1Where an application for security for costs is brought after the parties have substantially progressed the appeal (outlines filed, appeal book prepared), the delay — even if not lengthy in absolute terms — is significant in context and weighs against the grant of security, particularly where the applicant knew from the outset that the appellant was legally aided and impecunious.
2The likelihood that security will stifle an appeal retains weight even at the appellate stage (where the appellant has had her day in court), and the combination of stifling effect, delay, arguable merit, and the raising of a question of legal principle of broader significance can together outweigh the appellant's impecuniosity and prior exercise of legal rights.
3The possibility that Legal Aid Queensland might pay an adverse costs order under s 32 of the Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997 (Qld) is speculative and carries no weight in assessing whether security should be ordered, as that power appears only enlivened once an adverse costs order is actually made.
