Appeal against decision of associate justice to grant extension of time to commence proceedings for damages
Quick Take
1An appeal against a discretionary decision to extend time under s 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) is governed by House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 principles, not the correctness standard; the appellant must establish specific error or that the decision was plainly wrong, unreasonable or unjust.
2The characterisation of delay as 'long' rather than 'inordinate' is not a specific error; the word 'inordinate' is merely a convenient label for delay that is excessive in the circumstances, and the legislation requires consideration of the 'length' of delay without mandating any particular characterisation.
3The assessment of whether it is 'just and reasonable' to extend time requires a synthesis of all relevant circumstances into a single evaluative conclusion, not a summation of values separately ascribed to each factor; where the decision-maker has regard to relevant considerations, makes necessary findings of fact without misapprehending the evidence, and reaches a conclusion reasonably open, the appeal should fail.
