Later decisions that cite Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd
Viscount Stmon L.C. My Lords, before
this House, and apparently in both courts below, the appellants
did not attempt to rely on the fact that the demand for shops
had ceased, or on their inability to procure finance, as estab-
lishing a defence. They relied entirely on the impossibility of
building created by the restrictions imposed on work of this
character and on the acquisition of materials. Though these
restrictions were not particularized it must be taken that they
were imposed by valid orders or prohibitions under the Defence
Regulations, and while it would have been more satisfactory
if the documents relied on had been set out or referred to, the
case has proceeded (as must this appeal) on the footing that
the performance of the covenant to build was impossible, and
continues to be so while the orders or prohibitions are in force.
Asquith J., who tried the case, held on the authorities that the
doctrine of frustration did not apply to a lease at all, and that
for this purpose there was no distinction between a building
lease and any other lease, though he said that had the doctrine
applied he would have decided that the contract had been
discharged. ~ The Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by
MacKinnon L.|f., said ( 3) that the doctrine had never been
applied to a demise of Bh property and that there was clear
authority that it cannot be. "It is impossible for the
"defendants to rely on the doctrine of frustration to relieve
"them from their obligations as tenants under a demise of
"land for ninety-nine years." ' Against that judgment the
tenants appeal to this House. Tawo_questions are raised by
the appeal: first, can_the doctrine_of frustratio n_apply to
determine a_leas a_lease ? and, secondly, even if it can, are the
circumstances in mstances in the present case such as to produce the result
that the lease has been determined by frustration? If, my
Lords, we all agree (as I understand we do) that the answer to
(1) 3 B. & S. 826, 832. (3) [1943] K. B. 493, 496.
(2) (Unrep.) Sept. 16, 1942.
227
HOL. (BE)
1945
CRICKLE-
woop
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
v,
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
228
HL. (E)
1945
CRICKLE-
woop
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
U.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Viscount Simon
LG,
HOUSE OF LORDS (1945 |
the second question is in the negative, it is not essential in the
present case to reach a conclusion on the first question (as to
which I gather that our opinions are divided). Nevertheless,
I propose to express my opinion with regard to both questions,
since the more general issue has been much discussed and was
pronounced on in the courts below, where it was regarded as
concluded by authority, including the authority of this House,
in Matthey v. Curling (1).
The broad issue must first be soneneretl as though it were
res integra: then I propose to consider the effect of previous
decisions. Frustration may be defined as the premature
determination of an agreement between parties, lawfully
entered into and 1 in course of operation at the time of i of its
prem emature determination, owing to the occurrence of an
Dine or Change oF orcumsrances 50 cuncamen f circumstances so fundamental —
as to_he regarded by the law both as striking at thé root of the
agreement, and as entirely beyond what was contemplated by
the parties when they entered into the agreement. If, there-
fore, the intervening circumstance is one which the law would
not regard as so fundamental as to destroy the basis of the
agreement, there is no frustration. Equally, if the terms of the
agreement show that the parties contemplated the possibility
of such an intervening circumstance arising, frustration does
not occur. Neither, of course, does it arise where one of the
parties has deliberately brought about the supervening event
by his own choice. (See the cases collected in Joseph
Constantine Steamship Line, Ld. v. Imperial Smelting Corpora-
tion, Ld. (2).) But where it does arise, frustration operates
to bring the agreement to an end as regards both parties
forthwith and quite apart from their volition. Is there any
good reason why this conception of frustration should not
ever apply to a lease of land and result in its premature
determination ? I do not feel able to assert any a priori or
absolute impossibility, though the instances in which the
doctrine might apply to such a lease are undoubtedly very rare.
A lease of land creates in the lessee an estate, which is
a chattel. yinterest:)) (Law \jofmRroperty-,Ack. 1025; Sse at
sub-s. r (0).) Such an estate, by the nature of the case, lasts
at most for the term stipulated and may come to an end
sooner. In normal circumstances, the estate continues to
exist for the period of the agreed term—in the present instance,
for ninety-nine years from March 25, 1936—but it is liable to
(1) [1922] 2 A. C. 180. (2) [1942] A. C. 154, 160.
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
be determined by the landlord's re-entry for non-payment of
rent or for breach of covenant. This is expressly provided for
by cl. 4 of the present lease. The question therefore is whether,
in addition to pre-determination under such express provisions,
it is possible that a lease for years should pre-determine from
a supervening cause which amounts to frustration. If so, the
' term ends, no further rent is payable, and the lessor recovers
the property with all permanent structures erected upon it,
at once. It is said that this cannot be so, because a lease is
more than a contract and amounts to an estate: but this
reasoning seems to me to be dangerously near to arguing in
a circle ; if we assume that frustration can only arise in cases
where there is a contract and nothing else, the conclusion of
course follows that frustration cannot arise in the case of
a lease. Where the lease is a simple lease for years at a rent,
and the tenant, on condition that the rent is paid, is free
during the term to use the land as he likes, it is very difficult
to imagine an event which could prematurely determine the
lease by frustration—-though I am not prepared to deny the
possibility, if, for example, some vast convulsion of nature
swallowed up the property altogether, or buried it in the depths
of the sea. The lease, it is true, is of the "site,"' butit seems to be
not inconceivable that, within the meaning of the document
the "'site'' might cease to exist. If, however, the lease is
expressed tobe for the purpose of building, or the like, and if
the lessee is bound to the lessor to use the land for such
purpose with the result that at the end of the term the lessor
would acquire the benefit of this development, I find it less
difficult to imagine how frustration might arise. Suppose,
for example, that legislation were subsequently passed which
permanently prohibited private building in the area or
dedicated it as an open space for ever, why should this not
bring to an end the currency of a building lease, the object of
which is to provide for the erection on the area, for the com-
bined advantage of the lessee and lessor, of buildings which
it would now be unlawful to construct ? It is no answer to
say that it may be presumed that the legislature would make
express provision, by compensation clauses or otherwise, to
deal with such a case: we are entitled to test the applicability
of the doctrine by assuming supervening illegality, without
any qualification. Neither, I think, is the theoretic possibility
of frustration got rid of by stressing the complications that
might in some cases arise between the parties if the relation of
229
Ha een (E)
1945
CRICKLE-
WOOD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Vv,
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Viscount Simon
iLAGe
230
H, L.. (£.)
