Later decisions that cite Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd
AUTHORITY
AND
Reccc>. - May 26, 1960. Lorp Rapcuirrs. My Lords, on May 23, 1955,
Lr. the appellants entered into an agreement under their respective
eee seals whereby the first of them, the Independent Television
= casa Authority (hereinafter referred to as ''I.T.A.''), constituted the
— ___ second of them, Associated-Rediffusion Ltd. (hereinafter referred
to as '' A-R.''), programme contractors for one of I.T.A.'s tele-
vision broadcasting stations during a period ending on July 29,
1964, in consideration of a fee of £495,600 per annum for the first
24 years and a fee of £536,900 per annum thereafter. According
to the appellants the only stamp duty payable on this document
under the Stamp Act, 1891, is the deed stamp of 10s. This con-
tention was rejected by the respondents, who assessed the duty
ad valorem on a total sum of £4,572,193, made up of £495,600
per annum for 24 years and £536,900 per annum for 6 years 76
days, and required payment of £11,430 10s. on this basis in addition
to the 10s. stamp. Their decision was upheld by Wynn-Parry J.
in the High Court and by the Court of Appeal (Jenkins, Romer
and Pearce L.JJ.). I think that the opinions expressed in all the
courts below were plainly right; and, as the two points argued on
behalf of the appellants in this House are directly covered by
authorities of long standing which I have no wish to disturb, I
propose to deal with them as briefly as is consistent with respect
for the argument that was put before us.
The head of charge in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act
under which the ad valorem duty is claimed is '' Bond, Covenant,
"or Instrument of any kind whatsoever.'' This head falls into
three sub-divisions, of which sub-division (1) runs as follows:
'"(1.) Being the only or principal or primary security for any
"annuity (except upon the original creation thereof by way of sale
"or security, and except a superannuation annuity), or for any
""sum or sums of money at stated periods, not being interest for
'""any principal sum secured by a duly stamped instrument, nor
'rent reserved by a lease or tack.
25 [1946] A.C. 119; 61 T.L.R. 577; [1945] 2 All E.R. 499, H.L.
A.C.
"For a definite and certain
"" period, so that the total
""amount to be ultimately
""payable can be ascer-
"* tained.
For the term of life or any
"'other indefinite period.
"* For every 5l., and also
""for any fractional part of
"5l., of the annuity or
'"sum periodically payable 0 2
AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
The same ad valorem duty as
a bond or covenant for such
total amount.
oe
6"
Is the agreement that we have here a "' security '' for this
purpose? It is not denied that an instrument may constitute a
security even though it is itself the original and only source of
the obligation to pay periodical sums of money which is the basis
of the ad valorem charge of duty. This has long been settled law
and, having regard to the actual wording that I have set out, I do
not see how any other construction could well have been adopted
by the courts.
But then, it is said, you have here an agreement which is
fundamentally executory on both sides; and so it is. I need not
go into any detailed analysis of the complicated provisions of the
agreement; it is clear enough that A-R.'s obligation to pay its
fee, which is due by monthly instalments, forms a promise in
exchange for I.T.A.'s promise to broadcast the programmes
supplied from the station installed and maintained by it for the
purpose. If J.T.A. should fall down on its obligation, A-R.'s
obligation to pay the fee would be in abeyance. The argument put
before us is that a covenant of this kind which is executory and
therefore, in a sense, conditional cannot be described as a
'* security '' for a sum or sums of money at stated periods within
the meaning of '' Bond, Covenant, or Instrument '"' in the Stamp
Act, all the less so, perhaps, because of the presence of the
qualifying or explanatory words '' so that the total amount to be
'' ultimately payable can be ascertained '' which come after the
words '' For a definite and certain period.'' Indeed, to make the
distinction effective, the argument goes so far as to say that an
instrument is not a security for money unless the payee is either
gratuitous or has executed by the date of the instrument all the
consideration that is to move from him.
Certainly the law has never hitherto recognised a distinction on
these lines. As long ago as 1872 an agreement for the payment
of periodical sums in consideration of the supply of asphalte from
'
439
dal, DUE {05;)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComRs.
Lord Radcliffe.
440
Hea ABS
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lp.
