Later decisions that cite Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd
Lorp Buckmaster. My Lords, the appel- lant is the owner of the Killymoon estate in the county of Tyrone. The respondents are five insurance companies with whom at various dates in January and February of 1922, the appellant effected insurance against fire on timber and wood goods in the open situate on the Killymoon domain not within a hundred yards of any saw mill or any building (1) (1807) 9 East, 72. (5) (1852) 7 Ex. 323. (2) [1905] 2 K. B. 555, 562. (6) (1856) 5 E. & B. 870. (3) (1802) 2 East, 544. (7) (1859) 1 E. & E. 652. (4) (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 478, 485. (8) (1876) 1 App. Cas. 713. (9) (1886) 12 App. Cas. 128. 623 H. L. (In.) 1925 MACAURA v. NorTHERN ASSURANCE Co. 624 H. L, (IR.) 1925 —Y MAcAuRA v. NortHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster. HOUSE OF LORDS [1925] in which wood working by power other than wind or water was carried on. Neither the amounts nor the exact language of the policies are material for the purposes of the present appeal, nor is the fact that the policies were really effected in the name of the appellant and the Governor and the Company of the Bank of Ireland, for the real questions that arise for determination are these : 1. Whether the appellant had any insurable interest in the goods the subject of the policies, and 2. Whether the respondents were, in the circumstances, at liberty to raise the contention that he had no such interest in the manner in which it was raised in the course of these proceedings. . The history of the matter can be stated in a few sentences. The appellant upon whose estate the timber in question was originally standing on December 30, 1919, assigned the whole of it to a company known as the Irish Canadian Saw Mills, Ld., the amount to be paid for the timber felled and unfelled being 27,000/., while a further 15,0001. was to be paid for the cost incurred by the appellant in felling the timber that was then down. The total price paid was therefore 42,0001., satisfied by the allotment to the appellant or his nominees of 42,0001. fully paid 1/. shares in the company; no further shares than these were ever issued. The company proceeded with the operations of cutting the timber, and by the end of August, 1921, it had all been felled and sawn up in the saw mills. In the course of these operations the appellant had become the creditor of the company for 19,000/., and beyond this it is stated that the debts of the company were trifling in amount. The timber when cut remained lying on the appellant's land, and on February 22, 1922, the greater part of it was destroyed by fire. The appel- lant accordingly claimed against the companies upon the policies and, on May 30, 1922, in an answer sent on behalf of all the companies, it was stated that the com- panies must decline to accept liability for the loss of any timber within a hundred yards of the saw mill. The appellant and the Bank of Ireland accordingly instituted A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. proceedings by issuing writs against each of the respondent companies, and each of the statements of claim delivered contained the following allegation: "3. The plaintiffs were at the date of the effecting of the said policy of insurance and at the time of the loss and damage hereinafter mentioned interested in the said timber to the amount so insured thereon as aforesaid." On production of the policies all these actions must have been dismissed, since each policy contained a clause referring all disputes to arbitration and making the award of the arbitrator a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the companies. Instead of pleading this as a defence the companies applied to stay the actions and refer the matters in dispute to arbitration, and on July 21, 1922, an order was made to that effect. Upon the hearing of the arbitration several charges of fraud and dis- honesty were made against the appellant, all of which failed, and upon the point initially raised in the letter to which reference has been made the arbitrator decided in the appel- lant's favour, but he held that in the circumstances the appellant had no insurable interest in the timber, and this view has been supported in the Court of King's Bench and in the Court of Appeal. The question as to the competency of the arbitrator to determine the dispute as to the insurable interest of the plaintiff only arises if no such insurable interest can be recog- nized by the law, and it is this point therefore that first re- quires consideration. It must, in my opinion, be admitted that at first sight the facts suggest that there really was no person other than the plaintiff who was interested in the preservation of the timber. It is true that the timber was owned by the company, but practically the whole interest in the company was owned by the appellant. He would receive the benefit of any profit and on him would fall the burden of any loss. But the principles on which the decision of this case rests must' be independent of the extent of the interest held. The appellant could only insure either as a creditor or as a shareholder in the company. And if he was not entitled A. C. 1925. 