Where the prosecution case on all charges in a sexual offence trial depends entirely on the credibility and reliability of a single complainant with no independent supporting evidence, and the jury acquits on some charges, there must be a logical and reasonable explanation for the divergent approach to the complainant's credibility as between the charges resulting in conviction and those resulting in acquittal. The relative seriousness of the charges does not, without more, provide such an explanation. Hayne J's statement in Libke that the question is whether the jury 'must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt' does not restate the M test in more stringent terms but merely emphasises the essential question of whether it was 'open' to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
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