Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board

(2008) 19 VR 398; [2008] VSCA 43

Victorian Court of Appeal

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Interrogate

Catchwords

1. Statutory Construction
2. › Legal profession regulation
3. › Practising certificates
4. › Renewal
5. › Time limit for determination
6. › Whether statutory body loses power to determine application after expiry of prescribed period
7. › Whether 'must' in time limit provision is mandatory or directory
8. › Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic), ss 2.4.5, 2.4.12
1. Administrative Law
2. › Judicial review
3. › Discretion to refuse relief
4. › Adequate alternative remedy
5. › Denial of natural justice
6. › Whether existence of right of review by administrative tribunal precludes judicial review where applicant alleges serious breach of natural justice
7. › Whether applicant entitled to fair hearing at first instance and full appellate recourse
1. Administrative Law
2. › Delegation of statutory powers
3. › Construction of power to delegate
4. › Whether delegator retains power to exercise delegated function notwithstanding unrevoked delegation
5. › Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 42A
1. Administrative Law
2. › Natural justice
3. › Denial of procedural fairness by decision-maker
4. › Whether failure of natural justice at first instance can be cured by sufficiency of natural justice in appellate or review body

Quick Take

The Legal Services Board retains power to determine practising certificate renewal applications after the 60-day period prescribed by s 2.4.12(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); a late determination is not void for want of jurisdiction. However, where a solicitor alleges a serious denial of natural justice in the Board's decision-making process, the existence of a right of review before VCAT does not necessarily preclude judicial review, because the applicant may be entitled to a fair hearing at first instance together with full appellate recourse. The demand on the Court's time and resources is not a relevant consideration in exercising the discretion to refuse judicial review.