1945
CRICKLE-
WwooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
MRusy Ep.
Uv.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
TRUST; LD,
Viscount Simon
iC;
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 |
lessor and lessee is prematurely terminated for all purposes by
such a cause. In the case of pure contract also, the situation
resulting from frustration has raised questions of difficulty
which, after forty years of doubt, were only settled by the
decision of this House in Fibyosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn
Lawson Combe Barbour, Ld. (1); and even then it was con-
sidered just and necessary to modify the common law
consequences by a subsequent Act of Parliament, the Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 (6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40.)
I now turn to the cases. A careful examination of the
decided cases to which the Court of Appeal refers satisfies me
that it is erroneous to suppose that there is authority binding
on this House to the effect that a lease cannot in any circum-
stances be ended by frustration. In Matthey v. Curling (2),
the House did not say so: the decision there was that requisi-
tioning by the Government was no answer to a claim on the
covenant for rent, any more than ouster by a trespasser would
be: the remedy of the tenant was against the Government
for compensation. Equally, destruction by fire, after the
Government had requisitioned the place, left the tenant still
liable on his covenant to deliver up in proper condition, for
the tenant could have covered the risk by insurance. Thus,
on the true construction of the document, the two covenants
still bound the tenant. It seems clear that, if the actual
decision in Matthey v. Curling (2) is as above set out, the
Court of Appeal was mistaken in treating it as "clear
"authority ' that the doctrine of frustration "' cannot '" be
applied to a demise of real property. It is noteworthy that
when Matthey v. Curling (3) was before the Court of Appeal,
Atkin L.J., in his dissenting judgment, observed: "it does
"not appear to me conclusive against the application to a
"lease of the doctrine of frustration that the lease, in addition
"to containing contractual terms, grants a term of years.
"Seeing that the instrument as a rule expressly provides for
"the lease being determined, at the option of the lessor, upon
"the happening of certain specified events, I see no logical
"absurdity in implying a term that it shall be determined
"absolutely on the happening of other events—namely, those
"which in an ordinary contract work a frustration.'' This
passage exactly expresses my view. I may further point out
that in Taylor v. Caldwell (4), when the question was raised
(1) [1943] A. C. 32.
(2) [1922] 2 A. C. 180.
(3) [1922] 2 A. C. 199, 200.
(4) (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
A. ¢. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 231
whether the hall which was burnt down was demised to the H. L. (E,)
defendant or not, Blackburn J. said (1): '' Nothing however,
hes agra inet Stren ee 1945
"in our opinion, depends on this." The impression, which
I venture to think is erroneous, that this House in Matthey v. ©®ICKLE-
Curling (2) actually decided that frustration cannot arise in the Property
case of a lease, is encouraged by the headnote to that casein ;%?
the Law Reports, which states that that decision_affirmed _ menr
Whitehall Court," Ld. v._Eitlinger (3). It is true that 7*08® 1».
Lord Atkinson in Matthey v. Curling (4) expressed the view Lrtcuton's}
that the Whitehall Court case (3) was rightly decided, but none ee
of the other Lords 'either said or implied this. Moreover, in Trust, Lo.
the Whitehall. Court case (3) Lord Reading C.J.'s primary
decision was that the mere fact that the tenant was personally
prevented from residing in the leased flat did not affect the
existence of the chattel property vested _in him under the
lease. It is true that Lord Reading gave a further reason for
his decision, which was based on the adoption of a sentence
in Lush J.'s judgment in London & Northern Estates Co. v.
Schlesinger (5), but in this last quoted case also_the actual
decision of the Divisional Court was that a tenancy was not
extinguished because the tenant for the time being was not
allowed by law to inhabit the flat. which had been leased to
him. This was the ground of decision on which both members
of the Divisional and Lush JJ.—concurred, and
though Lush J. added that a tenancy agreement was more than
a contract and that the chattel interest created by the lease
continued to be vested in the tenant, he did not in fact, I think,
advance the abstract proposition that a lease can never be
determined by events equivalent to frustration. At any rate,
this House is not obliged to accept such a proposition, and,
as I have indicated, I think it goes too far. The occasions,
however, on which frustration terminates a lease must be
exceedingly rare.
