As a minimum requirement for particularisation of sexual offence counts, there must be sufficient particularity to demonstrate one identifiable transaction meeting the description of the offence charged, distinguishable from any other similar incidents suggested by the evidence. Particulars that assume the guilt of the accused (such as 'the first occasion' of offending) do not perform the function of identifying the occasion to which a count relates. Where evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct is admitted, the jury must be directed to distinguish between evidence going to the offences charged and evidence of other misconduct, warned against reasoning from propensity, and told that the number of allegations does not bolster the complainant's evidence on the offences charged. The majority held that the adequacy of particulars is a matter of judgment affected by the complainant's age and the circumstances, while Fitzgerald P held that adequacy cannot be divorced from the evidence providing context and that details assuming guilt never suffice.
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