Later decisions that cite Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council
April 19. Viscounr Srwonps. My Lords, the appellants
put their claims on alternative grounds, (a) that the contract
33 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 85 [1920] 1 K.B. 868.
4th ed., 122. 36 2 Hudson's Building Contracts,
34 [1949] 2 K.B. 623. 4th ed., 122.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
price was subject to an express overriding condition contained
in a letter of March 18, 1946, that there should be adequate
supplies of labour and material, and (b) that the contract
had been entered into on the footing that adequate supplies
of labour and material would be available to complete the
work within eight months, but, contrary to the expectation of
both parties, there was not sufficient skilled labour and the work
took 22 months, and that this delay amounted to frustration
of the contract. It was conceded by the respondents that,
if the contract was frustrated as alleged, the appellants were
entitled to a further sum upon the basis of a quantum meruit.
With this aspect of the case, which might have presented some
difficulty, your Lordships will not be troubled. These two grounds
of claim have persisted through the long course of these proceed-
ings, which have included a prolonged hearing before an arbitrator,
an award in the form of a special case, a hearing of the case by
the Lord Chief Justice, an appeal to the Court of Appeal, a
reference back to the arbitrator, a supplemental award by him,
a further hearing by the Court of Appeal, and an order of that
court rejecting the appellants' claim.
My Lords, with the first ground of claim I will deal very
briefly. I am in full agreement with the opinion of Parker L.J.
on this part of the case, which will be elaborated by my noble
and learned friend, Lord Radcliffe. The appellants' letter of
March 18, 1946, to which I have referred, was a covering letter
in which, while enclosing their tender prepared in accordance
with the respondents' bills of quantities and specifications, they
made a number of statements about the basis of that tender.
The material statement was as follows: '* Our tender is subject
"to adequate supplies of material and labour being available
""as and when required to carry out the work within the time
'" specified.'' It is possible that, if this letter had been followed
by an immediate acceptance, the parties must have been deemed
to enter into a contract which contained some such term, though
its precise content and effect would have been extremely difficult
to define. But that is not what took place nor what might be
expected to take place. On the contrary, there were negotiations
following the tender and these resulted in the formal agreement
of July 6, which did not incorporate the letter of March 18. It
would, as it appears to me, be contrary to all practice and
precedent to hark back to a single term of preceding negotiations
after a formal and final agreement omitting that term has been
signed. The reference to the letter in an appendix to the tender
713
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lop.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CouNncrIn.
Viscount
Simonds.
a EE ee a ee ae ee ee ee eee
714
H. L. ()
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lr.
0.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DiIsTRICT
CoUNCIL.
Viscount
Simonds.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956]
is clearly confined to the matter with which that appendix dealt,
namely, the so-called '' escalator ''' clause of the conditions of
contract.
The second ground of claim demands more serious considera-
tion, not because it has any intrinsic merit but because it has
acquired from the course of the proceedings a certain specious
validity.
[His Lordship recited the findings of the arbitrator and the
direction of the Court of Appeal on the first hearing there and
continued: ] My Lords, I do not find it easy to interpret this
direction. The case of Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town
Trustees, which is reported only in Hudson on Building Contracts,
if it can be said to embody any principle, illustrates an early stage
in the development of the doctrine of frustration which has since
been the subject of many decisions in this House. And it was,
I think, to this issue that the contentions of the parties and the
further findings of the arbitrator were directed.
[His Lordship referred to the supplemental award and con-
tinued: | Now the matter came back to the Court of Appeal, which
was not constituted as on the former occasion. The alternative
grounds of claim were again fully argued. The first ground, that
of the incorporation of the letter of March 18 in the contract, was
rejected, either because it was held not to be incorporated or
because, even if incorporated, it had not the effect for which the
appellants contended. Upon this I will say no more.