So much for the abstract and theoretical question. But
there remains the practical issue whether what is proved to have
happened in the present case could be enough to constitute
frustration of such a lease. I do not agree with Asquith J.
that the orders requiring a suspension of building are sufficient
to strike at the root of the arrangement. The léase at the time
had more than ninety years to run, and though we do not know
Viscount Simon
sue.
(1) (1863) 3 B. & S. 832. (4) [1922] 2 A. C. 180, 237.
(2) [1922] 2 A. C. 180. (5) [1916] 1 K. B. 20, 24.
(3) [1920] 1 K. B. 680.
232 HOUSE OF LORDS [1945]
H. L. (E.) how long the present war, and the emergency regulations which
have been made necessary by it, are going to last, the length
of the interruption so caused is presumably a small fraction
eee. of the whole term. Frustration, where it exists, does not work
Property suspension but brings the whole arrangement to an inevitable
Invest. end forthwith. Here, the lease itself contemplates that rent
MENT may be payable although no building is going on, and I cannot
Trust, LP. regard the interruption which has arisen as such as to destroy
[Letentow's the identity of the arrangement or make it unreasonable to
# INVEST- carry out the lease according to its terms as soon-as the inter-
Trust, Lv. ruption in building is over: this is the nature of the test for
frustration suggested in the well-known case of Metropolitan
Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co., Ld. (1). I therefore conclude,
on the facts, that the liability for rent under the covenant
continued uninterrupted, and I move your Lordships to dismiss
the appeal with costs.
1945
Viscount Simon
ibe
Lorp RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN (read by Lorp PoRTER).
My Lords, I share the opinion, which all your Lordships
entertain, that no question as to what is called frustration can
arise on the facts of the present case. Unfortunately we have
no pleadings and little evidence, owing to what seems to me
a regrettable attempt to take a short cut in an important case.
We must therefore assume it to be true (owing to an admission
made by the respondents in Judge's Chambers) that no
obligation on the part of the appellant company to erect shops
on any of the fourteen blue sites arose until after the outbreak
of the war, and that government restrictions on buildings
and building materials made it impossible to erect shops on
any of those sites. It seems, however, equally true, that if it
had chosen so to do, it had ample time before September 3,
1939, to erect shops on six of the sites. But apart from this
last-mentioned fact, all that has happened is that for a portion
of a span of ninety-nine years the erection of shops on the
sites has been postponed, with the result that for a time the
appellant company will be liable to pay a rent of 35/. per
annum in respect of each site, although no shop has been
erected thereon. But that is to carry out the very provisions
of the lease which is said to be frustrated. The rent there-
under is payable in respect of sites, not in respect of shops ;
and cl. 2, after fixing times within which the tenant has to erect
shops, provides in terms that nothing in the clause should in
(1) [r918] A. C. 119.
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
any way affect the rent or rents payable in respect of the
demised property or any part thereof or the time or manner of
such payment. It seems to me clear that the intention of the
parties was that rent would be payable even though the sites
were vacant, and that the landlord was not to be driven to sue
for damages for breach of covenant to erect shops. To such
an action the war-time restrictions might well afford a defence,
but that is a consequence very different and far removed from
frustration. Therefore, even on the assumption that the
doctrine of frustration can be applied to a lease, this appeal
must fail.
On the broader question I confess that I am unable to grasp
how the doctrine of frustration can ever apply so as to put an
end to a lease and the respective liabilities of landlord and
tenant thereunder. A lease is much more than a contract.
It creates and vests in the lessee an estate or interest in the
land, a chattel interest, it is true, but a vested estate or interest
none the less. As was said by Lush J. in London & Northern
Estates Co. v. Schlesinger (1) "' It is not correct to speak of this
"tenancy agreement as a contract and nothing more. A term
"of years was created by it and vested in the appellant, and
"T can see no reason for saying that because this order dis-
"' qualified him from personally residing in the flat, it affected
"the chattel interest which was vested in him by virtue of the
"agreement. In my opinion it continues vested in him still."
That dictum of Lush J. was approved in Whitehall Court, Ld. v.
Etilinger (2), a case which itself was approved by Lord Atkinson
in your Lordships' House without any dissent from his
colleagues in the case of Matthey v. Curling (3). When a con-
tract is frustrated it is because what is called the " venture "'
or " undertaking' in which the parties have contracted to
engage can no longer be carried out. The court in such circum-
stances declares the contract to be, or treats it as being, no
longer binding on the parties. That is an end of the matter.
But when a lease is in®question, and has been granted by one
to another, it is the lease which is the "' venture "' or "' under-
"taking'"' upon which the parties have embarked. The
contractual obligations thereunder of each party are merely
obligations which are incidental to the relationship of landlord
and tenant created by the demise, and which necessarily vary
with the character and duration of the particular lease. It may
(x) [1916] 1 K. B. 20, 24.
(2) [1920] 1 K. B. 680, 686, 687.
A. C. 1945.
(3) [1922] 2 A. C. 180, 237.
3 dP
233
H. L. (E.)
1945
CRICKLE-
WwooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
TRUST RLeD,
v.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Russell of
Killowen.
