Practitioners drafting contracts referencing a specific regulatory authority should consider including provisions addressing the possibility that the authority may be replaced by a successor body, as courts will not imply such a term.
Later decisions that cite Besier v Foster
BESIER v. FOSTER [1952] HCA 14; (1952) 94 CLR 526
Contract
High Court of Australia
Dixon C.J.(1), McTiernan(1), Williams(1), Webb(1) and Fullagar(1) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Contract - Specific performance - Sale of land for fixed sum or such other sum as might be approved by Commonwealth authority under Commonwealth regulations - Application to Commonwealth authority - Cessation of regulations before decision - Provision by State Act for dealing with applications pending before Commonwealth authority - Whether decision by State authority a fulfillment of contractual term.
HEARING
Melbourne, 1952, March 14, 17. 17:3:1952DECISION
THE COURT delivered the following oral judgment:-2. We shall not enter upon the questions which were discussed as to the sufficiency of that or the sufficiency of the consents which were given. What we shall place our decision upon is the plain meaning of the provision which we have read from the contract, the provision which states that the price may be a lower sum approved by the delegate of the Treasurer under the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations. No consent was given to the contract for the higher sum of 26,500 pounds and any approval or consent which was obtained capable of satisfying the terms of the provision was given only by the State authority. It is clear that the clause specifies the federal authority, the delegate of the Treasurer under the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations, and we think that the plaintiff cannot escape the consequences of the fact that the condition which those words prescribe was never fulfilled, with the result that the condition on which the obligation of the contract as a sale at a lower price depends was never fulfilled. To escape from that it has been argued that the words "the delegate of the Treasurer" in the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations, whilst literally referring to the federal authority, are really directed at specifying what may be called the legal authority for the time being who may exercise land sales control on the same principles as appear from the Economic Organization Regulations. The argument is that there is nothing except the legal position of the delegate of the Treasurer under the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations to lead to the selection of him as the person to fix the lower price and that in reality and in substance those words are merely directed to prescribe the legal authority as he may be from time to time constituted provided that the principles upon which the authority proceeds are the same or substantially the same as those which the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations contemplated. Accordingly, they should, as it is submitted for the plaintiff, be construed as in substance providing for the possibility of the transfer of authority from Commonwealth to State. (at p529)
3. We think that there cannot be found in the words any such wide intention. They speak for themselves. They are definite and they satisfy the authority which is erected by the Commonwealth. The argument that Commonwealth authority as distinguished from State authority is non-essential is an argument which disregards what the words say and attempts to introduce into them a change of actual meaning. It is however next submitted that an implication should be drawn from the surrounding circumstances and from the text of the contract that in case of a transfer of land sales control from the Federal to the State governments (provided the new authority acts upon the same principles) the contract should proceed as under that new authority and the new authority should fulfil the function which the paragraph of the contract expressly reposes in the delegate of the Treasurer under the Commonwealth regulations. To make an implication to the effect of that described appears to us to go beyond anything warranted by the principles upon which implications are made to give efficacy to a contract where a term has been unexpressed or some matter has been omitted. In fact the parties may or may not have contemplated the possibility of a new authority arising and the old authority ceasing. Upon either hypothesis they have expressed themselves in exact terms and there is no basis for introducing into their contract an unexpressed term as a necessary implication to overcome the difficulty in which one party to the contract finds himself. As this is a matter which is fatal to the success of the action for specific performance we think we should pronounce upon it now and not proceed to investigate the other matters raised by way of defence, some only of which we have adverted to. The appeal should therefore be allowed and the judgment of Gibson J. restored. (at p530)
4. The order will be: - Appeal allowed with costs. Order of the Supreme Court discharged. Appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed with costs. Order of Gibson A.J. restored. (at p530)
ORDER
Appeal allowed with costs. Order of the Supreme Court discharged. Appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed with costs. Order of Gibson A.J. restored.