3 2U 625 H. L. (Ir.) 1925 —— MACAURA Vv. NORTHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster, 626 H. L. (IR.) 1925 ~~ Macaura v. NorTHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster. HOUSE OF LORDS [1925] in virtue of either of these rights he can acquire no better position by reason of the fact that he held both characters. As a creditor his position appears to me quite incapable of supporting the claim. If his contention were right it would follow that any person would be at liberty to insure the furniture of his debtor, and no such claim has ever been recognized by the Courts. It is true that since the case of Godsall v. Boldero (1), where a creditor of Mr. Pitt was held entitled to effect an insurance upon his life, this interest of a creditor has always been recognized as sufficient to support a life policy, but this depends, as was said by Lord Ellenborough, upon the means and probability of payment which the continuance of a debtor's life affords to his creditors and the probability of loss which would result from his death. In the case of Moran, Galloway & Co. v. Uziellt (2), where a creditor for ships' necessaries was held entitled to insure the ship, the decision rested upon the fact that the creditor had a right in rem against the vessel, and the learned judge said that "in so far as the plaintiffs' claim depends upon the fact that they were ordinary unsecured creditors of the shipowners for an ordinary unsecured debt, I am satisfied that it must fail. The probability that if the debtor's ship should be lost he would be less able to pay his debts does not, in my judgment, give to the creditor any interest, legal or equitable, which is dependent upon the safe arrival of the ship." This is, in my opinion, an accurate statement of the law, and the appellant therefore cannot establish his claim as creditor. Turning now to his position as shareholder, this must be .independent of the extent of his share interest. If he were | entitled to insure holding all the shares in the company, each shareholder would be equally entitled, if the shares were all in separate hands. Now, no shareholder has any right to any item of property owned by the company; for he has no legal or equitable interest therein. He is entitled to a share in the' profits while the company continues to carry on business and a share in the distribution of the surplus (1) 9 East, 72. (2) [1905] 2 K. B. 555, 562. A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. assets when the company is wound up. If he were at liberty to effect an insurance against loss by fire of any item of the company's property, the extent of his insurable interest could only be measured by determining the extent to which his share in the ultimate distribution would be diminished by the loss of the asset—a calculation almost impossible to make. There is no means by which such an interest can be definitely measured and no standard which can be fixed of the loss against which the contract of insurance could be regarded as an indemnity. This difficulty was realized by counsel for the appellant, who really based his case upon the contention that such a claim was recognized by authority and depended upon the proper application of the definition of insurable interest given by Lawrence J. in Lucena v. Craufurd. (1) I agree with the comment of Andrews L.J. upon this case. I find equally with him a difficulty in under- standing how a moral certainty can be so defined as to render it an essential part of a definite legal proposition. In the present case, though it might be regarded as a moral certainty that the appellant would suffer loss if the timber which constituted the sole asset of the company were destroyed by fire, this moral certainty becomes dissipated and _ lost if the asset be regarded as only one in an innumerable number of items in a company's assets and the shareholding interest be spread over a large number of individual shareholders. The authorities which have the closest relation to the present are those of Paterson v. Harris (2) and Wilson v. Jones. (3) In the first of these cases a shareholder in a company that was established for the purpose of laying down a submarine cable between the United Kingdom and America, effected an insurance upon his interest in the cable. The share- holder's insurable interest in the cable does not appear to have been disputed and the real question, therefore, was never argued. In the case of Wilson v. Jones (3), where another policy was effected by a shareholder in the same company, it was distinctly held that the policy was not upon (1) 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 269, 302. (2) 1B. & S. 336. (3) L. R. 1 Ex. 193; L. R. 2 Ex. 139. 3 2U2 627 H. L. (IR.) 1925 —— MACAURA Vv. NorTHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster, 628 HOUSE OF LORDS [1925] H. L. (Ir.) the cable but upon the shareholder's interest in the adventure 1925 —— MACAURA v NorTHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster. atin of the cable being successfully laid. It was attempted by the underwriters to limit the insurance to an interest in the cable itself, which would have lessened the risk, but it was held that this was not the true construction of the policy. It was not argued that, if it were, the shareholder had no interest to insure, but both Martin B. in the Court of Exchequer and Willes J. in the Exchequer Chamber, stated that the plaintiff had no direct interest in the cable as a shareholder in the company, and, so far as I can see, this consideration it was that assisted the Court in determining that the insurance was upon the adventure in which the shareholder had an interest, and not upon the cable in which he had none. There are no other cases that even approxi- mately approach the present case, and, properly regarded, I think the case of Wilson v. Jones (1) is