Later decisions that cite Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lorp MacDeErmott, who stated the facts set out above and continued: In its material terms, s. 11, sub-s. 2, of the Ordinance reproduces s. 2, sub-s. 3, of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, which, there can be little doubt, was designed to modify the effect of certain decisions of the courts relating to the quantum of compensation in cases of compulsory purchase. Their Lordships, however, do not find it necessary to discuss the historical background of this legislation as its applicability to the somwehat peculiar situation presented by this appeal turns, in their opinion, on the actual wording of the enactment. It is, of course, possible that land may have a special suitability or adaptability for several purposes, and, where this is so, it may well happen that s. 11, sub-s. 2, will operate to exclude compensation in respect of some of such purposes and not in respect of others. But it must be assumed that the word " purpose '"' is used or referred to throughout the sub- section in the same sense. That being so, the expression " if 'that purpose is a purpose to which it could be applied only (1) [1915] 2 Ch. 252. ND PORT Co., Lp, v. SUB- INTENDENT 572 TOC. 1947 POINTE GOURDE QUARRYING AND TRANSPORT Comsicp: v. SUB- INTENDENT HOUSE OF LORDS [1947] 'in pursuance of statutory powers" indicates, in their Lordships' view, that the word is employed in the sub-section as meaning a purpose to which the land can be applied. It therefore connotes a use, actual or potential, of the land itself, and cannot be regarded as meaning a purpose which is only concerned with the use of the products of the land else- where. So, while the use of this land as a quarry manifested a "special suitability or adaptability" for a purpose within the meaning of the sub-section (which on the facts was not excluded thereby from the assessment of compensation) the use of the quarried stone in the construction of the naval base, though of particular importance to the United States on account of their special needs, did not, in the opinion of their Lordships, constitute in: itself a " special suitability or "adaptability of the land for any purpose"'' within the meaning of the sub-section. At most it was but a circumstance which added to the value to the United States of the use of the land as a quarry. Their Lordships therefore consider that s. 11, sub-s. 2, of the Ordinance did not apply to the item under discussion when regarded alone, as it must be in this case, and cannot therefore be said to have operated to prevent the value reflected in the award of $15,000 being taken into account. It follows from this that the question as submitted to the Full Court should have been answered in the negative. But it does not follow that this part of the award can stand. It is well settled that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. As it was put by Eve J. in South Eastern Ry. Co. v. London County Counetl (1): "" Increase in value consequent on the execution of the under- "taking for or in connexion with which the purchase is made "must be disregarded." This rule was recognized by the Full Court and, indeed, appears to be the basis of its main con- clusion, for in the course of his judgment Blackall C.]J., after a reference to Lord Buckmaster's statement of the principle in Fraser v. Fraserville (2), proceeds : "In "the present case, although a value as a quarry had admittedly "been created prior to the acquisition, that value wasincreased "by the fact that a base was being established in the vicinity "for which a large quantity of stone in a readily accessible "situation was required. In other words, the value was (1) [1915] 2 Ch. 252, 258. (2) [1917] A. C. 187, 194. A. C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. " enhanced by the scheme of the party acquiring the land, and ' that is not a factor for which additional compensation may " properly be awarded."' On behalf of the appellants it was said that the relevant scheme in this matter was the acquisition of the quarry land and not the construction of the naval base in its vicinity. Their Lordships are unable to accede to this argument. The case stated finds that the lands acquired were "' required by "the United States for the establishment of a naval base in "Trinidad." That being so, the nature of the scheme of this acquisition is clear and the award of $15,000 can only be related to the additional value which it gave to the quarry land. For these reasons their Lordships consider that the Full Court was right in disallowing the item in question. This determines the substance of the matter in dispute as the appeal cannot be regarded as turning on the answer given to the question of law submitted which was, unfortunately, formulated too narrowly to raise the real issue. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants must pay the costs of this appeal.