All debts must be deducted from the total dutiable estate (including notional estate such as protected life insurance proceeds) for probate duty purposes in Victoria, not merely from assets available to creditors.
Decisions cited by Sullivan v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic)
SULLIVAN v. COMMISSIONER OF PROBATE DUTIES (VICT.) [1976] HCA 43; (1976) 135 CLR 237
Death Duties (Vict.)
High Court of Australia
Barwick C.J.(1), Gibbs(2), Stephen(3), Mason(4) and Jacobs(5) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Death Duties (Vict.) - Probate duty - Dutiable estate - Final balance - Deduction of debts from estate - Life insurance policies included in estate - Proceeds of policies protected from availability for payment of debts by Life Insurance Act (Cth) - Debts exceeding value of property of estate available for payment of creditors - Whether excess of amount of debts over available property deductible in calculating final balance for duty - Probate Duty Act 1962 (Vict.), s. 10(1) (a) (i).
HEARING
Melbourne, 1976, May 19.DECISION
August 17.
2. The appellants now appeal to this Court by its special leave from the
decision of the Supreme Court. (at p240)
3. There was real estate valued at $10,000, money at bank $147.02, shares to
the value of $1,581.50 and the proceeds of life policies
$27,595.75 in the
estate of the deceased. The deceased at his death owed $28,515.35 and, in
addition, there were claims not admitted
by the appellants but apparently not
abandoned by the claimants totalling $47,000. The amount of the debts,
$28,515.35, thus exceeded
the estate of the deceased other than the proceeds
of the life policies. (at p240)
4. The estate of the deceased, being insolvent, was administered in
bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy had disowned the life
policies. Section
92(2) of the Life Insurance Act 1945 (as amended) (Cth), prevented the
proceeds of the policies being liable to
be applied or made available in
payment of the debts of the deceased "by any judgment, order or process of any
court, or by retainer
by an executor or administrator, or in any other manner
whatsoever ..." (at p240)
5. The learned judge who heard the appeal at first instance followed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Adam J.) in
Sheezel v. Commissioner
of Probate Duties [1973] VicRp 41; (1973) VR 435 , and confirmed the assessment of duty on the
basis of a final balance in
the estate of $26,180. The final balance
had been
arrived at by the Commissioner as the "net proceeds of policies of insurance
after
payment of secured creditors totalling
$1,254.16" and an allowance of
$160 for funeral expenses, in addition an allowance of $556.50
in respect of
premiums paid on a policy
and returned ex gratia which amount was included in
the proceeds of the life policies. In
other words, the other amounts of the
deceased's indebtedness were not allowed as deductions because the proceeds of
the policies
were not available to the creditors of
the deceased. (at p241)
6. The relevant provisions of the Probate Duty Act 1962 (Vict.) ("the Act")
are:-
"6. Subject to this Act there shall be paid to the Commissioner,The 1st Schedule contains various rates of duty calculated according to the identity of the persons to whom "the final balance passes" and the assessment of that balance.
to be by him paid into the Consolidated Revenue, by
every administrator or other person required by this Act to
file a statement, duty calculated on and in relation to the
final balance of the estate in accordance with the provisions
of the First Schedule to this Act."
"7.(1) The following classes of property shall for the purposesThere follows by description a number of items of property actual and notional to be so included.
of this Act be and be deemed to form part of the
estate of a deceased person:-"
"4.(1) 'Final Balance' means the final balance, on which
duty is to be calculated, that is to say, the total value of all
property which forms or is deemed to form part of the estate
and all amounts which under sections eight or thirty-nine of
this Act are required to be included in the final balance, less
the total value of all items which are allowed as deductions."
"10.(1) Subject to this section in computing the final balance
for the purposes of this Act there shall be allowed as
deductions from the estate of a deceased person -
(a) if he was domiciled in Victoria at the time of his death -
(i) all debts at the time of his death due and owing by
him except debts charged on real property situate
outside Victoria;
...
(4) No allowance as a deduction shall be made for l 154930 154990
(a) any debt the amount of which is incapable of being ascertained;
(b) any debt where there is a right of reimbursement except
to the extent that the Commissioner is satisfied that the
exercise of the right would not result in the recovery of
the full amount of the debt;
(c) any debt incurred or created by the deceased to the
extent that such debt was not incurred or created bona
fide for an adequate consideration in money or money's
worth paid or given to the deceased;
(d) any debt which is irrecoverable by action through the
lapse of time except where such debt is proved to have
been paid in due course of administration; or
(e) any debt charged on any estate or interest in any property
of the deceased to the extent that the value of such
estate or interest is allowed as a deduction under this
section."
"11.(1) Every administrator shall file in the office of the
Commissioner a statement in the prescribed form specifying
particulars of -
...
(e) any debts due and owing by the deceased at the time of
his death and any other amounts which are allowed as
deductions by this Act;
...