against and not in favour of the appellant's contention. Upon the merits of this dispute, therefore, the appellant must fail. Neither a simple creditor nor a shareholder in a company has any _insurable interest in a particular asset which the company holds. Nor can his claim to insure be supported on the ground that he was a bailee of the timber, for in fact he owed no duty whatever to the company in respect of the safe custody of the goods; he had merely permitted their remaining upon his land. The remaining contentions can be briefly dealt with. The letter of May 30 certainly created no estoppel, nor did the application to refer to arbitration. Whether the arbitrator had power without consent to determine that the policy was void because of lack of insurable interest does not appear to me to arise. The time for the appellant to take this objec- tion was when the order for reference was made, for one of the allegations in issue was the statement that he possessed an insurable interest ; nor is there any substance in the conten- tion that he was led by the defendants to believe the only question to be referred was the construction of the policy. (1) L. R. 1 Ex. 193; L. R. 2 Ex. 139. A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. In any event a further opportunity was offered to him upon the question being raised before the arbitrator, for he could then have raised his contention on an application to stay the arbitration; but, in fact, the point was fully argued before the arbitrator, who was asked by appellant's counsel to state a case upon it. On December 13, 1922, the appellant served a notice of motion seeking to have the award set aside, and on January 8 a further notice of motion was served adding as an additional ground for relief that the arbitrator's jurisdiction was terminated by repudiation of the policy on the grounds of fraud put forward by the defendants. The notice of motion is not in the documents before the House, but it would appear from this statement that neither notice of motion raised the particular point that is now relied upon. The Court of the King's Bench Division decided against the appellant, and his notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal asked only the following relief, namely: that question No. 1 in the award should be answered in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative and the judgment of the King's Bench should be reversed. Now, question No. 1 was the question as to whether the appellant had any insur- able interest in the timber, and it was this question which the appellant himself invited the Court of Appeal to decide in his favour. After this it is impossible for him to say that there is no proper decision upon the matter and that the whole proceedings are void. Nor did he raise again by his notice to the Court of Appeal the question that the arbi- trator's jurisdiction was terminated by the charges of fraud. It would, indeed, have been foolish to do so, for those questions were all decided in his favour. The question therefore as to the authority of the arbitrator to decide the point as to insurable interest is no longer open to the appellant, but if it were, I agree with the views expressed upon it by Moore L.J. in the Court of Appeal. For these reasons I am of opinion that this appeal must fail and should be dis- missed with costs. Lorp Arktnson. My Lords, I have had the pleasure and advantage of reading the judgment which has just been 629 H. L. (Ir.) 1925 —— MACAURA Vv. NORTHERN ASSURANCE Co. Lord Buckmaster. 630 HOUSE OF LORDS [1925] H. L. (Iz.) delivered by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack. i925 I approve of it and have nothing to add. v. Lorp SumNER. My Lords, this appeal relates to an insur- Assurance ance on goods against loss by fire. It is clear that the appellant oo: had no insurable interest in the timber described. It was not his. It belonged to the Irish Canadian Sawmills, Ltd., of Skibbereen, co. Cork. He had no lien or security over it and, though it lay on his land by his permission, he had no responsibility to its owner for its safety, nor was it there under any contract that enabled him to hold it for his debt. He owned almost all the shares in the company, and | the company owed him a good deal of money, but, neither as creditor nor as shareholder, could he insure the company's assets. The debt was not exposed to fire nor were the shares, and the fact that he was virtually the company's only creditor, | while the timber was its only asset, seems to me to make no difference. He stood in no "legal or equitable relation to' the timber at all. He had no "concern in " the subject insured. His relation was to the company, not to its goods, and after the fire he was directly prejudiced by the 2 are of the company's assets, not by the fire. 4 No authority has been produced for the proposition that the appellant had any insurable interest in the timber in any capacity, and the books are full of decisions and dicta that 'he had none. Paterson v. Harris (1) and Wilson v. Jones (2) are very special cases, and neither is in point here. In the former there was no plea traversing the allegation that the plaintiff had an insurable interest. The Court, construing the policy as one really expressed to be on the cable, dealt with the case as one in which interest was admitted therein, but its decision of the case after this admission of interest is not a decision that a shareholder as such has an insurable interest in a company's assets themselves. In the latter, where the policy described the subject-matter of the insurance in a very obscure manner, it was held that the shareholder insured had an interest that he could insure in the profits of (1) 1B. & 8. 