A defendant resisting an extension of time on the basis of a lost cross-claim for contribution bears an evidential burden of demonstrating that the cross-claim was viable and realistic, not merely a theoretical possibility. The mere expiry of the limitation period for contribution claims under s 26(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1969 does not, without more, establish prejudice sufficient to defeat an application for leave to commence proceedings out of time. The question whether a grant of leave under s 52(4) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 removes the s 26(1)(b) limitation period (leaving only the s 26(1)(a) two-year post-judgment period) was raised but left open.
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