Where a public officer directs the termination of a person's employment, the first form of misfeasance in public office (targeted malice) requires that the intention to inflict harm be the actuating motive for the exercise of power; it is insufficient to show that the officer intended to terminate the employment and that harm resulted, if the officer's purpose was to remove the employee for reasons within the proper scope of the power (such as perceived incompetence). For the second form of the tort, the officer must be shown to have had actual knowledge or reckless indifference to the requirement of procedural fairness as a condition of the validity of the direction; constructive knowledge or imputed indifference is insufficient.
The full text is available to signed-in members, including the 29 later cases that cite this judgment.
3 of the 29 citing cases carry a classified treatment. How each court treated it is available to signed-in members.