The Court refused an extension of time to appeal a contact order made by the President of the Children's Court, holding that a section 91 appeal from a standalone contact order under section 86 of the Care Act does not permit the appellate court to consider at large questions of parental responsibility in the absence of a section 90 leave grant from the Children's Court. The guiding principles in section 9 of the Care Act — particularly the paramountcy of the child's welfare, the weight to be given to a mature child's expressed views, and the least intrusive intervention principle — were applied as substantive considerations in the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse an extension of time. On the facts, the 14-year-old child's consistent, informed opposition to the proceedings and to compelled contact, his settled care arrangements, and the father's poor prospects of success were decisive against the grant of leave.
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