A second murder committed while escaped from custody serving a sentence for a prior murder, in chillingly similar circumstances, may constitute culpability so extreme as to mandate a life sentence under s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, even where the second murder was unpremeditated. The two-stage process under s 61(1) requires first assessing whether objective culpability is extreme enough to warrant life imprisonment, and then whether subjective circumstances can displace that need — but subjective circumstances remain relevant even where the criteria in s 61(1) are satisfied. The court was divided on whether the absence of premeditation in the second murder was sufficient to take the case outside the worst case category.
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