The Court discharged a prior restraint order that had prevented the automatic operation of a trust deed clause appointing the plaintiff as appointor upon turning 23, finding that the circumstances justifying the status quo order (lack of client instructions, proximity to trial) had changed. The Court refused to give the discharge retrospective (nunc pro tunc) effect, holding it was inappropriate where the plaintiff had not in fact been acting as appointor during the restrained period. On withdrawal of admissions, the Court refused leave to withdraw factual admissions in paragraphs 89 and 91(a) of the defence where no error in the admitted facts was demonstrated and the defendant merely sought to re-characterise the purpose of admitted transfers, but granted leave to withdraw the admission in paragraph 91(b) concerning the legal conclusion of indebtedness, as that raised a genuine question of legal characterisation appropriate for resolution at trial.
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