The second ground of claim remains, and upon this the learned
judges of the Court of Appeal were unanimously against the appel-
lants and they were, in my opinion, clearly right. If the matter
had in the first instance come before a court of law which, after
finding the facts as found by the arbitrator, had then to consider
the law applicable to those facts, there could only have been one
answer. The Lord Chief Justice was, in my opinion, stating
the obvious when he said in the passage that I have cited, '' I
""do not think it is destruction of the whole foundation of the
"contract.'' The doctrine of frustration of a contract (for it is
that doctrine and nothing else which must be invoked) has never
been applied or, so far as I am aware, been sought to be applied
to such a case unless, indeed, Bush v. Whitehaven Port and
Town Trustees' was one. The contract was for completion of
certain work in eight months: the contractors made their tender
in the expectation that they would be able to do the work in
the time and made a price accordingly. It may then be said that
1 (1888) 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 715
they made the contract on the ''basis'' or on the '' footing'? H. L. (B.)
that their expectations would be fulfilled. Nor presumably were 1956
the expectations, or at least the hopes, of the respondents in —-—————
any way different. Let it be said, then, of them, too, that they Sine
contracted upon the same basis or footing. But it by no means Lr. |
follows that disappointed expectations lead to frustrated | contracts. F pein
T do not 'propose to revive the controversy about the juridical _Ursan
basis of the doctrine of frustration. If it rests on an implied' pete
term of the contract to the effect that the parties will not be! =
bound if a certain event happens or does not happen, I can see Simonds.
no ground for saying that such a term must be implied in this
contract. If it is permissible to judge by the event, it is clear |
that the parties would not have agreed on any such term. I
pause to observe that it is not enough to say that in the event
of something unexpected happening some term must be implied:
it must be clear also what that term should be. In such a case
as this I can see no reason for supposing that the parties would
have agreed either at what moment the frustrating event was
to be deemed to happen, or what was to be the position when
it in fact happened. Equally, if, as is held by some, the true
doctrine rests, not on an implied term of the contract between the
parties, but on the impact of the law on a situation in which an
unexpected event would make it unjust to hold parties to their
bargain, I would emphasize that in this aspect the doctrine has
been, and must be, kept within very narrow limits. No case has
been cited in which it has been applied to circumstances in any
way comparable to those of the present case. It is sufficient to
ask when in the course of this twenty-two month contract that
unexpected disruptive event happened which put an end to it.
'* Rights,'' said Lord Sumner in Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel
& Co.,? '' ought not to be left in suspense or to hang on the
'* chances of subsequent events.'' It is wholly inconsistent with
this, as I think, fundamental condition that a building contractor
should without intermission work upon his contract over a period
which by much or little exceeds the contract time and at the end
of it say, as the appellants say here, "' A twenty-two month
'' project is not an eight month project,'' or less formidably,
'* An expenditure of £111,000 is not an expenditure of £94,000,
'' therefore the original contract must be regarded as frustrated
'' and for all the work that has been done we must be paid, not
'the contract price but upon the basis of a quantum meruit."'
My Lords, I say it with all respect to the arguments of counsel,
2 [1919] A.C. 485, 454; 35 T.L.R. 150.
716
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
0.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DIsTRIOT
CoUNCIL.
Viscount
Simonds.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
but it appears to me that that is to make nonsense of a doctrine
which, used within its proper limits, serves a valuable purpose.
But, it was urged, this case cannot be regarded in the manner
that I postulated. There are the findings of the arbitrator, a man
experienced in the matter of building contracts, and they should
not be set aside. I will say at once that the arbitrator has clearly
done his work with great care and skill. But his findings involve
a blend of law and fact and, deliberately using the words that he
has chosen, "' basis' and '' footing,'' I can see no justification
for a conclusion of law that the contract was frustrated.
It remains to say something about the case of Bush v. White-
haven Port and Town Trustees? which has loomed so large in
the earlier stages of this case and in the argument before this
House. I must say for myself that I find it an extremely puzzling
case and, if it had been a decision of this House and, therefore,
binding on us, I should have felt grave difficulty about it. But
two things may be said: first, that it is not binding on us;
secondly, in so far as it is an authority on the law of frustration,
for which purpose alone I conceive it to have been cited, it must
be read in the light of the numerous decisions of higher authority
which have since been given. I am not satisfied that it can be
supported on the ground suggested by Denning L.J. nor, on the
other hand, do I say that the decision is a wrong one. But I do
emphatically say that it cannot, in the light of later authority,
be used to support the proposition that where, without the
default of either party, there has been an unexpected turn of
events, which renders the contract more onerous than the parties
had contemplated, that is by itself a ground for relieving a party
of the obligation he has undertaken. I agree with the learned
Lord Justice that that is the import of the decision of this House
in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas
Ltd.,* and that it precisely covers this case.
I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
Lorp Morton or Hrenryron. My Lords, two questions of law
arise on this appeal: 1. Was the letter of March 18, 1946, from
the appellants to the respondents, incorporated in the contract
under seal which was entered into by the parties on July 9, 1946?