0.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComRs.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961]
time to time was held to be chargeable ad valorem as a "' covenant
''in relation to an annuity or other periodical payment '' under
the Stamp Act, 1870 (Limmer Asphalte Paving Co. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners). In Jones v. Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners? an agreement between a telephone company and a
theatre ticket agent for periodical payments for the use of tele-
phone lines and apparatus to be erected and maintained in
working order was held chargeable ad valorem as a "' Bond,
'' Covenant, or Instrument '' within the meaning of the Stamp Act,
1891. Then came the decision in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v.
Inland Revenue Commissioners,® the agreement there in question
being one for the hire of a private wire and apparatus to be
installed and maintained by the telephone company. The point
that agreements for periodical payments in executory contracts
could not be '"' securities '' was expressly put to the Court of
Appeal by Mr. Asquith Q.C. of counsel*: Would you charge as
a security, he said, an agreement to pay for the hire of a carriage?
The point was noticed by A. L. Smith L.J. at the outset of his
judgment.' It somewhat troubled him, he admitted, but the real
question was, not what "' security '' meant in ordinary parlance
but what it meant in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act. All
the members of the Court of Appeal agreed that the agreement
before them was chargeable ad valorem as a "' Bond, Covenant,
"or Instrument."'
>?
The case came to this House.* It is very briefly reported and
only Lord Halsbury L.C. delivered any reasoned opinion.
Evidently, the arguments raised before the Court of Appeal were
repeated: the appellants' printed case put as its first reason that
the instrument was ''an agreement for the hire and use of a
'chattel and for services . . . in connection therewith '' and so
not a '' security '' for the payment of money: there was the judg-
ment of A. L. Smith L.J. before them: and all the members of
the House, Lords Halsbury, Macnaghten, Brampton and Robert-
son, agreed in dismissing the appeal. Lord Halsbury's words':
'The real truth is that this Taxing Act intended, as it appears
"to me, to apply taxation to every document of this kind; it
"mentions in the first instance those under seal... '' appear
to me to be about as explicit a determination of the matter as one
could expect to find from authority.
1 (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 211. 4 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250, 254, 255.
2 [1895] 1 Q.B. 484. 5 Ibid. 257.
3 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250; [1900] 6 [1900] A.C. 1.
TNA Cee ile 7 Ibid. 2.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
No doubt the inclusion of executory contracts in this category
for the purposes of the Stamp Act has created some anomalies
which remain unresolved. The '' Bond, Covenant, or Instrument "'
category, with its ad valorem charge, looks as if it had trenched
very far on the category of simple '' Agreement,'' with its 6d.
stamp. If a written agreement promising periodical payments in
return for supplies (see County of Durham Electrical Power
Distribution Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners *) or services
is chargeable ad valorem, can it be right that a written service
agreement between, say, a manager and his employer or a
managing director and his company should be stamped only with
the 6d. "' Agreement '' stamp, as is still the standing practice?
And, if by the statute agreements for the hire of labourers or
menial servants or for the sale of goods are exempted from the
6d. agreement stamp altogether, could they nevertheless be
charged ad valorem on any periodical payments or instalments
provided for as being covenants or instruments forming the
security for payments of money? I do not think that we are here
concerned to give the answer to these questions. It is possible
that at some future date counsel for the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue may be able to convince a court of law that ad valorem
duty, if ever claimed, has been rightly claimed in respect of
service agreements: on the other hand, some other counsel
appearing for a taxpayer may be able to demonstrate that,
having regard to the provisions of the Act as a whole and the
specific exemptions set out under the head "' Agreement,'' no
agreement for the sale of goods or the rendering of services by
servants or labourers is liable to the ad valorem charge, notwith-
standing that it may provide for instalments or recurrent pay-
ments. I think that it is enough for this House to recognise these
possibilities without exploring them. In my opinion the present
appeal relating to this agreement between I.T.A. and A-R. is
untouched by such questions by reason of two considerations
which are enough to conclude it. The first is that there is no
plausible analogy between the treaty between these two corpora-
tions concerning the running of one of the commercial television
programme areas and a hiring of a labourer or menial servant.
The other is that the chargeability of an agreement of the kind
now before us has twice been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in
Jones v. Inland Revenue Commissioners * and National Telephone
Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners }° and once by this
8 [1909] 2 K.B. 604; 25 T.L.R. 9% [1895] 1 Q.B. 484.
672 10 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250.
ae
44]
H. L. (B.)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lip.
0.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComrRs.
Lord Radcliffe.
