
profession, as was expressly stated in that case in the judgment
of the Privy Council. By way of contrast, Gregory v. Duke of
Brunswick (5), may be regarded as a striking illustration of
what might be held to constitute a conspiracy to injure ;
what was alleged was a conspiracy to hiss an actor off the
stage in order to ruin him. To what legitimate interests
(1) [1901] A. C. 495. (4) [1924] A. C. 764, 771.
(2) [1899] 2 I. R. 667, 674. (5) (1844) 6 M. & G. 953.
(3)) 20°C me Ina2638:
A. 0. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
479
other than those mentioned the general doctrine may extend 4. L. (Sc.)
I do not here seek to define, since beyond question it extends
to the present case, whether the object of the action were
the prosperity of the industry or the obtaining 100 per cent.
membership. But the objects or purposes for which com-
binations may be formed are clearly of great variety. It
must be left to the future to decide on the facts of the particular
case, subject to the general doctrine, whether any combination
is such as to give rise to a claim for a conspiracy to injure.
But the object of securing 100 per cent. union membership,
if it were operative in inducing the respondents to combine
with the employers, was relied on by the appellants on other
grounds as vitiating the combination. It was objected that
there could be no combination between the employers and the
union because their respective interests were necessarily
opposed. I think that is a fallacious contention. It is true
that employers and workmen are often at variance because
the special interest of each side conflicts in a material respect
as, for instance, in questions of wages, conditions of hours of
work, exclusion of non-union labour. But apart from these
differences in interest, both employers and workmen have a
common interest in the prosperity of their industry, though
the interest of one side may be in profits and of the other in
wages. Hence a wider and truer view is that there is a
community of interest. That view was acted upon in the
present case in regard to the essential matter of yarn importa-
tion. As to the separate matter of the union membership,
while that was something regarded as important by the
respondents it was probably regarded by the employers as a
matter of indifference to them. It was, in any case, a side
issue in the combination even from the respondents' point
of view. I may add that I do not accept, as a general pro-
position, that there must be a complete identity of interest
between parties to a combination. There must, however,
be sufficient identity of object, though the advantage to be
derived from that same object may not be the same.
The appellants have further contended that the " deal"
referred to in the respondent Veitch's letter was a bargain by
which the union sold to the employers the dockers' aid in
return for the employers' aid in regard to union membership.
In other words, the contention was that the respondents or
the union were bribed and were mercenaries, not interested
in the embargo except for the reward which was in its nature
—
1941
CROFTER
HAnpD
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Go:
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
480
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) unrelated to the embargo. The facts, however, were not as
1941
CROFTER
HAND
WoveEN
HarRRIS
'TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Wright.
the contention assumes, so that I need not discuss whether a
party to a combination whose interest was merely separate
and mercenary, could ever be held to have a legitimate interest
or justification for harm done in pursuance of the combination.
I need add merely a few words on the objection that the
embargo was the act of the dockers for the benefit, not of
themselves, but of the textile workers. It is enough to say
that both sections were members of the union, and there was
in my opinion a sufficient community of interest even if the
matter is regarded from the standpoint of the men, as
individuals, and not from the standpoint of the respondents,
who were the only parties sued. Their interest, however,
was to promote the advantage of the union as a whole.
In my opinion, the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
Lorp Porter. My Lords, the circumstances relevant to
be considered in this case extend over a considerable period
and the conclusions to be drawn from them demand a close
scrutiny of the evidence. I need not state the facts; but I
must set out the inferences which have been drawn from them
and consider whether those arrived at by the courts below
and particularly by the Lord Ordinary, have been shown to
be wrong. Apart, however, from the facts, the arguments
have ranged over a wide area of somewhat obscure law as to
which so far as it is necessary your Lordships must find a
solution. In a matter so difficult, however, I should not feel
justified in expressing a concluded opinion upon any matter
which is not essential for the determination of the case. I
propose therefore to state with what accuracy I can the exact
findings upon which I think a conclusion of law has to be
pronounced.
It is unnecessary to emphasize the principle so often
recognized by your Lordships, that in all cases where facts
have to be reviewed, it is undesirable that the findings of the
courts below should be disturbed by a Court of Appeal unless
it appears that those findings are clearly wrong, and more
especially that it is undesirable to do so where the conclusions
reached must to a large extent depend upon the demeanour
of the witnesses and the impression formed by a tribunal which
has seen them and can judge of their honesty and accuracy.
In the present case the court had to determine the purpose,
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
48
motive, intention, call it what you will, of Mr. Veitch and H.L. Gc.)