2. Was that contract frustrated, with the result that the appel-
lants, who have erected 78 houses for the respondents, are not
bound to accept the contract price, but are entitled to a further
3 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4 [1952] A.C. 166; [1951] 2T.L.R.
4th ed., 122. 571; [1951] 2 All E.R. 617.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
sum of over £17,000, which the arbitrator has awarded to
them ?
My Lords, in my opinion, the letter of March 18, 1946, merely
formed part of the negotiations between the parties which led
up to the contract of July 9, and its terms were not incorporated
into that contract. This matter is dealt with fully in the opinion
which will be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord
Radcliffe, and I am content to say that I agree with his reasoning
and his conclusion.
I can state quite briefly my views on the second question,
since I understand your Lordships are all of opinion, as I am, that
the Court of Appeal reached the right conclusion. The appellants
contracted to complete 40 houses within six months, 70 within
seven months, and all the 78 houses within eight months. It
is agreed that the work started on June 20, 1946, and should,
therefore, have been completed in February, 1947. In fact, the
progress of the work was delayed, because, as the arbitrator held,
"" adequate supplies of labour and materials were not available at
'""the times required.'' Nevertheless, the appellants went on
with the work, without any actual interruption, and completed it
in a period of 22 months. They now contend that the contract
was frustrated, and they rely on certain findings by the arbitrator,
which have already been read, and on the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town Trustees.®
My Lords, it is clear that the appellants are entitled to no more
than the contract price, unless they can satisfy your Lordships
that at some time the contract of July 9, 1946, came to an end,
so that in continuing to erect houses they were no longer working
under that contract. I am not so satisfied. I agree with the
observation of Morris L.J. that *: '' Though the basis or footing
''of the contract was removed in the limited sense that the
'' anticipations of the parties were not realized, the facts found
''do not require an implication in the contract that it was to
'come to an end if those anticipations were not realized.'' It
is, I think, impossible to hold that a contract has been frustrated
unless it can be said: '' As and from such and such a date, at
'"* latest, the contract ceased to bind the parties.''
In the course of the hearing counsel for the appellants were
asked: '' When do you say that the contract came to an end? "'',
and they replied that they were unable to specify any time. I
5 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 6 [1955] 1 Q.B. 302, 314-315;
4th ed., 122. [1955] 1 All E.R. 275.
A.C. 1956. 47
Cae
H. L. (B.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CouNcIL.
Lord Morton
of Henryton.
718
H. L. (B.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
es
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CouNCIL.
Lord Morton
of Henryton.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
think that this answer was correct and inevitable, but it reveals
the inherent weakness of the appellants' case.
The facts in the case of Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town
Trustees' are very briefly stated in the report, but I think it is
clear that the judgments of the Court of Appeal in that case were
based upon the findings of the jury, and in particular the fifth
finding. The question put to the jury was: '' Were the
''gonditions of the contract so completely changed, in conse-
'quence of the defendant's inability to hand over the sites of
'' the work as required, as to make the special provisions of the
'' contract inapplicable? '', and the jury replied: "' Yes.'' This
question was, I think, a question of law, or at least of mixed fact
and law, but the Court of Appeal accepted the jury's answer,
and on that footing held that by October 8, 1886, when the con-
tractors got possession of the required sites, the contract had
ceased to exist. In my opinion, Bush v. Whitehaven Port and
Town Trustees? was a decision upon very special facts, which
enabled the court to find that, although the contractors finished
the work specified in the contract, they were not working under
the contract from October 8, 1886, onwards. For this reason the
case does not, in my opinion, assist the appellants. I would add
that, since the decision in the case just cited, the doctrine of
frustration has frequently been considered in your Lordships'
House, and for an authoritative exposition of the doctrine one
should turn to the speeches in this House rather than to the
judgments of the Court of Appeal in Bush v. Whitehaven Port
and Town Trustees.?
I would dismiss the appeal.
Lorp Rerp. My Lords, the arbitrator has found in his supple-
mentary award that "' the footing of the contract was removed,"'
and his reason for so finding is that '' both parties entered into
"the contract on the basis that adequate supplies of labour
""and materials would be available at the times required,'' but
that adequate supplies were not available, with the result that
the duration of the work was unavoidably extended from eight
months to 22 months. It seems clear that he has used the
words "' footing'' and "'basis'' because the special case was
referred back to him for further findings of fact relevant to the
application of the principle in the case of Bush v. Whitehaven
Port and Town Trustees,' and the contentions of the parties on
this issue, and the parties used these words in their contentions.