442
Heo
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
CoMRS.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961]
House, when the latter case?! was on appeal: and there is no
reason of any compelling force why the principle that was applied
to them should now be challenged. Indeed, I have not myself
been able to see why, if the recording of an enforceable promise
for the payment of money under seal or in a written instrument
constitutes a '' security '' for the payment of that money under
the Stamp Act, such a document is any the less a security for that
purpose because the promise is contingent or conditional or
dependent for its enforceability upon the performance of some
parallel engagement by the promisee.
I turn now to the second point which the appellants relied
upon. The agreement between them, they said, was so con-
structed that, except for an initial period covering the 44 months
from November 15, 1955, to March 31, 1956, no fixed fee or other
sum to be paid thereunder was ascertainable at the date when
the document was tendered for stamping and consequently no
'* total amount to be ultimately payable '' could be determined as
the basis for an ad valorem charge.
Certainly it would be impossible to tell from studying the
agreement how much money will eventually be paid under it
before it expires. Quite apart from several provisions which could
operate to determine it on either side and provisions (third
schedule, para. 8 and para. 4) allowing I.T.A. to raise the fee
for the time being payable in certain specified contingencies, the
agreement included a general variation clause (third schedule,
para. 2 (2)) whereunder the basic figures of £495,600 per annum
and £536,900 per annum would rise or fall according to variations
of 5 per cent. or more in the average of the index figures for all
items in the Board of Trade Interim Index of Retail Prices as at
January 15, 1952. It was upon the presence of this variation
clause that the appellants' argument concentrated to make good
its claim that there could be no total ascertainable amount under
the agreement.
My Lords, in my opinion this argument misconceives the
significance of such words as "' money payable '' when used in
the Stamp Act in relation to the stamping ad valorem of contracts
or other instruments. The true principle to be applied is, I think,
well set out in the judgment of Collins M.R. in Underground
Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Com-
missioners **: '* The question is the principle underlying the
'construction of the Act, and it seems to me that we can get ata
11 [1900] A.C. 1. 12 [1905] 1 K.B. 174, 182.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
"' definite principle from those cases. The principle is that the word
'""" debt' applies to money payable whether upon a contingency
"or as an absolute and unconditional certainty . . . It seems to
""me, therefore, that the words ' money payable for an indefinite
"period ' include money which may never become payable unless
"the particular event happens.'' I think it clear that the same
principle was adopted in the decision of the case when it later
reached this House.}8
I take it, therefore, to be a well-settled principle that the
money payable is ascertained for the purposes of charge without
regard to the fact that the agreement in question may itself contain
provisions which will in certain circumstances prevent it being
payable at all. If that is so, there is at least no better reason for
adopting a different principle when there are found clauses which
merely vary the amount to be paid according to specified con-
tingencies. Nor does it matter for this purpose whether the effect
of such a clause is to make it possible for the sum to be increased
or to be diminished. In County of Durham Electrical Power
Distribution Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,\* any varia-
tion would have been downwards: in the Underground Electric
Railways Co. case the variation might have been upwards or
downwards. What is necessary is that it should be possible to
ascertain from the agreement that there is some specified sum
agreed upon as the subject of payment which may perhaps fairly
be called the prima facie or basic payment. Even that minimum
condition may have to be restated in relation to certain kinds of
securities, such for example as guarantees, in which the ad
valorem charge is calculated according to the maximum sum con-
tingently payable, or, to put it in another way, the amount of the
guarantee: see the second Underground Electric Railways Co.
case. 16
Applying these principles to the agreement now before us, I
think it plain that the £495,600 per annum rate for the first 24
years and the £536,900 per annum thereafter were the sums prima
facie payable, and that the contingency that the Board of Trade
price index figure might alter sufficiently from time to time to
bring about variations of those figures does not affect the proper
ad valorem calculation of duty.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
13 [1906] A.C. 21. 16 [1914] 3 K.B. 210; affirmed
14 [1909] 2 K.B. 604. [1916] 1 K.B. 306, C.A.
15 [1905] 1 K.B. 174.
445,
ae Ts (ES)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComRs.
Lord Radcliffe. .
444
Pode
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
0.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComMRs.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961]
My Lords, my noble and learned friends, Lorp TucKER and
Lorp Morris or Borru-y-GEest, who are unable to be present
today, ask me to say that they agree with this opinion and
conclusions.
Lorp Conen. My Lords, the question at issue on this appeal
is as to the stamp duty payable on an agreement made between
the two appellants on May 28, 1955, under which the second
appellants (the contractor) were appointed a programme contractor
pursuant to section 2 of the Television Act, 1954, for a term
commencing on the date of the agreement and (unless previously
avoided or terminated under the provisions of the agreement)
ending on July 29, 1964.
