A child born with disabilities has no cause of action in negligence ('wrongful life') against a medical practitioner who negligently failed to diagnose the condition and advise the mother, where the only alternative to the child's disabled existence was non-existence. The compensatory principle cannot accommodate a comparison between disabled existence and non-existence. The duty of care owed by a medical practitioner to a foetus does not extend to providing the mother with information to enable termination of the pregnancy. Policy considerations including the sanctity of life, implications of genetic science, and the availability of parental remedies militate against recognition of such claims. However, Mason P's dissent articulates an alternative framework that may be relevant to future reconsideration.
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