Mr. Mackenzie. I cannot find that the Lord Ordinary, or
indeed the Inner House, thought either of them untruthful
or dishonest. It would have been possible to judge them to
be men who clearly foresaw the injury which their acts would
produce and to have intended that injury, or to have thought
them muddle-headed, obstinate and prejudiced, but. still
honestly desirous of doing what they considered beneficial to
their trade union and anxious only to promote its interests,
even though their acts might be prejudicial to some or all of
the employers of the labour which they represented. Both
courts took the latter view. One cannot be too logical in
these matters or expect a defender to have an exact appre-
hension of the consequences of his acts or clearly to appreciate
how the methods he adopts for effecting the end at which he
aims, will work. His action may inevitably cause injury,
yet that may not be his object. The case which is under
consideration seems to me to be pre-eminently one in which
an appellate tribunal should be guided by the opinion of the
judge who saw and heard the witnesses and I do not find
myself qualified to criticize or correct his conclusions as to
the purpose which the defenders had in mind in following the
path along which they travelled.
I showld allow myself more latitude in dealing with the
question whether there was a combination between the mill-
owners or some of them and the two defenders sued, because
the material for judgment is, I think, more abundant and
because the Inner House has taken a view contrary, it is true,
to that of the Lord Ordinary, but still one which must be shown
to your Lordships to be wrong before it is interfered with.
Having these considerations in mind, I find myself unable to
differ from the Lord Ordinary when he concludes'that there
was no conspiracy to injure, and if for my own part I had to
decide the further question whether a combination between
millowners and defenders had been proved, I should not feel
justified in forming an opinion contrary to his, but, in agreement
with the opinion already expressed by the Lord Chancellor,
should not consider this combination established. I am the
more emboldened to express this view as I think it has the
support in the Inner House of the Lord Justice Clerk and that
Lord Wark, if he had himself had to determine it, would have
been of the same opinion, though undoubtedly Lord Fleming
and Lord Mackay take the other view. But the Lord Justice
A. C. 1942. 3 AL,
1941
CROFTER
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TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
482
H. L. (Se)
1941
—
CROFTER
HAanpD
WoveEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
Clerk thought there was some kind of understanding more or
less defined between Mr. Veitch and Mr. Skinner to the effect
that if the union took action and imposed an embargo against
the importers of yarn, the union in turn would be assisted by
the millowners to get their 100 per cent. membership, and I
understand some of your Lordships to agree that the wider
combination has been established. I am therefore prepared
to treat the case upon that footing.
If the meaning of a combination to injure were plain and
if a finding that it had not been proved were enough, the
view that there had been no combination to injure would
be conclusive of the case. But as both the meaning of the
phrase and the question whether a mere absence of intention
to injure is all that is required to absolve the defenders from
liability, are both in dispute, it is first of all necessary to state
exactly what I believe the finding of the Lord Ordinary to
have been. It is, I think, set out succinctly in the following
paragraph (1): "In the present case the immediate purpose
"of Mr. Veitch and Mr. Mackenzie was to force producers to
"come to an agreement regarding the selling price of tweed
"and the exclusive use of island spun yarn. The means
"adopted necessarily inflicted injury on the petitioners. But
"was the infliction of injury Mr. Veitch's motive? Lord
"Dunedin in Sorrell v. Smith (2) suggested a test as follows.
"* Was such a purpose the real root of the acts that grew from
""it, or was the true motive of the acts something else, such
""as for instance, the furtherance of the defendant's own
"" business ?" Applying this test the answer must be in the
"negative. There is no evidence that Mr. Veitch had evinced
"any malice or ill will towards any of the petitioners or that
"he was prompted by a desire to destroy the trade of any
"persons who were employing weavers and paying them the
"union rate of wages. The purpose at the root of his action
"was to advance the position of the union and its members,
"however mistaken he may have been in the means he adopted
"to secure that end. It may be that the benefits hoped to
"be obtained would have been an ultimate and not an
"immediate consequence of the action taken, but I do not
"think it would have been any more remote than in the cases
"of Sorrell v. Smith (3) and Ware and De Freville, Ld. v. Motor
"Trade Association (4). There is ample evidence for this
(1) 1940 S. C. 141, 146, 147. (3) [r925] A. C. 700.
(2) [1925] A. C. 700, 717. (4) [1921] 3 K. B. 40.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
483
finding and although Mr. Veitch's testimony was at times H. L. (Sc.)
confused and inconsistent, its effect was a matter for the
learned judge. I find no attack upon the substantial honesty
of this witness either by him or by the Inner House though
the lack of consideration shown is severely criticized by both.
The views of the Inner House are not dissimilar. I may
quote from the Lord Justice-Clerk and from Lord Fleming.
The former says: "Moreover, there are a number of circum-
"stances that point to Mr. Veitch having acted in good faith.
"He was a trusted and responsible official. He had no quarrel
"with any of the petitioners ; there is nothing to suggest that
"he had ill will towards anyone. I regard the suggestion that
"he was out to ruin the importers as entirely ill-founded.