234
H. L. (E.)
1945
CRICKLE-
WwooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
U.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Russell of
Killowen.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 }
well be that circumstances may arise during the currency of
the term which render it difficult, or even impossible, for one
party or the other to carry out some of its obligations as land-
lord or tenant, circumstances which might afford a defence
to a claim for damages for their breach, but the lease would
remain. The estate in the land would still be vested in the
tenant. I know of no power in the court to declare a lease
to be at an end except upon findings that some event has
occurred on the happening of which the lease terminates by
reason of some express provision contained in the document.
In such a case the term ends not because the court exercises
a power to terminate it, but because in the events which have
happened the lease operated only as a demise for the shorter
period. Nor do I know of any power in the court to order
a tenant (who, be it observed, might have sublet part by way of
mortgage or otherwise) to surrender his term to the landlord.
The lease must of necessity continue. Some of the obligations
thereunder may from time to time, from various circumstances,
become difficult or impossible of performance by one or other
of the parties ; but, in my opinion, it cannot have applied to
it the doctrine of frustration. The rent will continue to be
payable in accordance with the terms of the document.
Since preparing my opinion in this case I have had an
opportunity of perusing a print of the remarks which my noble
and learned friend Lord Wright proposes to address to your
Lordships and of considering the numerous references therein
to a series of authorities cited by him. I wish to guard against
it being said that your Lordships are in agreement with all
my noble friend's statements. For myself I disagree with
many of them: in particular I disagree with the view in rela-
tion to a lease of land, which is expressed in the following
terms: "' If the contract is avoided or dissolved, as it may be
"by either party, under the express terms of the lease, the
" estate in land falls with it."" Ifby these words my noble friend
only wishes to record the proposition that the exercise of a power
to determine a lease will put an end to the lessee's estate in the
land, well and good; but if he means that the estate in land
necessarily comes to an end with cesser of contractual liability,
I disagree. A lease may come to an end, and with it the
estate in the land and all contractual lability by virtue of
some provision in the lease, or by reason of some defect in the
title of the person who purported to grant it. But, in my
Opinion, the cesser or suspension of some contractual liability
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
under the lease will not destroy the estate in land which is
vested in the lessee, unless the lease provides that in that event
the term of years shall cease. Further I disagree with the
view that there is anything in Lord Buckmaster's judgment
in the case of Matthey v. Curling (1) or in the cases of Brewster
v. Kitchell (2) or Baily v. de Crespigny (3) inconsistent with
the view that the doctrine of frustration cannot apply to a lease
of land, or favouring the view that it may so apply. I concur
in the motion proposed.
Lorp Wricut. My Lords, while I agree that the appeal
must fail and the decisions of the courts below must be upheld, —
I prefer to base my conclusion on the ground that whether the
doctrine of frustration can apply or not to a demise of land,
no circumstances are shown in the present case which would
excuse the appellants from their covenant to pay rent for the
ten shop sites, which are the sites in respect of which rent is
claimed. I think the case is concluded by the principles laid
down by this House in Matthey v. Curling (x) in the opinion
delivered by Lord Buckmaster, concurred in by Lords Sumner,
Wrenbury and Carson. Lord Atkinson gave a _ separate
opinion agreeing in the result. In that case demised premises
had been lawfully requisitioned by the military authorities
who continued in occupation during the remainder of the
term. A month before the term ended the house was destroyed
by fire, The claims in the action which the lessor brought
against the lessee included (1.) rent for the last quarter ;
(2.) damages for breach of covenants including the covenant
to repair and deliver up in repair. The defence as to the
former was that the lessees had been evicted by a title or
authority which they could not withstand. Lord Buckmaster
said that there was not an eviction by title paramount or
eviction by the lessor himself, but a mere eviction. He
concluded that (4) the question was " how far the lessor has
"been deprived of the benefit of his covenant, and an act
"lawfully or unlawfully done, for which he is in no way
"responsible, cannot, in my opinion, have that effect, unless
"the covenant can be construed as excluding the event."
Further, as to the repairing covenant, he held that the lessees
were liable though the military had been in occupation when
(x) [1922] 2 A. C. 180. (3) (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 180.
(2) (1698) 1 Salk. 198. (4) ite22i)) 2A C227.
3 U
235
GLAE,
1945
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
TrRusT, Lo.
v.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lo.
ly
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
v.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 |
the house was burnt and continued in occupation until some
time after the term ceased by effluxion of time. Lord Buck-
master was also of opinion (1) that there was no impossibility
of performance, though enjoyment of the premises had been
interfered with by legal powers ; he added " that a terminable
"occupation by military authorities during an uncertain
"time for which compensation may prove to be recoverable
"constitutes no answer to the obligations of this repairing
"covenant." It is clear that the agreed facts which the
appellants rely on as relieving them from their obligation to
pay rent under the covenant are not nearly so strong in their
favour as those discussed by Lord Buckmaster. The appellants
were not ejected in any shape or form from the demised
premises. Neither the lessor nor anyone claiming under him
interfered with the enjoyment of the land. All that
happened was that for an uncertain term of the period,
obviously likely to be short compared with the ninety-nine
years of the lease, they could not proceed with their building
scheme. The period of interruption is not stated, but it seems
to be accepted that it is limited to the duration of the present
emergency. The covenants to pay rent are absolute in terms
and are expressly made independent of the progress of the
building operations. It seems to me impossible to hold that
these covenants are discharged by the facts alleged by the
appellants in their affidavit. Even if the doctrine of frustra-
tion can be invoked in the case of a lease the interruption of the
building operations cannot be regarded as likely to be so long
in its duration as to destroy the basis or foundation of the
lease and to lead the court to declare that it is dissolved on the
principles applied by the court in order to determine if a
contract is frustrated. Thus in Metropolitan Water Board v.