336. (2) L. R.2 Ex. 139. A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. the adventure so described, but it was expressly stated that he had no such interest in his shares in the company. There remains the contention that the respondents were incompetent to raise the absence of insurable interest upon 631 H. L. (IR.) 1925 —— MaAcAauRA v. NorTHERN the arbitration. This seems to me to be a pure misappre- mere hension. It is said that the defendants could not have got the order, which stayed the action and referred the matter in dispute to arbitration, if they had stated that they meant to rely on this point or, rather, if they had not actually inti- mated that they would not. The argument rests on the contention that to put the plaintiff to proof of an insurable interest is the same thing as pleading the Gaming Act, and saying that the policy is null and void and that there is no contract for arbitration or anything else, but in truth the defendants have said no such thing. The letters written before the order was made did not, either affirmatively or negatively, show anything of the kind. The plaintiff had averred an insurable interest in his pleading. The defendants, who moved for a stay before putting in a defence, simply denied liability, and the issue so raised was the matter in dispute. The case of Jureidini (1) is not in point. There persons, who had repudiated the whole contract of insurance, afterwards relied on a limited arbitration clause contained in it, which required the amount payable to be determined by arbitration, and said that, until he had obtained such an award, the plaintiff could not complete his case. It was held that the defendants could not both repudiate the contract in toto and require the performance of a part of it, which only became performable when liability was admitted or established. The present case is the converse. Here an arbitration and award are conditions precedent to any action to enforce the policy. The defendants do not repudiate the policy or dispute its validity as a contract ; on the contrary, they rely on it and say that, according to its terms, express and implied, they are relieved from liability: see Stebbing's case (2); Woodall v. Pearl Assurance Co. (3) It is a (1) [1915] A. C. 499. (2) [1917] 2 K. B. 433. (3) [1919] 1 K. B. 593. Lord Sumner, 632 HOUSE OF LORDS [1925] H.L. (Ix.) fallacy to say that they assert the policy to be null and 1925 void. They do not plead or mention the Gaming Act, Macaura and have no need to rely on it. The contract made in : the policy was that, if the plaintiff could prove, among Norruern ASSURANCE other things, that he had, at the time of loss, such an "maser insurable interest in the timber as the law recognizes, Sa the insurers would pay, and not otherwise. No gaming contract was ever made, nor any agreement to pay, interest or no interest. It is we who would make the contract a gaming contract, if we were to accept the appellant's con- tention. The respondents say, and truly say, that a fire 4 insurance policy is not an aleatory contract, but is a contract of indemnity, under which the assured must aver and prove interest at the time of the loss. This is a part of the law of insurance, quite independently of the Gaming Act, though the consequence of failure to prove interest is the same —namely, that the policy is unenforceable by an uninterested assured. It was open to the defendants to raise this case at any time. Under the policy arbitration was the only legal proceeding open, and the order was made as a matter of course. The insurers gave up nothing in consideration of getting the order, and all the defences remained open to them. Estoppel has been mentioned, but there was none. The defendants did not make any representation, and the plaintiff did not change his position on the faith of one. ' The case of Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Craine (1) is distinguishable. It is a case in which, under very special circumstances, the appellants were held to have estopped themselves by their conduct from claiming to rely on one of the conditions in a policy (p. 553). Here I can find no conduct which disentitles the defendants to raise any defence, of which the case admits. I also agree with the Courts below that the appellant allowed the point of absence of interest to be taken before the arbi- trator and, without moving to discharge the order of reference, went on and took his chance of success, and, further, that there is nothing now before your Lordships except the determination of the questions stated by the learned (1) [1922] 2 A. C.541. A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. arbitrator in his award. A motion to set the award aside failed, and has not been appealed. My Lords, I think this appeal fails. Lorp Wrensury. My Lords, this appeal may be dis- posed of by saying that the corporator even if he holds all the shares is not the corporation, and that neither he nor any creditor of the company has any property legal or equit- able in the assets of the corporation. Further, I have read and concur in the judgment delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Sumner. I think the appeal should be dismissed. Lorp Puitirmore. My Lords, I concur. ; Order of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland affirmed, and appeal dismissed with costs. t Lords' Journals, April 3, 1925.