"His letter to Mr. Mackenzie of January 28 shows that he
"was prepared to meet them and discuss the position. There
"is not the slightest trace of personal ill will or spite ; I doubt
"aif he knew any of them personally. The attainment of
"Too per cent. trade union membership was the declared
"policy of his trade union. From 1935 onwards the officials
"of the union had made it clear that they regarded price-
"cutting as something that would be hurtful to the interests
"of the workers in the industry, and that they would not
"hesitate to take direct action to prevent it. I attach the
"greatest weight to the fact that Mr. Veitch instructed an
"embargo against Mr. Macdonald, the largest, or one of the
"largest millowners in the island—there is no suggestion that
"this was a conspiracy to injure—as showing that he genuinely
"believed that price-cutting would be gravely prejudicial to
"the interests of his men. Also it had been represented to
"Mr. Veitch by Mr. Skinner, particularly in his letter of
"January 6, that the continued importation of yarn was
"responsible for the reluctance of many yarn purchasers to
"bind themselves to a price agreement and that the price of
"yarn as affected by the importation would 'seriously affect '
"their ability to maintain existing wage rates. There is no
"suggestion that the dockers were coerced or intimidated
"into taking action. They were consulted and were unanimous
"in their decision—presumably 'because they were satisfied
"where their true interests lay. Taking all these facts
'together, I find it impossible to draw the conclusion that
"Mr. Veitch was acting with an intent to injure. On the
"contrary, I am satisfied, and I hold in fact, that he was
"acting in the honest belief that the step was justified in
3 2L2
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WOVEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
484.
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WovEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
Uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942
"furtherance of the interests of his own members and the
"industry as a whole." (x). Lord Fleming's words are:
"Then there is the circumstance that both the parties had
"the same interest in the matter. To exclude mainland yarn
'would give the island millers a monopoly of the supply of yarn,
"and Mr. Veitch's view was that the prohibition of mainland
'"'yarn would be to the benefit of the workers in the industry."
And again: "I feel satisfied that Mr. Veitch held sincerely
"and strongly the view that the continuance of unrestricted
"importation of mainland yarn would, sooner or later, prove
'harmful to the members of the union, and that in the absence
"of an agreement between the millowners and the importers,
"the best policy for the union to adopt was to exclude it from
"the island if it could. Mr. Macrae, who knew the whole
"history of the industry, and was interested in it because it
"involved the welfare of many members of his congregation,
"also held this view, and I do not think it can be said to be
"an unreasonable view. At all events it cannot be said that
"it was so unreasonable as to justify an inference that there
"was some other ulterior reason for Mr. Veitch's decision.
"What lay at the root of the opposition to the importation
"of mainland yarn on the part of Mr. Veitch and Mr. Macrae
"seems to have been the idea that the whole process of making
"wool into Harris tweed should be retained as far as possible
"as an island monopoly for the benefit of the workers on the
"island. The exclusion of mainland yarn would not only
"give the island a monopoly of the whole process of manufac-
"ture, but would also tend to make the practice of price-
"cutting more difficult. All tweed manufactured on the
"island would qualify for the 'stamp,' and would not have
"to face competition from Harris tweed woven in the island,
"but from yarn not spun on the island. If, as I think, Mr.
"Veitch sincerely held views of that kind, I find it difficult
"to attribute his actings to anything else than a bona fide
"desire to advance the interests of the members of his union."
Lord Wark's reasoning does not differ from that of his brethren.
His conclusion is expressed as follows (1): ''Taking the
"respondents in turn, I begin with Mr. Mackenzie. I cannot
"find anything in the evidence to show, or even to suggest,
"that he was inspired by any motive other than the desire
"to forward what he bona fide believed to be the interests
"of the members of his union. The same is true of Mr. Veitch.
(1) 1940 S. C. 141, 156. Ibid. 172.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
485
"There is no evidence that I can find of any ill-will against H. L. (Sc.)
"any of the petitioners. It does not appear that he had
"ever met any of them. His sole concern with them, in my
"view, was to prevent them acting in such a way as would,
"in his honest opinion and belief, injure the interests of the
"members of the union: and, in my judgment, his only
"motive in acting as he did was to advance these interests,
"or at least to prevent injury to them. I cannot doubt,
"upon the evidence, that Mr. Veitch honestly believed that
"a continuance of the importation of mainland yarn would
"bring down tweed prices and, with them, the wages of the
"spinners and weavers.' As I am discussing the case on the
footing that there was a combination to which Mr. Skinner
at least and possibly also some of the millowners were parties,
I omit to stress the still stronger view expressed by Lord
Fleming as to Mr. Mackenzie's activities (1): ''The latter,"
he says, "'was throughout a mere servant, his function being
"in the main limited to carrying out Mr. Veitch's instructions
"and doing routine work. The grounds for holding him guilty
"of any intention to injure are much weaker than in Mr.
"Veitch's case."
