Where a publication contains express statements disclaiming knowledge of the purpose of transactions or indicating the publisher has 'pieced together' a relationship, and where imputations are pleaded in terms substantially different from and at a higher level of abstraction than any statement in the publication, it is reasonably arguable that a jury could find the imputations were expressions of opinion derived by the publisher from stated facts, and a defence of fair comment should not be struck out at the interlocutory stage. The statutory defence of honest opinion under s 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) does not differ from the common law defence of fair comment as to the requirement that the facts on which the opinion is based appear in the publication or otherwise be apparent to the reader.
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