Dick Kerr & Co., Ld. (2), the test applied was whether the
interruption was so long as to destroy the identity of the work
and service when resumed with the work and service when
interrupted, as Lord Dunedin put it (3), or in Lord Blackburn's
words in Dahl v. Nelson (4), quoted by Lord Atkinson (5),
whether the interruption was "so great and long as to make it
"unreasonable to require the parties to go on.'"' But a lease
is more than a contract. It creates an estate in land (Law of
Property Act, 1925, Ss. 1, sub-s. r (0).) The estate so created is
(x) [1922] 2 A. C. 230. (4) (1881) 6 App. Cas. 38, 53.
(2) [1918] A. C. 119. (5) [r9r8] A. C. 119, 131.
(3) Ibid. 130.
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
limited and determined by the contractual terms of the lease
and is governed by the agreement between the lessor and
lessee. It may be that in earlier days the element of covenant
bulked sometimes more largely in the eyes of the law than the
question of tenure. In Paradine v. Jane (1), the judges do not
mention the element of tenure. The claim was in debt. The
court states the absolute character of the contract in language
which has often been quoted (2): "' When the party by his
"own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is
"bound," they said, "to make it good, if he may, notwith-
"standing any accident by inevitable necessity, because he
"might have provided against it by his contract." Lord
Atkinson in his opinion in Matthey's case (3) quotes these
expressions aS a general statement of contract law, but so
unqualified a statement would not be consistent with the
modern law relative to the discharge of contractual obligations
by impossibility of performance, as explained by this House in
Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ld. v. Imperial Smelting
Corporation, Ld. (4) and other well-known authorities. Indeed,
in Constantine's case (5), Lord Porter expressly enters a caveat
_ against treating what he correctly calls the dicta which I have
just quoted as universally applicable. I need not in detail
refer to the mass of modern authority which would refute
such a wide statement of the law. I may, however, refer to
Lord Sumner's pithy description of the doctrine of frustration
as "'a device, by which the rules as to absolute contracts are
" reconciled with a special exception which justice demands "' :
Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Sieamship Co., Ld. (6). But the
doctrine of frustration can only be held to be applicable after
a careful consideration of the particular case, and in particular
after scrutinizing the nature of the contract and the particular
circumstances of the case: The nature of a lease not only
involves a tenure as well as a contract, but has become the
subject of precise rules which must be taken to be settled law
of at least general application and to be understood by those
who enter into transactions of lease. Hence I think the care-
fully guarded way in which Lord Buckmaster deals with the
question before him in Matthey's case (7). He is careful to
express no opinion as to the decision in Whitehall Court, Ld. v.
(I
2
(
(3
(
y Ibid. 203.
) [1926] A. C. 497, 510.
), [TOZZI 2s A CaTso:
) (1646) Aleyn 26. ' {5
) Ibid. 27. (6
) [1922] 2-A.-C. 180,233. (7
) [7942] A. C. 154.
237
H. L. (E.)
1945
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
'GRuSsT, bp:
v.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Wright.
238
H. L. (E.)
1045
CRICKLE-
WooD
PROPERTY
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
DPRUST Lp:
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 }
Ettlinger (1), which Lotd Atkinson (2) says expressly '' was
"rightly decided." The majority of the House said nothing
about the case, and I think the statement in the head-note that
Whitehall Court, Ld. v. Ettinger (x) was affirmed is not
accurate if intended to apply to the judgment of the House.
In Whitehall Court, Ld. v. Ettlinger (1) Lord Reading C.J.
held indeed (3) that the requisition of the flats by the military
authorities did not establish a case of eviction by title para-
mount and held (4) that there was "' no reason why the chattel
"interest which was vested in the tenant by virtue of the two
"leases was affected merely because he was personally
"prevented from residing in the flats.' In so deciding he
seems to me to follow the same lines of reasoning as
Lord Buckmaster did in Maithey's case (5). Lord Reading
also did perhaps recognize the distinction between an ordinary
contract and a lease. But I cannot find that his language
justified the head-note to the effect that the doctrine of the
termination of a contract by the frustration of the adventure
did not apply to the creation of an estate by demise. He was,
I think, careful to limit his observations to the facts of the case
before him. And in London & Northern Estates Co. v.
Schlesinger (6), the lessee had become by the outbreak of war
an alien enemy and prohibited from residing in the area in
which the flat was situated. It was not difficult to hold that
the prohibition did not put an end to the tenancy or discharge
the obligation to pay rent, though the tenant's personal
enjoyment of the premises was prohibited. On that ground
the court held that performance of the contract was not
rendered impossible. The tenant could, so it was held,
sublet or assign the lease. That was. enough to decide the
case. Lush J., however, added (7) that nothing had happened
in that case to affect the chattel interest vested by virtue of the
agreement. Hesaid, truly enough, that the tenancy agreement
was not only a contract and nothing more, but a contract which
created a term of years. It is clear that this is an element to
be taken into account in considering whether events which
have occurred, such as a requisition for a time or a destruction
of the demised dwelling house by fire or the like have put an
end to the tenancy or the tenant's obligations under the
tenancy. It may be broadly said that as a general rule this
(1) [z920] 1 K. B. 680. (5) [1922] 2 A. C. 180.