I have quoted somewhat fully from the opinions expressed
because having regard to the arguments addressed to your
Lordships I think it necessary to ascertain exactly what
purpose the courts below imputed to those who have been
held to have combined. Both I think found that the
stoppage of the importation of mainland yarn was effected
because Veitch and Mackenzie at any rate thought it in the
interest of their workers to do so. Both also, I think, believed
each of the defenders to hope that the manufacturers, mill-
owners and non-millowners, would come to an agreement
amongst themselves, and when that hope failed, put the
strongest pressure they could upon the dissentient employers
by refusing to handle their material, whether in the shape of
yarn or the finished or unfinished product. The immediate
purpose of the combination in this view was to prevent the
importation of mainland yarn and to bring about an agreement
amongst the employers to use only that spun upon the island,
the motive of the defenders being thereby to prevent the
danger of competition which they feared might cause a
diminution of wages and to bring about a state of affairs in
which a 100 per cent. membership of the union would be
(1) 1940 S. C. 141, 161,
1941
—
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Lord Porter,
486
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WovEN
Harris
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942}]
attained in the ranks of the spinners and of the weavers—the
motive of the millowners to increase their profits and perhaps
to eliminate competition in spinning.
No doubt the result of the embargo was necessarily to injure
those against whom it was exercised, but that was not found
to be its purpose. Its object as found by the Lord Ordinary
was to further the defenders' own legitimate business, and if
that was their intention I should not consider them participants
in an actionable conspiracy even though the inevitable result
of the action which they took would be to ruin the importers
of mainland yarn. This is the view of Holmes J. in Vegelahn
v. Guntiner (1) when he says: " The fact that the immediate
"object of the act by which the benefit to themselves is to be
"gained is to injure their antagonists does not necessarily
"make it unlawful, any more then when a great house lowers
"the price of certain goods for the purpose, and with the effect,
"of driving a smaller antagonist from the business."" These
observations are no less weighty though delivered in a dis-
sentient judgment. They were approved by Lord Cave in
Sorrell v. Smith (2), and by Scrutton L.J. in Ware and De
Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade Association (3). They are also in
conformity with the principles expressed in Mogul Steamship
Co. v. Macgregor, Gow & Co. (4), which preceded it and are
supported by the view of the majority of your Lordships'
House in Allen v. Flood (5), which was decided two years later.
In the last named case Lord Herschell speaking of the Mogul
case (4), said (6): "In that case the very object of the
"defendants was to induce shippers to contract with them
"and not to contract with the plaintiffs, and thus to benefit
"themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs, and to injure
"them by preventing them from getting a share of the carrying
"trade. Its express object was to molest and interfere with
"the plaintiffs in the exercise of their trade. It was said
"that this was held lawful because the law sanctions acts
"that are done in furtherance of trade competition. I do
"not think the decision rests on so narrow a basis, but rather
"on this, that the acts by which the competition was pursued
"were all lawful acts."" The general proposition has been
summed up by Scrutton L.J. in Ware and De Freville, Ld. v.
Motor Trade Association (3) as follows: "I take Allen v.
(1) (1896) 167 Mass 92. (4) [1892] A. C, 25.
(2\airo92'5 NAL C¥700,"7 ia" (5) [7898] A. C. x.
(3) [1921] 3 K. B. qo, 67. (6) Ibid. 140.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
487
"Flood (1) and Bradford Corporation v. Pickles (2) to decide H. L. (Sc.)
"that an act otherwise lawful, though harmful, does not become
"actionable by being done maliciously in the sense of with a
"bad motive or with intent to injure another... . I take
"the Mogul case (3) as deciding that a combination to do
"acts, the natural consequence of which was to injure another
"in bis business, was not actionable if those acts were not
"otherwise unlawful, such as assaults or threats of assaults,
"and were done in furtherance of the trade interests of those
"combining. I understand Quinn v. Leathem (4) to decide
"that a combination to injure another in his trade and
"business, not in furtherance of the trade interests of those
"combining but out of spite against the person injured is
"actionable.'"' This is a summing up of the principles to be
deduced from the so-called trilogy of cases upon conspiracy,
and I think it is a correct one. It has since received support
from the reasoning upon which your Lordships' House decided
Sorrell v. Smith (5).
If this be their result Mogul Steamship Co. v. Macgregor,
Gow & Co. (3) and Allen v. Flood (1) are consistent and easily
comprehensible. More difficulty is to be found in explaining
Quinn v. Leathem (4). Why should a combination to injure
be actionable, whilst action taken by a single person for that
purpose_and that purpose only is permissible ?
In Sorrell v. Smith (5) Lord Cave L.C. thought the point
an open one and Lord Sumner considered it at least not free
from doubt, but the view that a combination to do acts
injurious to others is actionable, whereas the act of a single
individual is not, is, I think, supported by the greater weight
of authority. Lords Field and Hannen in the Mogul case (3),
are of this opinion, and in Allen v. Flood (1) Lords Watson (6),
Herschell (7), Macnaghten (8), Lord Shand (9), Lord Davey (ro),
who with Lord James constituted the majority of the House—
all indicated that a conspiracy to injure might give a good
cause of action, where similar action on the part of an individual
would not. Scrutton L.J. in Ware and De Freville, Ld. v.