(4) From the information contained in the statement and
from such other information as he may possess the Commissioner
shall cause the final balance to be determined and
an assessment of the duty payable on the basis of the final
balance to be made and notice of the assessment to be
served upon the administrator or other person liable to pay
the duty." (at p242)
7. The Supreme Court of Victoria decided in Sheezel v. Commissioner of
Probate Duties [1973] VicRp 41; (1973) VR 435 that "in computing the final
balance of an
estate, the allowance to be made under s. 10(1) (a) (i) for debts of the
deceased cannot exceed the value of the assets
out of which those debts are to
be met". This conclusion was founded upon the proposition
that "the broad
scheme of the legislation"
(the Probate Duty Act 1962) "is to ensure that real
debts, but only real debts affecting the value of the dutiable estate passing
to the personal representative
are taken into account as deductions" (1973)
VR, at p 437 . Reliance was placed on In re Barnes (1938)
2 KB 684 and
Edilson v. Commissioner
of Stamp Duties (1942) NZLR 536 . It was thus decided
in substance that the terms of s. 10(1)
(a) (i) of the Act must be read as
limited to those debts to the payment of which the estate of the deceased
would necessarily be
applied, or, in other
words, to confine the estate from
which debts should be deducted to the actual estate of the deceased. Notional
estate not being
available for payment of debts would fall within the decision
of Sheezel v. Commissioner of Probate Duties [1973] VicRp 41; (1973)
VR 435 . (at p242)
8. In 1973 the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal Division,
decided in Jelfs v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1973)
1 NSWLR 372 that "the
whole of the amount of the debts actually due and payable by the deceased at
the time of his death shall be
set off against his dutiable estate in order to
arrive at the final balance of the estate upon which duty is to be assessed"
and
"that no implication to the contrary is to be read into" s. 107(1) of the
Stamp Duties Act, 1920 (N.S.W.) "on the basis that the literal construction
would lead to absurd results". (at p243)
9. Hope J.A., who wrote the leading judgment in that case, described the
relevant sections of the Stamp Duties Act (1973) 1 NSWLR,
at pp 374-376 .
These provisions are, in my opinion, indistinguishable in structure and effect
from the sections
of the Act which
I have set out. (at p243)
10. His Honour then said (1973) 1 NSWLR, at p 376 :
"Duty is payable on the 'final balance of the estate', a
figure which is to be computed in the way directed in the
sections I have described. In arriving at this figure, there is
to be placed on one side of the ledger the value of various
assets, some of which will vest in the legal personal representatives
of the deceased and some of which will not, but all of
which are to be deemed to be part of his estate for the purposes
of the assessment and payment of duty. Having arrived
at that figure, certain allowances are authorized. It is conceded
for the Commissioner, and in my opinion rightly conceded,
that the word 'allowance' means 'deduction', and
indeed these words are used interchangeably in various provisions
of the Act. The Act then points to the value from
which any deduction is to be made: that value is the 'total
value of his dutiable estate' which s. 104 expressly provides
shall comprise the assets described in ss. 102 and 103 of the
Act. There is no express provision of Act that the allowance
or deduction in respect of debts is to be made only in
respect of the deceased's actual estate, as opposed to the
whole of his dutiable estate, including his notional estate.
Indeed, s. 108(1) (a), in dealing with what might be called
foreign debts where there are no foreign assets, expressly
provides that all unsecured debts may be deducted from the
dutiable estate of the deceased. All these provisions are directed
to the computation which s. 105 requires to be made
in order to ascertain the final balance of the estate of a
deceased person. The language of the sections is quite clear,
and unless the Court is constrained by authority, or some
implication is to be read into the relevant provisions, because
their literal construction would lead to absurd or quite unreasonable
results, or for some similar reason, that construction,
which is the one contended for by the appellants,
should, in my opinion, be given to them." (at p243)
11. The Supreme Court of New South Wales expressly rejected the submission
that, by implication, a deduction "can only be made in
respect of debts which
the legal personal representative, in the ordinary course of administration,
would be able to pay out of the
assets which vested in him". (at p244)
12. That Court thought, as I do, that the statutory provisions upon which In
re Barnes (1938) 2 KB 684 was founded were significantly
different from the
Stamp Duties Act. I would add that they are also significantly different from
those of the Act to which I have
called attention: it was not a matter of
"slight variation in language". In my opinion, too little heed was paid
to
this difference
by the Supreme Court of Victoria in deciding Sheezel v.
Commissioner of Probate Duties [1973] VicRp 41; (1973) VR 435 . (at p244)
13. The Supreme Court of New South Wales acknowledged the similarity of the
legislation dealt with in Edilson v. Commissioner of
Stamp Duties (1942) NZLR
536 with the Stamp Duties Act (N.S.W.). But the Supreme Court of New Zealand
failed, in my opinion, adequately
to observe and give effect to the
differences between
the Finance Act, 1894 (U.K.) and the Death Duties Act,
1921 (N.Z.). Consequently,
in my opinion, the judgment of the Supreme Court
of
New Zealand (Smith J.) should not be followed in the construction of s. 10(1)
(a) (i). (at p244)
14. The structure of the Act is that, by the operation of s. 7, an estate is
constructed which includes indifferently both actual
and notional estate.
