The Court held that a judge's independent research into the current state of the law and raising the results of that research with counsel during a hearing is ordinary judicial practice that does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, even in the context of an ex parte habeas corpus application where counsel contended the procedure should be summary and limited. The Court also held that there was no logical connection between the judge's conduct in identifying and raising relevant Federal Court authorities — including decisions directly involving the applicant — and any feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits. The question of the correct evidentiary burden for habeas corpus where the applicant was detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act, and whether prior Federal Court dismissals give rise to res judicata, issue estoppel or abuse of process, were expressly left for determination at a later stage.
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