7 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
The appellants' submissions, as stated in the award, are almost
identical with the arbitrator's findings, and the respondents' sub-
mission is that the footing on which the contract was agreed was
not so changed that the contract could be treated as void. This
form of award gives rise to considerable difficulty. But I have
some sympathy with the arbitrator: he may have found as much
difficulty as I have in discovering '' the principle in the case of
"Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town Trustees.' ''
In order to determine how far the arbitrator's findings are
findings of law and therefore subject to review, I think it is neces-
sary to consider what is the true basis of the law of frustration.
Generally this has not been necessary: for example, Lord Porter
' said in Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co.
Ltd.*: '* Whether this result follows from a true construction
'of the contract or whether it is necessary to imply a term or
'whether again it is more accurate to say that the result follows
"" because the basis of the contract is overthrown, it is not neces-
'"sary to decide.'' These are the three grounds of frustration
which have been suggested from time to time, and I think that
it may make a difference in two respects which is chosen. Con-
struction of a contract and the implication of a term are questions
of law, whereas the question whether the basis of a contract is
overthrown, if not dependent on the construction of the contract,
might seem to be largely a matter for the judgment of a skilled
man comparing what was contemplated with what has happened.
And if the question is truly one of construction I find it difficult
to see why we should not apply the ordinary rules regarding the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence whereas, if it is only a matter
of comparing the contemplated with the actual position, evidence
might be admissible on a wider basis.
Further, I am not satisfied that the result is necessarily the
same whether frustration is regarded as depending on the addition
to the contract of an implied term or as depending on the
construction of the contract as it stands.
Frustration has often been said to depend on adding a term to
the contract by implication: for example, Lord Loreburn in
F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Meaican Petroleum
Products Co. Ltd.,® after quoting language of Lord Blackburn,
said: '' That seems to me another way of saying that from
'
7 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 9.[1916] 2 A.C. 397, 404; 32
4th ed., 122. TVG ils
8 [1944] A.C. 265, 281; 60 T.L.R.
419; [1944] 1 All E.R. 678.
719
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CouNcIL.
Lord Reid.
720
AOL. ()
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
'DISTRICT
Councin.
Lord Reid.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956]
'the nature of the contract it cannot be supposed the
'' parties, ag reasonable men, intended it to be binding on them
''under such altered conditions. Were the altered conditions
"such that, had they thought of them, they would have taken
'their chance of them, or such that as sensible men they would
'"' have said ' if that happens, of course, it is all over between us *?
'' What, in fact, was the true meaning of the contract? Since the
'* parties have not provided for the contingency, ought a court to say
''it is obvious they would have treated the thing as at an end? "'
I find great difficulty in accepting this as the correct approach
because it seems to me hard to account for certain decisions of
this House in this way. I cannot think that a reasonable man
in the position of the seaman in Horlock v. Beal 1° would readily
have agreed that the wages payable to his wife should stop if his
ship was caught in Germany at the outbreak of war, and I doubt
whether the charterers in the Bank Line case ! could have been
said to be unreasonable if they had refused to agree to a term
that the contract was to come to an end in the circumstances
which occurred. These are not the only cases where I think it
would be difficult to say that a reasonable man in the position of
the party who opposes unsuccessfully a finding of frustration
would certainly have agreed to an implied term bringing it about.
I may be allowed to note an example of the artificiality of the
theory of an implied term given by Lord Sands in James Scott
& Sons Ltd. v. Del Sel 1": "' A tiger has escaped from a travelling
""menagerie. The milkgirl fails to deliver the milk. Possibly
'the milkman may be exonerated from any breach of contract;
'but, even so, it would seem hardly reasonable to base that
'"' exoneration on the ground that ' tiger days excepted ' must be
"held as if written into the milk contract."'
I think that there-is much force in Lord Wright's criticism in
Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd.}s:
'The parties did not anticipate fully and completely, if at all,
'' or provide for what actually happened. It is not possible, to my
"mind, to say that, if they had thought of it, they would have
"said: ' Well, if that happens, all is over between us.' On the
' contrary, they would almost certainly on the one side or the
'' other have sought to introduce reservations or qualifications or
'" compensations.''
It appears to me that frustration depends, at least in most
cases, not on adding any implied term, but on the true construction
10 [1916] 1 A.C. 486; 32'T.L.R. 251. 12 1922 §.0. 592, 597.
