matter of Mrs Chang’s proceedings and Danwei’s proceedings for the division of matrimonial property because the necessary first step in the latter proceedings is the ascertainment of the property of the parties to the marriage.
Alternatively, the matrimonial proceedings brought by Danwei are pending in the FCFCA and the subject matter of Mrs Chang’s proceedings are in relation to the subject-matter of those proceedings.
I am, therefore, not persuaded that there is any substance in Mrs Chang’s contention that the FCFCA does not have jurisdiction.
I observe that s 5(1)(b)(ii) of the Cross-vesting Act sets out in subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) the matters to which the court, before whom an application to transfer has been made, must have regard. The conjunction of those subparagraphs requires the Court to have regard to all three considerations. However, it is not necessary that all three considerations support a favourable exercise of the discretion.[4] They remain considerations, not pre-conditions, to the exercise of the power.