Motor Trade Association (11) finds difficulty in accounting
for the difference. One not uncommon explanation is that a
(1) [1898] A. C. 1. (7) Ibid. 129.
(2) [1895] A. C. 587. (8) Ibid. 153.
(8) [ese] UN Co Ae (9) Ibid. 168.
(4) [1901] A. C. 495. (ro) lbidr72"
(5) [1925] A. C. 700. (xx) [1921] 3 K. B. 40.
(6) [1898] A.C. 1, 108,
1941
——
CROFTER
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WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
488
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) combination may exert undue pressure where one person will
I194I
CROFTER
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HarrRIs
TWEED
Co.
a
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
not, but it is not very satisfactory. In the first place it is not
necessarily true and, in the second, to exert pressure is not
unlawful. But there is an earlier question. Whether there
be combination or not, it may be a criminal offence and an
actionable wrong to induce another to do what is unlawful
or to do what is lawful by unlawful means. The phraseology
is first to be found in Rex v. Jones (1) and has again and again
been repeated both in criminal and civil cases though in the
former it may be a limitation and not a definition. In
criminal cases Fitzgerald J. puts the principle in Reg. v.
Parnell (2) in the following words : '' Conspiracy has been aptly
'described as divisible under three heads : (1.) Where the end to
"be obtained is in itself a crime ; (2.) Where the object is lawful
"but the means to be resorted to are unlawful ; (3.) and where
"the object is to do an injury to a third party or to a class,
"though if the wrong were effected by a single individual it
"would be a wrong but not a crime."
And in Mogul Steamship Co. v. Macgregor, Gow & Co. (3),
Lord Watson says: "' I apprehend that in order to substantiate
"their claim, the appellants must shew, either that the object
"of the agreement was unlawful, or that illegal methods were
"resorted to in its prosecution." In Fitzgerald J.'s definition
even the third heading postulates the existence of a civil
wrong, and in recent times I do not think that it has been
held criminal merely to combine to injure a third party
provided no unlawful means are used or contemplated and it is
doubtful whether such a combination ever was criminal: see ©
Wright on Criminal Conspiracy (1873), p. 41. It is true that
in certain classes of case, e.g., where masters and workmen
or trade are concerned, it was at one time held criminal to
agree not to sell under fixed prices or not to work under
certain prices (see Rex v. Eccles (4) ), but the doctrine is not
one to which, apart from statutory prohibition, any court
to-day is likely to subscribe.
There may, however, be combinations which are criminal,
though entered into for purposes which would not be criminal
if done by an individual, but whether this be so or not it is now
established that a conspiracy, the object of which is to injure a
third person, is an actionable wrong. Quinn v. Leathem (5),
(1) (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 345. (4) (1783) 1 Leach 274.
(2) (1881) 14 Cox C. C. 508, 513. (5) [z90r] A. C. 495.
(3) [1892] A. C. 25, 41.
A.C. 'AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
489
and Sorrell v. Smith (1) in your Lordships' House are sufficient H.-L. (Sc.)
authority for this proposition. Why it has been so held is
not, I think, clear. That such a combination may be action-
able had, as I have indicated, already been recognized by
at least five of the members of your Lordships' House who were
amongst the majority in Allen v. Flood (2) and has again
been recognized in Sorrell v. Smith (1). The point is now too
well established to be the subject of controversy. In Lord
Dunedin's view as expressed in the last mentioned case a
conspiracy to injure is a criminal offence and therefore either
the object aimed at or the means used (the noble Lord uses
both expressions) were illegal. It may be so or it may be, as
Lord Sumner suggests, that a combination to injure is a form
of intimidation or again it may be that the doctrine is a
survival of the view formerly held as to the illegality of
combinations to raise wages or interfere with trade or of the
more paternal view expressed on a different matter by Lord
Mansfield in Jones v. Randall (3): '' Whatever is contra bonos
"mores est [sic] decorum, the principles of our law prohibit,
"and the King's Court, as the general censor and guardian of
"the public manners, is bound to restrain and punish." In
any case it is undoubted law.
Whether it is, necessary that the object of the defenders
should be solely to gain an advantage for themselves or whether
their motives may be mixed provided the main or substantial
motive is their own gain is not so clear. Lord Dunedin in
Sorrell v. Smith (1) apparently thought it enough that the
dominating motive should be to benefit oneself. On the
other hand in Mogul Steamship Co. v. Macgregor, Gow & Co. (4),
Lord Hannen raises the question what would happen if the
evidence had shown that the object of the defendants was
a malicious one, namely to injure the plaintiffs, whether the
defendants should be benefited or not, but since in that case
as in this their sole motive was to secure certain advantages
for themselves, leaves the question unanswered. Lord Watson,
in the latter case, says (5): "' If the respondents' combination
"had been formed not with a single view to the extension
"of their business and the increase of its profits but with
"the main or ulterior design of effecting an unlawful object a
"very different question would have arisen." Lord Parker
(1) [1925] A. C. 700. (4) [1892] A.C. 25, 59.
