The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal against sentence on parity grounds, holding that it was reasonably open to the sentencing judge to impose sentences on the applicant that were only modestly more favourable than those imposed on his co-offender, notwithstanding findings that the co-offender was the mastermind, bore higher responsibility, had more limited rehabilitation prospects, and did not benefit from the same moral culpability reduction. The Court emphasised that the differing non-parole period proportions (66.6% for the applicant versus 75.3% for the co-offender) reflected the judge's rehabilitation findings, and that the co-offender's individual sentences on joint charges were likely compressed by totality considerations given she was sentenced on seven charges versus the applicant's three. The Court confirmed that the parity test requires the applicant to show the lack of differentiation was not reasonably open, not merely that greater disparity could have been imposed.
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