Commissioner of Police v Sleiman & AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd & Ors

[2011] NSWCA 21

NSW Court of Appeal

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Catchwords

1. Administrative Law
2. › Judicial review
3. › Review of administrative tribunal decisions
4. › Criminal intelligence confidentiality regime
5. › Whether Commissioner bound to consider request for approval to disclose criminal intelligence
6. › Whether ADT empowered to adopt special advocate procedure
7. › Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW), s 29(3)
1. Administrative Law
2. › Tribunals
3. › Powers and procedures
4. › Procedural fairness in face of statutory confidentiality regime
5. › Power to appoint counsel to assist tribunal
6. › Amicus curiae analogy
7. › Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW), ss 73(2), 73(3)
1. Constitutional Law (Cth)
2. › Judicial power of States
3. › Supervisory jurisdiction of Supreme Courts
4. › Whether statutory confidentiality regime denies constitutionally entrenched supervisory jurisdiction
5. › Whether practical difficulties in invoking judicial review constitute denial of jurisdiction
6. › Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) principles
7. › Constitution, Ch III, s 73
1. Administrative Law
2. › Statutory construction
3. › Criminal intelligence non-disclosure regime
4. › Construction of 'approval' power in s 29(3)
5. › Whether approval envisages request by tribunal or by review applicant
6. › Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW), ss 15(6), 15(7), 29(3)

Quick Take

The Commissioner of Police is not bound to consider or respond to a licence holder's request for approval to disclose criminal intelligence under s 29(3) of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW); the sub-section envisages that requests for approval will be made by the ADT, not the review applicant. However, the ADT retains power to appoint its own counsel to assist it in evaluating criminal intelligence, performing functions analogous to an amicus curiae, without requiring the Commissioner's approval. Practical difficulties in invoking the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction caused by a statutory confidentiality regime do not render the regime constitutionally invalid under Kirk principles.