By clause 9 of the agreement it was provided that in considera-
tion of the right and duty of the contractor to provide programmes
to be broadcasted by the authority the contractor was to make
payments to the authority as provided in the third schedule to the
agreement.
Clause 1 of the third schedule was in the following terms:
''1. The Contractor shall as from the date of commencement
'' of broadcasting from the station described in the Table (herein-
'' after called ' the commencement date ') pay to the Authority a
''fee at the rate of £495,600 per annum until the 31st day of
'" March, 1958, or the expiration of 24 years from the commence-
''ment date (whichever is the later) and a fee at the rate
'' of £536,900 thereafter.''
Under clause 2 (2) the fees fixed by clause 1 were liable to be
increased or decreased by reference to increases and decreases of
5 per cent. or more in the half-yearly index figure as in sub-
clause (1) of clause 2 defined of the interim index of retail prices
published by the Board of Trade. Having regard, however, to the
definitions in the said sub-clause (1) no increase or decrease could
take effect in respect of any half-yearly period commencing before
April 1, 1956. The third schedule contained other provisions as to
the increase of fees in certain events with the details of which I
need not trouble your Lordships.
The agreement was presented for adjudication and the com-
missioners assessed it to duty under the head of charge '' Bond,
"Covenant or Instrument of any kind whatsoever (1) being the
'"' only or principal or primary security for any annuity . . . or for
'""any sum or sums of money at stated periods... '' in the First
Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891. They were further of
opinion that it was '' for a definite and certain period so that the
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
" total amount to be ultimately payable can be ascertained."' It
followed that in accordance with the terms of the said head of
charge the agreement was chargeable with the '' same ad valorem
'" duty as a bond or covenant for such total amount.'' Taking as
their basis the figures given in clause 1 of the third schedule to
the agreement the commissioners assessed the liability at
£11,430 10s., to which was added the '' deed' stamp of 10s. pay-
able under section 4 of the Stamp Act, 1891.
No objection was taken by the appellants to the fixed duty
of 10s. but they disputed the liability to the duty of £11,430 10s.
on three grounds, only two of which are now maintained. They
are as follows:
I. That the agreement is not liable to ad valorem duty at all
as not being a "' security '' liable to ad valorem duty within the
meaning of the above-mentioned head of charge '" Bond,
"* Covenant,'' etc.
II. That if contrary to this contention the agreement is liable
for ad valorem duty as a security for a definite and certain period,
it is chargeable only in respect of the fee payable during the period
from November 15, 1955, to March 31, 1956, that being the only
period the fee for which could be ascertained with certainty at
the date of the agreement.
The matter came before the court on a case stated and on
July 15, 1958, Wynn-Parry J. rejected both contentions, and on
February 9, 1959, his decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Before your Lordships both points were again argued. I shall
deal first with the question whether the agreement of May 23,
1955, was a security liable to ad valorem duty within the meaning
of the head of charge '' Bond, Covenant,' etc.
Before your Lordships, as in the Court of Appeal, the appel-
lants contended that the agreement was wholly outside the scope
of this head of charge because it was not an agreement securing
the payment of periodical sums recoverable by the obligee as a
debt merely upon proof of the agreement, and of the fact of
non-payment but was an executory agreement for the payment
of periodical sums by way of remuneration for services to be
rendered.
I agree with Jenkins L.J.'" that this argument was con-
cluded against the appellants so far as the Court of Appeal
was concerned by the decisions in Jones v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners,1® National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue
17 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 259, 264. 18 [1895] 1 Q.B. 484.
445
H. L. (E.)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lp.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComMRs.
Lord Cohen
446
H. L. (BE)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
0.
INLAND
REVENUE
CoMRs.
Lord Cohen.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961 |
Commissioners ° (Court of Appeal), County of Durham Electrical
Power Distribution Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners *° and
British Italian Corporation Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners 7! per Rowlatt J. and the Court of Appeal.