(2) [1898] A. C. 1. (5) [1892] A. C. 42.
(3) (1774) Lofft. 383, 385.
IQ41
CROFTER
Hanp
WoveEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Gos
Us |
VEITCH,
Lord Porter.
490
HeL.-(Sc3)
1941
CROFTER
Hanpb
WOVEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Austraha v.
Adelaide Steamship Co., Ld. (1) speaks of " the right of com-
''bining with others in a common course of action, provided
'such common course of action is undertaken with a single
"view to the interests of the combining parties and not with
'"'a view to injure others''; and in Sorrell v. Smith (2) Lord
Sumner expresses himself as not prepared to admit that the
addition of personal animosity to a desire to benefit oneself
makes actionable that which without the animosity would not
be so, but confesses himself unable to say at what point the
intention to injure overweighs the scale so as to render the
confederates liable for the damage which they do in spite of
the private advantage which they hope to obtain.
The answer may be that given by Lord Dunedin in Sorrell v.
Smith (2), namely, that one must judge broadly as a jury
would judge, and so determine the predominant purpose.
After all, the task is no more difficult than that which faces
them in every criminal case—to determine whether there is
mens rea or not. Nevertheless if I thought that in the present
case the object of the parties to the combination was to ruin
the appellants, even though they hoped thereby each to gain an
advantage for himself, I should desire to consider the matter
further before deciding that the respondents were not liable,
but I do not think that such a case has been proved. The
Lord Ordinary and Inner House have not so found. The
direct object was to force an agreement and to stop the
importation of mainland yarn, both of which were, as found
by the courts below, honestly believed to be of direct benefit
to the defenders' trade union. No question of indirect
purpose comes in issue. The result of the action taken might
be to ruin the importers of mainland yarn, and it might be
recognized that this was a possible or even probable outcome,
but that was not the purpose of those who combined. Each
desired only to further his own interests.
If this view of the facts prevails, and it is recognized, as I
think it must be since the decision in the Mogul case (3),
that men are entitled to pursue their own advantage even
though the natural and inevitable result be the ruin of others,
the pursuers' case is at an end, but in deference to the forcible
arguments addressed to us on behalf of the appellants and in
view of the difficulties of the subject, I must add some further
(1) [1913] A. C. 781, 797. (3) [1892] A. C. 25.
(2) [1925] A. C. 700, 729, 742.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
491
observations and qualifications to the views which I have H. L. (Sc.)
expressed.
One of the difficulties in the law of actionable combination
is to decide what purposes are to be looked at in determining
whether the combination is illegal or not. This problem is
perhaps touched upon by Lord Cave in Sorrell v. Smith (1)
when. he speaks of the purpose of a threat being to forward
trade interests and not wilfully and ultroneously to injure the
trade of another, by which I think he means not wilfully to
injure the trade of another save for the purpose of forwarding
one's own. In other words, is it enough that the substantial
object of the defenders was not to injure the pursuer, or must
they go further and must it be established in some way, either
by positive evidence on behalf of the defenders or lack of
evidence on behalf of the pursuer, that they were following
some interest of their own? In Sorrell v. Smith (1) Lord
Sumner left the question open, though he suggests that the
defenders must not be intermeddling busybodies. Lord
Dunedin took the view that it was enough if they did not set
out to injure the pursuer and regarded evidence that their
own advantage was involved merely as tending to prove
that their object was not to injure. Lord Cave did not in
terms deal with the question, but the framework of his first
proposition, which I quote below, suggests that the defenders
must have their own end to gain. It is, I think, true to say
that in all the cases which have dealt with this subject the
contrast is drawn between a desire to injure on the one hand
and the pursuit of the defenders' interests on the other.
Nowhere except in Lord Dunedin's speech in Sorrell v. Smith (1)
is the mere fact that the defendant's object was not found
to be a desire to injure held to exonerate them from liability.
It is, I think, always added that their purpose was to gain an
advantage for themselves. Lord Sumner indeed asks (2), what
other motive can there be in such a matter beyond selfishness
and malice except, indeed, mere irresponsible wantonness.
So far, however, no case has decided, and it has not been
necessary to decide, whether confederates who have combined
not for the purpose of doing an injury but with no object of
their own to gain are or are not liable to those against whom
they have combined.
The present case, like those which preceded it, does not
require a solution of this problem. Throughout the defenders
(1) [1925] A. C. 700, 714. (2) Ibid. 739.
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
492
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
HanpD
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co:
Vv.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
_ HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
acted in what they believed to be the interest of their trade
union. But assuming that the defenders would only be
justified in pressing their own selfish aims, is every personal
advantage which accrues to them by reason of their action a
sufficient excuse or is something more intimately and directly
connected with their business interests required—something
which will help their trade or improve the position of their
trade union? Must it be something, as Scrutton L.J. says in
Ware and De Freville, Ld. v. Motor Trade Association (1),
"intended to secure the interests of the confederates in their
"trade by reasonable and legitimate means ''—by which I
understand him to mean by lawful means ?