That is the equivalent of the dutiable estate described in Jelfs v.
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1973) 1 NSWLR
372 . Additions are made by
virtue of s. 8. From the total value of that estate, deductions are allowed
as provided by ss. 9, 10
and 21. The result is the final balance of the
estate: see definition, s. 4(1). It is, to my mind, quite clear that the
allowable
deductions are to be made from the whole of the estate, that is to
say, from the total value of the items both actual and notional
brought into
the estate by s. 7. There is no warrant whatsoever, in my opinion, to limit
the deductions to those items of actual
estate which are included in the
estate of the deceased for the purposes of the Act by s. 7. It is from the
total value of the whole
estate, actual and notional, that all debts at the
time of the death of the deceased due and owing by him, with only the
exception
for which s. 10(1) (a) (i) and s. 10(3) and (4) provide, should be
deducted. (at p244)
15. No reduction by implication of the extent of the expression "all debts"
in s. 10(1) (a) (i) is, in my opinion, possible. The
language is both plain
and intractable: it should be given effect as the intention of the
legislature. It cannot, in my opinion,
be qualified by any supposed policy or
scheme of the Act or "broad principles of death duty legislation", which is
not only not apparent
in, but which, in my opinion, is contradictory of, the
express language of the statute. (at p245)
16. I am in accord with the views and reasoning of Hope J.A. expressed in
Jelfs v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties: I am unable to
agree with the
reasoning and conclusion of Adam J. in Sheezel v. Commissioner of Probate
Duties [1973] VicRp 41; (1973) VR 435 . (at p245)
17. Counsel for the respondent, in supporting the conclusion of the Supreme
Court of Victoria, has pressed upon us considerations
derived from the history
of legislation in Victoria imposing probate duty. But however much the
legislative antecedents of a statute
may aid the construction of ambiguous or
uncertain language of a statute, it cannot avail to displace or qualify such
unambiguous
and intractable language as is employed in the relevant parts of
the Act. (at p245)
18. Counsel also placed considerable reliance on the words of Dixon J. in
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (N.S.W.) v. Brasch. Dixon
J. said [1937] HCA 8; (1937) 57 CLR
69, at p 82 :
"Now, whatever else may be said about s. 107, I think itThe decision of the Court in that case was that "the liability under the onerous lease to pay future rent was a contingent debt within s. 107(2) (d) of the Stamp Duties Act, 1920-1933 (N.S.W.) and was not a debt 'due and owing' within s. 107(1)". It was to that matter that Dixon J. was directing his mind when writing the passage quoted. He was not concerned with the problem posed in this case and, in my opinion, his words ought not to be taken as lending support to the respondent's submissions. I agree with the views expressed in Edilson v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1942) NZLR, at p 541 and in Jelfs v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1973) 1 NSWLR, at p 378 , as to the relevance to the problems dealt with in those cases of the words of Dixon J. which I have quoted. (at p245)
clearly must be taken as implying that the debts with which
it is dealing are those for which the estate is liable. Its object
is to deduct from the aggregate property devolving on death
the charges properly payable thereout. In the practical affairs
of life, liabilities are rarely if ever incurred which do not
bind the obligor's personal representatives."
19. In my opinion, the plain and unambiguous language of the Act requires
that the appeal and the appellants' objection be allowed.
(at p246)
GIBBS J. I would allow this appeal for the reasons given by the Chief
Justice with which I am in agreement. (at p246)
STEPHEN J. I have had the advantage of reading and agree with the reasons
for judgment prepared by the Chief Justice. I would
allow this appeal. (at
p246)
MASON J. I am in agreement with the reasons for judgment which have been
prepared by the Chief Justice and, accordingly, I would
allow the appeal and
the appellant's objection. (at p246)
JACOBS J. I agree with the conclusion of the Chief Justice and with his
reasons and consequently with the reasoning of Hope J.A.
in Jelfs v.
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1973) 1 NSWLR 372 . I do not wish to add
anything. (at p246)
ORDER
Appeal allowed with costs.Order of the Supreme Court of Victoria set aside and in lieu thereof order that the appeal be allowed with costs.
Assessment reduced in accordance with the reasons for judgment.
Order that repayment of the amount of duty overpaid be made to the
appellants.
(HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.)SULLIVAN AND ANOTHER.........APPELLANTS;
APPELLANTS,THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATE
AND
DUTIES (VICTORIA)..........RESPONDENT.
RESPONDENT,
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF VICTORIA.