It was argued that your Lordships are not bound by those
decisions. That is correct, but the decision in the National Tele-
phone Co. case was affirmed by this House.?? It is true, as Wynn-
Parry J. said in the present case,?* that the point now in issue was
not dealt with by Lord Halsbury L.C. in his very short speech in
which the other learned Lords concurred. Lord Halsbury dealt
only with the question whether the head '' Bond, Covenant, or
'""TInstrument of any kind whatsoever '' covered documents not
under seal, but it would have been open to the appellants, despite
the adverse decision on that point, to have argued that duty was
not chargeable because the agreement was executory in character
and covered payments for services. This point had been taken
and fully argued in the court below, it was raised in the first of
the reasons included in the case presented on behalf of the appel-
lants to your Lordships' House, and it is difficult to believe that
Mr. Asquith and Mr. Roskill abandoned it at the hearing; all the
more so since the report of the proceedings in the House of Lords
states *4 that "'the facts and argument are set forth carefully
'" elaborately and in detail in the report below.'' In my opinion,
therefore, their Lordships must be taken to have approved the
ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeal?> on the point now in
issue and, if so, your Lordships are not free to hold that that
decision was wrong.
I desire to add, however, that I think the ratio decidendi of the
Court of Appeal ?® was correct, and that it governs the present
case. The effect of the agreement under consideration in the
National Telephone case *" is conveniently stated in the headnote
as follows:
'By an agreement in writing not under seal it was agreed
'" between a telephone company and one R. that the latter should
'"" pay to the company the sum of £12 per annum in advance for the
"hire of a private wire between his premises and the company's
"local exchange system, and the telephonic apparatus relating
'' thereto, and that either the company or the lessee might put an
19 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250. 23 [1958] 1 W.L.R. 948, 948.
20 [1909] 2 K.B. 604, C.A. 24 [1900] A.C. 1.
21 Sergeant on Stamp Duties, 8rd 25 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250.
ed., pp. 334, 837, 338 et seq. 26 Tbid.
22 [1900] A.C. 1. 27 [1899] 2 Q:B. 250.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
'' end to the agreement by giving three calendar months' notice in
'' writing expiring on the day previous to the rent being due in any
"year, and the company agreed to erect and maintain in working
'' order the said wire and telephone apparatus: —''
The commissioners held that the agreement was chargeable
under the head '' Bond, Covenant, or Instrument of any kind what-
""soever,'' and assessed the duty accordingly. On appeal, the
Divisional Court gave judgment in favour of the Crown and
the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. Mr. Asquith argued ?*
that if the decision stood, any executory agreement providing for
periodical payments such as an agreement for hire of a carriage
and the services of a coachman from a livery-stable keeper in
consideration of periodical payments, would be chargeable with
ad valorem duty as a security, but A. L. Smith L.J. was not
frightened by that analogy. After referring to the argument he
continued 7°: "' The question, however, is, not what in ordinary
"" parlance could be called a security, but what is the meaning of
"' the word ' security ' in this taxing Act; and it seems to me that,
"" when the Act is fully considered, the meaning of the word as
""used therein is fairly defined by the Act itself.'' Then, after
setting out the relevant provisions of the head of charge, he con-
tinued: ''I will take the words ' bond' and ' covenant' first of
""all. A bond given for the payment of a sum of money at stated
"" periods, or a covenant given for such payment, is clearly a
'"" security within the meaning of the Act. Then I come to the
' subsequent words, upon which the question in the present case
'" depends, ' or instrument of any kind whatsoever being the only
'** or principal or primary security . . . for any sum or sums of
'"" money at stated periods.' Those words, in my opinion, cover a
'" contract in writing, such as this, for the payment of a sum of
'"money at stated periods. I cannot sever the word ' instrument '
'* from the words ' bond' and ' covenant' which accompany it;
'* and, as a bond or a covenant for the payment of a sum of money
'' at stated periods is within the Act, I cannot see how I can hold
'that a contract in writing to the same effect is not within it.
'' Tt was argued that a ' security ' only means something auxiliary
'' to an antecedent obligation, and therefore that a simple contract
'' for the payment of £12 a year for the use of a telephone is not a
'security within the meaning of the Act. I think that the word
'« " security,' as used in the Act, clearly includes an instrument by
'' which the obligation to pay is originally created.''
'
28 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250, 254. 29 Ibid. 257, 258.
447
H. L. (B.)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
CcmRs.
Lord Cohen.
448
Bl TCE)
1960
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lp.
0.
INLAND
REVENUE
CoMRS.
Lord Cohen.
