The Court held that a sentencing judge who rejects unchallenged expert evidence as to a causal nexus between an offender's mental illness and the offending, without raising that possibility with counsel during the hearing, denies the offender procedural fairness where the Crown's submissions proceeded on the basis the evidence would be accepted. However, on re-sentencing, the Court held that the offender's depressive disorder and its causal link to the offending reduced moral culpability only to a limited extent and did not significantly diminish the weight to be given to general deterrence, retribution and denunciation for this objectively serious offence. The Court also held that PTSD developed by an offender as a psychological consequence of their own offending conduct is not generally to be treated as extra-curial punishment, though it may be taken into account as making time in custody more onerous or as a basis for finding special circumstances.
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