(2) [1922] 2 A.C. 180, 237. (6) [r916] 1 K. B. 20.
(3) [1920] 1 K. B. 680, 686. (7) Ibid. 24.
(4) Ibid. 687.
A. ¢. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
result does not follow casualties of that character, even though
the tenant is deprived of the advantages at least for a time
which the parties to the lease contemplated he would normally
enjoy. It has been held over and over again that a temporary
interruption of the tenant's use and occupation does not affect
the covenants or the chattel interest. The rule may be
different, it seems, in Scotland: see Tay Salmon Fisheries
Co., Ld. v. Speedie (1) and Mackeson v. Boyd (2). But the
Scotch authorities afford no analogy applicable to English
law, because they proceed, it seems, on a different view of the
contract and of the legal background. In England, since
Paradine v. Jane (3) and earlier, the law has been that in
general the tenant's covenant to pay rent or repair or deliver up
in repair are not affected by casualties which interfere with
his enjoyment of the demised land. The lessor as a general
rule gives no warranty in these respects in favour of the tenant.
The tenant must perform his covenants even though the
demised house is destroyed by fire (Monk v. Cooper (4)), quite
irrespective of what covenants as to repairs there may be
(Lofft v. Dennis (5)), or whether the loss of enjoyment is due
to the landlord's failure to fulfil his obligation to repair (Hart v.
Rogers (6)). In that latter case the tenant would have his
cross-claim against the landlord for damages. On the same
principle it has been held that a covenant in a mining lease to
raise and pay for a certain amount of coal is not affected if it
turns ont that the mine was so exhausted that there were not
coals left in it (Bute v. Thompson (7)). These and many
similar authorities show that by English law the lessee's
covenants are generally absolute. The enjoyment and the
covenant do not generally march together. I think Lord
Buckmaster's judgment proceeds on this basis. He does not
put it on the circumstances that the lease also creates an
estate inland. But though the lessee's covenants are generally
absolute, there are qualifications which the law lee in
relief f of essee, even in the absence of express terms.
other. words, covenants_in the lease may be suspended or
239
H.L. (EB)
1945
CRICKLE-
WOOD
PROPERTY
MENT
Trust, Lp.
v
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Wright.
terminated_b atic aw and the court will decree °
accordingly. Thus the covenant to pay rent may besusp 4
_ for instance, if the lessor himself evicts the tenant, as Lord
(1) 1929 S. C. 593. (5) (1859) 1 E. & E. 474,
(2) 1942 S. C. 56. (6) [rg16} 1 K. B 646.
) Aleyn 26 (7) (1844) 13 M. & W. 487.
)
(1727) 2 Stra. 763.
240
H. L. (E.)
1945
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
OF
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Wright.
HOUSE OF LORDS (1945 |
Buckmaster observed in Matthey's case (1), or if there is
eviction by title paramount, a term to be narrowly construed,
as Lord Buckmaster points out. The law has also implied a
term that a lease may be forfeited if the lessee by matter of
record or the like disclaims the lessor's title. Such a case was
discussed in Doe d. Graves and Downe v. Wells and Trow-
bridge (2). These results all flow from the general nature of the
contract as understood in English law and its application to
particular conditions of fact. I do not find that they depend
on the circumstance that the lease involves a tenure and
creates an estate in land. If the contract is avoided or dis-
solved, as it may be by either party, under the express terms
of the lease, the estate in land falls with it. I do not see why
this may not be also true if the lease were dissolved by opera-
tion of law. Lord Buckmaster does not mention this aspect,
though Whitehall Court, Ld. v. Eitlinger (3) was cited in argu-
ment (4) and is referred to by Lord Atkinson in his opinion (5).
Lord Buckmaster deals particularly (6) with Baily v. de
Crespigny (7). In that case a lessee claimed damages from
his lessor for breach of his covenant not to permit building
on a paddock facing the demised premises. The paddock
was compulsorily taken by a railway company, which erected
buildings on it, including a urinal, thus impairing the amenities
of the dwelling. It was held by a strong Court of Queen's
Bench that the lessee could not recover. Hannen J., who
delivered the judgment of the court held (8) that the lessor was
" discharged on the principle expressed in the maxim ' lex
""non cogit ad impossibilia '."" The court said (9) that if the
position had been reversed and it was the lessee who had
covenanted and was being sued for breach of covenant, he
would equally have been discharged from the covenant by the
change of law, on the principle laid down in Brewster v.
Kutchell (10). This comes very near to the idea of frustration
at least if the performance of the covenant is fundamental
to the lease and so do the words of Hannen J. (8) which
Lord Buckmaster quotes (11) with approval, though he seems
to put the decision on the narrower ground that the word
(@D)eito22 eA Cersow22 7.5 CGAY MERE OBR usher.
(2) (1839) 10 A. & E. 427. (8) Ibid. 185.
(3) [1920] 1 K. B. 680. (9) Ibid. 188.
(4) [1922] 2 A. C. 180, 222. (10) r Salk. 198.
(5) Ibid. 237. (tz) [r922] 2 A. GC. 180; 228.
(6) Ibid. 227.