INDEPENDENT
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961]
Finally, after giving further reasons for this conclusion based on
another part of the Schedule under the heading '' Mortgage, Bond,
''Debenture, Covenant,'' he concludes**: ''On these grounds
''T am of opinion that, upon the true construction of the statute,
''a contract in writing, whereby, as in this case, an obligation is
'' undertaken to pay a certain sum of money at stated periods for
'an indefinite period, is chargeable under the heading ' Bond,
'"* Covenant, or Instrument of any kind whatsoever,' in the
'' First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891. I am alive to the far-
'* reaching result of this judgment, but, if alteration is to be made,
'it must be by legislation. The above being in my judgment the
''true construction of the statute, I think that the case of
'"Limmer Asphalte Paving Co. v. Inland Revenue Commis-
'* sioners,*! and the case of Jones v. Inland Revenue Com-
'' missioners *2 which was decided by my brothers Wright and
'' Collins, were rightly decided. I have read the judgments
'' delivered in the latter case, and I agree with them entirely."'
I find this reasoning (in which Rigby L.J. and Collins L.J.
concurred) satisfactory. Even if, therefore, your Lordships are
not bound to hold that the decision of this House in the National
Telephone case ** approved the ratio decidendi of the Court of
Appeal in that case,*4 I would still reject the appeal on the first
point taken for the appellants.
I must not overlook the argument of the appellants based on
the exemptions to be found under the head '' Agreement or any
'" Memorandum of Agreement '' in the First Schedule to the Act
of 1891. The second exemption is '' Any Agreement or Memoran-
""dum for the hire of any labourer, artificer, manufacturer or
'""menial servant.'' It was argued that if your Lordships upheld
the decision in this case, it would follow that a service agreement
for the hire of, for example, an artificer, though exempt from
liability to the 6d. stamp under the heading '' Agreement '' would
be liable to ad valorem duty under the head '' Bond, Covenant,
"etc.'' I do not think this necessarily follows. Your Lordships
are dealing with an agreement for services, not a service agree-
ment, and I note that in British Italian Corporation v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners Rowlatt J. said *5: '' Now it is perfectly
'well known to everybody that these documents [contracts for
'"' the engagement of servants to be paid certain sums at intervals
"
30 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250, 258, 259. 34 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250.
31 UR. 7 Ex. 211. 35 Sergeant on Stamp Duties, 8rd
32 [1895] 1 Q.B. 484. ed., pp. 387, 338.
33 [1900] A.C. 1.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 449
"over a period of time] are simply stamped as agreements and H. L. (E.)
'' there is material . . . for thinking they are rightly so stamped, 1960
'" because if such a document is made between an employer and etna ieE f.
"an artificer or menial worker it is obviously treated as stamp- Teresa
"able only as an agreement because there is an exemption under AUrHority
"" the heading of ' agreement ' for it, and a document does not fall 'Ge
"under the heading of ' agreement' if it is independently stamp- Repirrusion
"' able in some other character.'' ny
For the reasons indicated by Rowlatt J. it may well be that if _Invanp
: : : REVENUE
the question of the stamp on a service agreement arises for your Comrs.
Lordships' decision, your Lordships may be able to hold that it is
not liable to duty under the head '' Bond, Covenant,'' but like
Rowlatt J., I do not think that this reasoning would justify your
Lordships in holding that the agreement for services now under
consideration is not so liable.
I turn, therefore, to the second point. Mr. Heyworth Talbot
argued that assuming the agreement is a security within the mean-
ing of the head "' Bond, Covenant,'' etc., and admitting that it is
for a definite and certain period, it is chargeable only in respect
of the fee payable for the period from November 15 (the latest
date by which broadcasting was to begin) until March 31, 1956
(the first, though broken half-yearly period contemplated under
the agreement). His contention is that upon the true construction
of the agreement it was impossible at the date of the agreement
to predicate as regards the period subsequent to March 31, 1956,
what sums would be payable because of the provisions in clause 2
(2) of the third schedule to the agreement for the increase or
diminution of the sums specified in clause 1 of that schedule. My
Lords, if the matter were res integra, I should have seen much
force in the argument that a condition of liability to charge was
that by an examination of the instrument the total amount
payable thereunder must be ascertainable as at the date of
agreement, with the consequence that if the total amount was not
so ascertainable the charge would not operate, but the question
is not free from authority, and I agree with Wynn-Parry J. and
the Court of Appeal that the decisions in the two Underground
Railway cases ** make it impossible for us to accept this argument
or allow the present appeal. These cases have been carefully
reviewed by Wynn-Parry J. and by Jenkins L.J. (as he then was)
delivering the judgment of the court in the Court of Appeal, and
Lord Cohen.
