There is no common law defence of contextual truth in defamation in Australia; such a defence requires statutory provision. In assessing apprehended bias, not every communication by a party's legal advisers to a judicial officer in the absence of the other party gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, particularly in small legal communities. The Supreme Court has both statutory power under ss 57 and 58 of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) and inherent power to suppress publication of evidence during a jury trial where necessary to secure the proper administration of justice, but such orders must do no more than necessary and be temporary. Issues of 'hard swearing' where credibility is central constitute a special reason for ordering a civil jury trial. Proof of malice against one co-defendant does not destroy the qualified privilege of another co-defendant.
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