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
"assigns '' as used in the covenant was to be construed in
a special and limited sense which did not include compulsory
acquisition by a railway company. But I cannot trace in
Lord Buckmaster's judgment any suggestion that as a universal
rule the doctrine of frustration or some analogous principle
could not be applied to a lease, which was enunciated to be the
rule by the Court of Appeal. It is true that there is no reported
case in which the rule has been applied and that it could be
applied only in rare and exceptional cases. But the doctrine
of frustration is modern and flexible and is not subject to being
constricted by an arbitrary formula. I am not therefore.
prepared to state as a universal principle that it can in no
circumstances be applied to a lease. Let me suggest a single
instance, which might some day prove to be of not merely
theoretical interest. Let me put the case of a building lease
for a term of ninety-nine years, and let it be supposed that
a public body acting under statutory authority, soon after the
lease was executed prohibited building on that site for an
indefinite time, the end of which, if it ever came, could not be
foreseen. In effect that would be a prohibition total for all
practical purposes both in extent and time, which would
override and control both lessor and lessee. Would in that
event the lessee continue bound to pay under the lease the
yearly rent for ninety-nine years, or would the relationship of
landlord and. tenant be dissolved by operation of law in
respect of that site ? Asa matter of general principle I would
say that the lease was avoided and the term came to an end.
But I abstain from further discussion of the point. I agree
with the opinion which my noble and learned friend the Lord
Chancellor has just delivered. 1 would dismiss the appeal.
LorD PorTER. My Lords, the appellants relied upon the
facts which have been stated by your Lordships in order to
establish their contention that the agreement between the
parties in relation to the fourteen sites had been frustrated
and the tenancy had been determined so far as those sites
were concerned. Both courts below rejected their contention
broadly on the ground that the doctrine of frustration does not
apply to a lease. Indeed Asquith J. indicated that if it did
apply he would have found frustration in the present case.
It is natural therefore that in their case as presented to your
Lordships the appellants should state that the question raised
by the appeal is whether the doctrine of frustration applies
CRICKLE-
woop
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
v,
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Wright.
242
H.L. (E,)
1945
CRICKLE-
woobD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
u.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp,
Lord Porter.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 |
to a lease. That question no doubt is an interesting and
difficult one, but it does not necessarily arise in the case now
before the House. A narrower question may well be all
that your Lordships have to determine, viz. :—whether the
rent claimed to be due under the lease of May 12, 1936, is
owed by the appellants to the respondents. To defeat this
claim the only answer presented to your Lordships was that
the lease or the agreements contained in it had been frustrated.
The exact question for your Lordships therefore is not does
the doctrine of frustration apply to leases generally, but in
the circumstances has this lease been frustrated ?
It was conceded on behalf of the appellants that the cases in
which a lease can be frustrated are rare and exceptional.
A lease is more than a contract. It has long been recognized
as creating an estate in land and by statute is enacted to do
so: see Law of Property Act, 1925, ss. I, sub-s. 1 and 205,
sub-s. I (xxvii.). Moreover the rent is payable for the site
and issues out of the land. In these circumstances it obviously
is not easy to visualize conditions in which the doctrine of
frustration would apply. The land in some form is there and
the payment of rent is not prohibited. Some terms of the
tenancy may be impossible of performance at least for the time
being but the tenancy itself is not thereby necessarily deter-
mined. Its basis still exists. Building may not be feasible,
yet I do not think the tenancy has come to an end for that
reason. But exceptional circumstances might conceivably
arise which could be plausibly put forward as a cause of
frustration and until it is necessary to pronounce definitely
one way or the other I prefer to reserve the point. What
I think is clear and I believe all your Lordships agree is that
the lease-now in question has not been frustrated by the
inability of the tenants in the circumstances now existing to
use the land for the purpose which both parties contemplated,
viz. :—the building of shops. The lease is a long one and the
interruption comparatively short. Moreover the obligation
to pay rent is not dependent upon the appellant's ability to
erect or upon the actual erection of shops. It is payable
from a date to be ascertained from the landlords' notice that
erection may proceed. If frustration can apply the fact that
there are in the contract provisions dealing with the circum-
stances said to cause frustration is not necessarily fatal to the
application of the doctrine. That circumstance is only one
element to be considered. In the present case there is, it is
«
A. ¢. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
true, a clause temporarily excusing for a time the obligation
to build, but it is noteworthy that this abeyance clause, as it
is called, though it excuses immediate building does not do
away with the obligation to pay rent during the period of
abeyance. In such circumstances I can see no reason for
invoking the doctrine of frustration. The basis of the contract
is not gone and if the theory of an implied term be relied on,
I cannot think that a lessor, however reasonable, must be
considered to have contracted on the basis that the tenancy
would come to an end in case the building of shops became
impossible for a number of years. I agree with the opinion of
the Lord Chancellor and, agreeing with it, am of opinion that
the appeal should be dismissed.