36 [1905] 1 K.B. 174; affirmed [1906] A.C. 21, H.L.; [1914] 3 K.B. 210;
affirmed [1916] 1 K.B. 306, C.A.
A.C. 1961. 30
450
H. L. (E.)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lrp.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
COMRS.
Lord Cohen.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961 |
I will not detain your Lordships by repeating what they have so
clearly stated. Suffice it to say that—
1. I agree with Jenkins L.J. that no material distinction can
be drawn between the words '' payable periodically '' in section 56
(2), which was the material section calling for consideration in the
first Underground Railway case,*7 and the words '' any sums or
''sums of money at stated periods '' in the head of charge with
which we are now concerned and that, accordingy, the latter
phrase includes money payable on a contingency.
2. I agree with Jenkins L.J. that one contingency possible
at the date of the agreement was that the half-yearly index figure
mentioned in clause 2 (2) of the third schedule would remain
constant within 5 per cent. either way.
3. I accept and adopt the proposition based on the two Under-
ground Railways cases ** stated by Wynn-Parry J. in the con-
cluding paragraph of his judgment as follows **: "' In the case of
"a deed, being a security within the meaning of that word as used
'in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891, under the heading
'""* Bond, Covenant, or Instrument of any kind whatsoever,' where
'"it appears on the face of the deed that there is a specified sum
'"payable by one party to the deed to the other party, then,
'' notwithstanding that such specified sum may (a) be increased
'""on the happening of a contingency or (b) may be reduced in part
'"or to nothing on the happening of a contingency, the deed is
'liable to be charged to stamp duty calculated on such specified
eum
I agree with Wynn-Parry J. that the agreement your Lordships
have to consider falls within this proposition, and for the reasons
I have given I would dismiss the appeal.
Lorp Keira or AvonHotmM. My Lords, under section 1 and the
First Schedule of the Stamp Act, 1891, ad valorem stamp duty is
charged at a prescribed rate upon (I omit certain words not
material for the purpose of this case) any '"' Bond, Covenant, or
"Instrument of any kind whatsoever. (1.) Being the only or
" principal or primary security for . . . any sum or sums of money
'at stated periods, not being interest for any principal sum
"secured by a duly stamped instrument, nor rent reserved by a
"lease or tack. For a definite and certain period so that the total
"amount to be ultimately payable can be ascertained . . ."'
37 [1905] 1 K.B. 174; [1906] A.C. SSH LOSI AC Costs LOUGi|eate Kes:
21. 3806.
39 [1958] 1 W.L.R. 948, 954.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue have held that an agree-
ment under seal dated May 23, 1955, between the Independent
Television Authority (called '' the authority ''') and Associated-
Rediffusion Ltd. (called '' the contractor '') (appellants in this
appeal) comes under this head of charge and that the ad valorem
duty amounts to £11,430, calculated on a fee payable by the
contractor to the authority at the rate of £495,600 per annum
under paragraph 1 of the third schedule of the agreement for the
period from November 15, 1955, to May 14, 1958 (two and a half
years), and on a fee of £536,900 per annum, similarly payable,
for the period from May 15, 1958, to July 29, 1964 (six years and
76 days). November 15, 1955, was taken by the commissioners
as the date when broadcasting under the agreement commenced,
and July 29, 1964, was the date on which, under the agreement,
the contractor should (subject to avoidance or prior determination
under certain clauses of the agreement) cease to be programme
contractor.
The two questions in the case are (first) whether the agree-
ment is a security falling under the head of charge set out above;
and (secondly), if it is, whether the duty payable has been
correctly calculated by the commissioners.
In view of the course of authority going back nearly one
hundred years and culminating in the decision of this House in
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,*°
it is impossible, in my opinion, to say that the agreement is not
a security and the only security for the payments mentioned
therein, within the meaning of the statute. All the considerations
which might tell against an instrument like this being a security
were advanced and weighed by the Court of Appeal in the
National Telephone Co.'s case,*! and the opinions of the Lords
Justices must, in my opinion, have been regarded by their Lord-
ships who heard the appeal as calling for no elaboration in
speeches in this House. It is not possible, in my opinion, to
regard the sole speech of the Lord Chancellor, short as it is, as
indicating that the argument before the House and the decision
of the House were directed solely to the question whether an
instrument had to be under seal in order to be a security. Nor
do I find it necessary to consider whether there can be agreements
for sums of money at stated periods which do not come under
this head of charge as securities. I am satisfied that the fact of
an agreement being for services, as this one is, is not per se a
40 [1900] A.C. 1. 41 [1899] 1 Q.B. 250.