That business in this connection is not confined to trade has
been insisted upon in Allen v. Flood (2), and in Bradford
Corporation v. Pickles (3) the principle was said not to be
confined to rights of property but to be equally applicable to
the exercise by an individual of his other rights.
The quotation most frequently made in this connection is
the well-known passage in the speech of Lord Cave L.C. in
Sorrell v. Smith (4). '' I deduce as material for the decision
"of the present case two propositions of law, which may be
"stated as follows :—(1.) A combination of two or more persons
"wilfully to injure a man in his trade is unlawful and, if it
"results in damage to him, is actionable. (2.) If the real
"purpose of the combination is, not to injure another, but
"to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it,
"then no wrong is committed and no action will lie, although
"damage to another ensues. The distinction between the
"two classes of case is sometimes expressed by saying that in
"cases of the former class there is not, while in cases of the
"latter class there is, just cause or excuse for the action
"taken."
This statement of principle is, I think, apt to be used as if
it resolved the many difficulties in a difficult department of
the law. Too often it is forgotten that the Lord Chancellor
himself introduced it by saying that he deduces as material
for the decision of the present case two propositions of law—the
italics are mine. In that case the combination was not to
injure but to forward or defend the trade of those who had
entered into the combination, as in this it was to increase the
membership of the trade union and protect the wages of its
(zt) [t921] 3 K. B. 40, 71, (3) [1895] A. C. 587.
(2) [1898] A. C, 1, (4) [1925] A. C. 700, 712,
A.C. | AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
493
members, and Lord Cave's statement does not seek to H.L. (Sc.)
comprehend all circumstances.
Cases in which the action of the confederates is to compel
the plaintiff to pay a debt as in Giblan v. National Amalgamated
Labourers' Union (1) have been held not to be within the
principles, perhaps on the grounds stated by Romer L.J. (2),
that the intent was to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining or
retaining employment in order to compel him to pay a debt
due from him " and from this the intent to injure the plaintiff
"appears to follow." But what of the case where the
defendants desire neither their own business advantage nor
the injury of the plaintiff, e.g., where they combine to compel
him to subscribe to an extraneous charitable fund? No
answer to this question has yet been given, and perhaps it is
enough for the purposes of the present case to say that the
benefit is sufficiently direct if it be to increase the effective
strength of a trade union, and to quote Hodges v. Webb (3) and
White v. Riley (4) as illustrating this conclusion. The broad
proposition was put by Lord Phillimore, then Phillimore J.,
in his dissenting judgment in Boots v. Grundy (5) in a way
which will comprehend most cases. "' If,'' he says, '' a number
"of persons, because of political or religious hatred, or from a
"spirit of revenge for previous real or fancied injury, combine
"to oppress a man and deprive him of his means of livelihood
"for the mere purpose of so-called punishment, I think the
"sufferer has his remedy. If the combination be to further
"their own prosperity, if it be constructive, or destructive
'only as a means to being constructive, the case is otherwise."
It was argued, however, that where you get a combination
of persons such as masters and workers who are apt to be
opposed in trade disputes, and when you find them joined in an
endeavour on the one hand to eliminate competition and on
the other to gain 100 per cent. trade union membership, the
only common object must be to injure, since the masters
could only rid themselves of competitors by injuring their
opponents, and the workmen could only obtain a Loo per cent.
trade union membership from masters with whom they were
agreed and therefore could not attain their object until all
others were driven out of the trade. The only common object
therefore was to injure, though each party to the combination
(x) [1903] 2 K. B. 600. (4) [r921] 1 Ch. 1.
(2) Ibid. 619. (5) (1900) 82 L. T. 769, 773.
(3) [1920].2 Ch. 70, 89. ' at |
1941
CROFTER
HAnpD
WoOvEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
Vv.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
494
H. L. (Sc.)
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WoveEN
HarrRISs
TWEED
Co.
Uv.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter,
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
might have a separate ultimate aim of his own which would
promote his own interests.
An argument against the right of a combination of employers
acting in conjunction with a trade union to refuse to employ
anyone not possessed of that trade union's ticket was urged
before Sargant J., as he then was, in Reynolds v. Shipping
Federation, Ld. (1), a case in which a combination of masters
and trade union officials agreed that only members of a
particular trade union should be employed on the ships of the
Federation. The learned judge rejected the argument.
