› Issue of complainant's motive to lie first raised by Crown Prosecutor
› Whether ground for discharge of jury
› Whether prejudicial effect curable by direction to jury
Criminal Law
› Trial
› Discharge of jury
› Impermissible comments by prosecutor
› Discretion of trial judge
› High degree of necessity required
› Whether prejudice curable by judicial direction
Criminal Law
› Evidence
› Credibility of complainant
› Motive to lie
› Impermissibility of prosecutor raising absence of motive to lie where not in evidence
› Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1
Quick Take
1Where a prosecutor impermissibly raises the absence of a complainant's motive to lie (contrary to Palmer v R), the resulting prejudice may be cured by an appropriately worded judicial direction, particularly where the comments were inadvertent rather than deliberate, the trial was short, and the corrective direction was given promptly.
2Whether to discharge a jury following prosecutorial impropriety is a discretionary decision requiring a high degree of necessity; an appellate court will recognise the trial judge is ordinarily better placed to assess whether prejudice can be dispelled by a clear warning.
3The form of a corrective direction need not follow a prescribed formula (such as that proposed in R v Costin) but must be sufficient in substance to address the prejudice in the particular circumstances of the case.
Case Details
Citation[2000] VSCA 67
Reported(2000) 112 A Crim R 323
CourtVSCA
JurisdictionVictoria
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