Lorp GoppaRD (read by LorpD PortTER). My Lords,
Asquith J., who tried this case, decided in favour of the
respondents on the ground that the doctrine of law usually
called frustration does not apply to a lease, and that this was
as true of a building lease as of any other. But earlier in his
judgment he said that had the doctrine applied he would have
decided that the contract, by which he must have meant the
lease, had been discharged. The Court of Appeal agreed with
him that the doctrine did not apply to a lease, but, as I read
their judgment, they also held that in any case it could not be
said that this particular lease was discharged, thereby differing
from the learned judge. I agree with the Court of Appeal on
both points. We are obliged, as were both courts below, to
deal with the case simply on the admission, embodied in the
order made by the Judge in Chambers, that the restrictions
placed by the Government upon building and materials
made it impossible to erect shops on any of the sites not already
built on or to continue their development. No reliance was
placed on the other admissions contained in the order.
Obviously the restrictions referred to are those imposed by
orders made under the Defence Regulations which have effect
only for the period of the present emergency, though how long
that will continue no one can say. On that one fact it is
impossible to say, supposing the doctrine to be applicable to
a lease, that one for ninety-nine years had been frustrated.
Even if the restrictions remain in force for ten years that is
a very small part of the life of this lease. Moreover the rent
is reserved in respect of sites, not shops, and begins twelve
months after notice is given that building may proceed on any
site, although by reason of what the lease calls an abeyance
243
Hy L. (E.)
1945
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
U.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp
CRICKLE-
wooD
PROPERTY
AND
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Ln.
v.
LEIGHTON'S
INVEST-
MENT
Trust, Lp.
Lord Goddard.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1945 |
period the tenant may not be obliged to build within that period
and may not do so. This abeyance period might quite con-
ceivably last for a considerable time, if there were no demand
for shops, but the rent would none the less be payable. If
however the tenants came under an obligation to build, but
were prevented from so doing by the orders, they would
furnish them with a good defence, were they sued for breach
of their covenant to build, but not to a claim for rent under
this lease. But I think it right to say that I agree also with
the Court of Appeal on the wider question. There is no doubt
I think that the opinion prevails generally in the profession
that the doctrine in question does not apply to a lease, and if
there is any doubt on the subject I venture to think that it is
desirable in the interests of lessors, lessees, and their advisers
that it should be resolved. I agree with the opinion of my
noble and learned friend Lord Russell of Killowen, which I have
had the advantage of reading, but as the matter is of obvious
importance and interest I will shortly state my own reasons.
The reason why the doctrine does not apply was first stated by
Lush J. during the last war in London & Northern Estates
Co. v. Schlesinger (1), and was that the lease creates -a term
of years which is vested in the tenant. I cannot but think
that this principle was accepted by this House in Matthey v.
Curling (2). In that case a house let on lease had been
requisitioned by the War Office who remained in possession
till the end of the term. Among other arguments it was
contended that performance by the lessee of his covenants
was thereby rendered impossible and was excused, it being
an implied condition that the lessee should be allowed to
continue in possession and enjoyment of the premises. Dealing
with this contention Lord Buckmaster said (3): '' There is
"no question here of performance having become impossible
"" owing to its prohibition by statute, for no law has prohibited
"' performance though enjoyment of the premises has been
"interfered with by legal powers." Lord Sumner and
Lord Carson agreed with his opinion, and none of them ex-
pressed any dissent from Lord Atkinson who expressly
approved the decision in Whitehall Court, Ld. v. Eitlinger (4),
which in turn had approved the opinion of Lush J. It is now
sought to apply this doctrine of frustration to a lease because
circumstances have arisen, and restrictions have been imposed,
which while not divesting the tenant of his interest do prevent
(1) [1916] 1 K. B. 20, 24, (3) [1922] 2 A. C. 180, 230.
(2) [1922] 2 A. C. 180. (4) [r920] 1 K. B. 680,
A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
245
him from putting the land to the use intended both by himand H.L. (E,)
the landlord. Now whatever be the true ground on which the
doctrine is based it is certain that it applies only where the
foundation of the contract is destroyed so that performance
or further performance is no longer possible. In the case of
a lease the foundation of the agreement in my opinion is that
the landlord parts with his interest in the demised property
for a term of years, which thereupon becomes vested in the
tenant, in return for a rent. So long as the interest remains
in the tenant there is no frustration though particular use may
be prevented. There can also be no doubt that if there be
frustration the contract is destroyed so that both parties are
released from its bonds. If then this doctrine applies to a lease
some strange and unjust results would follow, though to use the
well-known words of Lord Sumner the doctrine is " a device by
"which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with
"a special exception which justice demands" (Hivji Muljt v.
Cheong Yue Steamship Co., Ld. (1).) In the present case
if some shops had been built on the blue land and the lease
were held to be frustrated the landlords could presumably
repossess themselves of the land with the buildings on it for
which they would have to pay nothing. If the lease were now
to be regarded as at an end the tenants would have no title,
however willing they might be to continue to pay rent and
resume building when the orders ceased to have effect. And
what would then be the position of those to whom the shops
had been sub-let or of mortgagees from whom finance for the
building had been obtained ? It is no doubt easy to envisage
a hard case ; building lessees may find soon after a lease has
been granted that a statute is passed prohibiting building on
the land in perpetuity, and if the legislature should not see
fit to provide for compensation or to make provision for
what is to happen to leases in such cases hardship would result,
but no greater than if they had purchased the fee simple of
a building estate which subsequent legislation prevented them
from developing. In either case it is not the estate in the land
which is affected, but the use to which it can be put. In my
opinion the Court of Appeal was right on both grounds and
I would dismiss the appeal
Appeal dismissed.