"Indeed," he said (2), "a decision in favour of the plaintiff
"would lead to a strange anomaly. For many years past
"no one has questioned the right of a trade union to insist, if
_ "they are strong enough to do so, under penalty of a strike,
"that an employer or a group of employers shall employnone but
"members of the trade union. And theresult of any such effective
"combination of workmen has, of course, been to impose on
"the other workmen in the trade the necessity of joining the
"union as a condition of obtaining employment. Here, the
"employers, instead of being forced against their wills into
"employing union men only, have recognized that advantages
"may arise from adopting such a course voluntarily, and have
"accordingly made an agreement with the trade union to that
"effect. The incidental result to the other workmen in the
"trade is the same as if the employers had yielded against their
"wills instead of agreeing voluntarily. But I fail to see that
"workmen who are unwilling to join the union have any
"greater reason to complain of a violation of their legal rights
"in the second case than in the first.'' In that case the action
was against the masters' federation, the trade union, its
president and one of its representatives. It is true that the
complaint came from the members of another trade union
and not from another set of employers, but if the argument
is sound, as I think it is, it cannot be confined to one class of
confederates and be held inapplicable to another.
In the present case also masters and workmen combined.
The common object was not to injure but to promote agreement
between the two sets of employers, even though incidentally
the immediate effect of the common purpose might be to bring
a measure of injury upon the masters who were not millowners,
but the ultimate aim was to protect and improve the interests
of those who combined. The injury was but a step to an end.
(1) [1924] 1 Ch. 28. (2) Ibid. 39.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
495
The combination was therefore not to injure. but was to HL. (Sc.)
defend the interests of the parties to it and it becomes un-
necessary to consider a case of mixed motive where the object
was in part to injure and in part to benefit those who have
combined, and equally unnecessary to lay down the principles
applicable to a case where the object is neither to injure nor
to promote the interests of the parties but some extraneous
good or evil object with which they are not directly concerned.
But apart from these considerations I am not myself prepared
to accept the view that the joint objeet of the parties combining
is necessarily alone to be looked at. Each party may well
have its own private end to gain. The joint aim may at any
rate be no more than a desire for prosperity or peace in the
industry, and yet the combination may be justified. If,
however, one of the parties had no purpose but to vent his
own vindictive spite and if the other knew of and countenanced
that purpose by giving his assistance to the malicious acts
of the first, it may be that the other would then be a
participant in the wrong planned by the first to which he gave
his assistance.
I have so far dealt with Lord Cave's proposition as first
stated, but he put it in an alternative form, namely, was
there just cause or excuse for the action taken? So framed
it furnished, as he intended it to furnish, a test for the solution
of the case which he was considering, but it did not provide, nor
did it purport to provide, a general formula for universal use. As
Lord Dunedin pointed out in the same case, there is an earlier
question: "Is there any wrong to be justified?" If the
defendants have done no injury they do not require justifica-
tion. The alternative proposition suggests that action which
is necessarily injurious to the interests of others is in itself
actionable unless it is defensible on some ground. It is true
that the alternative method of approach is sometimes helpful
in ascertaining whether the purpose of the combination is
to injure others or to promote the interests of those in com-
bination, but I should not myself regard it as the same
question or decisive of the rights of the parties.
The true position is, I think, that some proceedings are not
actionable because neither the end nor the means are wrongful
but there are others in which either the end or the means are
wrongful and yet those acting in combination are excused
because they have just cause for what they have done. To
induce the breach of a contract which may lead to immorality
1941
CROFTER
HaAnpD
WovEN
HARRIS
TWEED
Co.
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
496
HOUSE OF LORDS [1942]
H. L. (Sc.) (see Brimelow v. Casson (1) ), or of a contract which is an
1941
CROFTER
Hanp
WoveEN
Harris
TWEED
Co:
v.
VEITCH.
Lord Porter.
infringement of the right of the breaker (see Smiths v.
National Association of Operative Plasterers (2), has been held
to be justified. These however are only examples, and afford
little assistance in determining the circumstances which will
constitute sufficient justification. I doubt whether it is
possible to define what those circumstances are. Perhaps
one cannot safely go further than the statement to be found
in Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation (3),
Smithies v. National Amalgamation of Operative Plasterers (2),
and Conway v. Wade (4), per Lord Loreburn, that they are
not matters for definition but for a consideration of the
individual circumstances of each case. Whatever the limits
within which just cause or excuse are confined, this class of
case is, I think, an exception to the general rule that a com-
bination to do what is unlawful or to do what is lawful by
unlawful means is actionable, and is not an alternative
expression of the principle itself. It may indeed be more
meritorious to induce the breach of a contract contra bonos
mores than merely to pursue one's own selfish ends, but the
one requires justification in law and the other does not.
I have ventured to add these observations not because the
questions raised in them demand solution in the present case,
but in order to show the limits of the present decision, and
lest it should be thought that the decision is authority for
wider and more comprehensive principles than the actual
circumstances require. For my own part I am content,
following the opinions of the Lord Ordinary and the Inner
House, to say that whatever the effect of their action might
be the confederates, millowners and defenders, had a common
object of benefiting themselves and not of injuring the plaintiffs
and so must succeed in their defence.