451
Hii L.: (Bi)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TRLEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lip.
vo.
INLAND
REVENUE
COMRS.
Lord Keith
of Avonholm.
452
H. L. (E.)
1960
INDEPENDENT
TELEVISION
AUTHORITY
AND
ASSOCIATED-
REDIFFUSION
Lr.
v.
INLAND
REVENUE
ComRs.
Lord Keith
of Avonholm.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1961 |
reason for excluding it from being a security, and that this agree-
ment is indistinguishable in character from the agreements held,
in the line of authority to which I have referred, to be securities.
On the second point the answer is also, I think, concluded,
in principle, by authority, including a decision of this House.
But before proceeding to authority I should say that I find no
difficulty in applying a strict and literal reading of the words in
the head of charge to the sums stated in the agreement. The
sums in question are sums at the rate of £495,600 and £536,900
per annum accruing from day to day and payable by equal
monthly instalments on the last day of each calendar month (third
schedule, paragraph 5). They are thus '' sums of money at stated
'' periods '' as mentioned in the head of charge. They are to
run, the £495,600 from the commencement date of broadcasting
to March 81, 1958, and the £536,900 from March 31, 1958, till
July 29, 1964 (clause 10 and third schedule, paragraph 1). They
thus run '' for a definite and certain period.'' The controversy
turns upon the next succeeding words in the head of charge, "' so
'"'that the total amount to be ultimately payable can be ascer-
'"'tained.'' The reason is that the agreement contains provisions
under paragraph 2 (2) of the third schedule for increasing or
reducing the contractor's fees by a percentage corresponding to
a certain increase or decrease in the half-yearly index figure of
retail prices published by the Board of Trade over the index figure
of the preceding six months; under paragraph 3 for increasing
the fee from time to time within certain limits at the discretion
of the authority after three and a half years; and under para-
graph 4 for increasing the fees at any time by agreement or by
arbitration in the event of the authority's revenue being insuffi-
cient to meet its expenditure. There are other provisions for
terminating the agreement in certain contingencies, but these
were not relied on by the appellants. In this situation the appel-
lants say it is not possible at the date of the agreement, at which
time the stamp duty falls to be fixed, to ascertain the total
amount that will be ultimately payable. This is not, in my
opinion, the outlook of the Act. The words, I consider, are meant
merely to indicate the arithmetical result of the continuance of
the stated sums for a definite period in producing a total sum
on which duty can be assessed. They are in contrast with the
reference to an annuity or other periodical sum payable for the
term of life or any other indefinite period for which another
method of assessment is necessarily directed in the same head
of charge.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
Authority, I think, supports this point of view. I do not feel
it necessary to examine in detail the cases of Underground Electric
Railways Company of London Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners *? and Underground Electric Railways Company of London
Ltd. and Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. v. Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners,*® which were very fully considered by the Court of Appeal
and Wynn-Parry J. It is true that these cases were not directed
to the precise point that arises here, inasmuch as they were
concerned with payments for an indefinite period payable in
certain contingencies and which might in other contingencies
fluctuate in amount within certain limits, and the question rather
was whether they could be regarded as periodical payments or
sums payable at stated periods. If so, no question of quantifica-
tion arose. But the problem is, I think, in principle the same.
If sums which might not be payable at all in certain contingencies,
or sums which might be increased (or diminished) in certain con-
tingencies, are regarded as periodical payments, or sums payable
at stated periods, for an indefinite period, I can see no distinction
in the case of sums payable at stated periods for a time certain,
albeit in certain contingencies these sums may likewise be
increased or diminished. The only distinction I see between the
present case and the cases referred to is that the limits of increase
or decrease are in certain contingencies unknown. But that, in
my opinion, makes no real difference. It does not appear to me
to matter whether sums payable at stated periods are maximum
sums capable of decrease or minimum sums capable of increase
under the terms of an agreement. They are still sums the total
of which are capable of ascertainment, unless they are payable
for life or for an indefinite period. The sums here are sums
which, I think, may be regarded as maximum sums capable of
decrease or minimum sums capable of increase. That fact is, in
my opinion, immaterial and irrelevant. They are, in my opinion,
sums to which the rules of calculation under the Act can be
applied. I accordingly agree that the appeal fails and should be
dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.