11 [1919] A.C. 435. 13 [1944] A.C. 265, 275.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
of the terms which are in the contract read in light of the
nature of the contract and of the relevant surrounding circum-
stances when the contract was made. There is much authority
for this view. In British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and
District Cinemas Ltd.1* Viscount Simon said: '' If, on the other
"hand, a consideration of: the terms of the contract, in the light
"of the circumstances existing when it was made, shows that
'they never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different
"situation which has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract
'ceases to bind at that point—not because the court in its
'' discretion thinks it just and reasonable to qualify the terms of
'"the contract, but because on its true construction it does not
'"' apply in that situation.'' In Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd.
v. Commissioners of Works }* Asquith L.J. said: '' In each case
'a delay or interruption was fundamental enough: to transmute
"the job the contractor had undertaken into a job of a different
""kind, which the contract did not contemplate and to which it
"could not apply, although there was nothing in the express
"language of either contract to limit its operation in this way."'
I need not multiply citations, but I might note a reference by
Lord Cairns so long ago as 1876 to '' additional or varied work, so
"" peculiar, so unexpected, and so different from. what any person
'' reckoned or calculated upon '' (Thorn v. London Corporation **).
On this view there is no need to consider what the parties thought
or how they or reasonable men in their shoes would have dealt
with the new situation if they had foreseen it. The question is
whether the contract which they did make is, on its true construc-
tion, wide enough to apply to the new situation: if it is not, then
it is at an end.
In my view, the proper approach to this case is to take from
the arbitrator's award all facts which throw light on the nature
of the contract, or which can properly be held to be extrinsic
evidence relevant to assist in its construction and then, as a
matter of law, to construe the contract and to determine whether
the ultimate situation, as disclosed by the award, is or is not
within the scope of the contract so construed.
The appellants on March 18, 1946, sent to the respondents
with their tender a covering letter. I agree with your Lordships
that this letter was not incorporated in the contract of July 9,
1946, and I do not think that it can be used in construing this
14 [1952] A.C. 166, 185. 16. (1876) 1 App.Cas, 120, 127.
15 [1949] 2 K.B. 632, 667; [1950]
1 All E.R. 208.
(21
H.'L. (B.)
H 1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
District
Counotn.
Lord Reid.
od
722
HL. (B)
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
COUNCIL.
Lord Reid.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
contract. It was simply part of the preliminary negotiations and
we do not know and cannot inquire why it was not incorporated
in the contract.
The arbitrator has found that both parties '' anticipated that
'' there would be available in the building industry a sufficient
'labour force and a sufficient supply of materials to enable the
'' work specified in the agreement to be carried out substantially
'' within the time stipulated in the agreement.'' The nature of
the contract is such that they must have expected this. The
contract required the appellants to complete the work within
eight months, and provided for payment of liquidated damages
if the appellants failed to do so, subject to the surveyor being
required in certain events to allow such additional time as he
might deem fair and reasonable: and it was clearly of great
importance to the appellants that there should be no substantial
delay because any such delay was bound to add considerably to
their costs. It appears from the arbitrator's findings that the
parties did not make their expectations known to each other, and
I do not think that a finding that the parties in fact expected that
there would be no substantial delay adds anything material or
alters the legal position.
The arbitrator then found that the conditions in which the
work had to be carried out were different from those anticipated,
in that at all times there was a serious shortage of labour and
difficulty in obtaining adequate supplies of bricks and other
material. He found that as a result of this shortage, and the
consequent delay in completing the work, the actual cost to the
appellants of carrying out the contract was £115,233, whereas the
sum paid to them under the contract was £94,424. The arbitrator
has not awarded the whole of the difference between these sums.
He held that to some extent the appellants were themselves to
blame, and awarded £17,651 as the additional cost and expense
properly and unavoidably incurred by them.
If the contract continued to apply, then the appellants are not
entitled to more than they have already received; but if it was
brought to an end, then the respondents admit that the appellants
are entitled to the sum awarded subject to a very small
adjustment.
The arbitrator found that ''the respondents accepted the
'position and allowed the work to continue until finally com-
"pleted on May 14, 1948, without serious objections by the
''yespondents.'' I do not think that that means, or was intended
by the arbitrator to mean, that at some time while the work was
ALC. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
in progress the parties agreed or must be held to have agreed
that their contract should no longer apply and that the work
should proceed on some other basis. There is no finding as to
when any such agreement must be held to have been made, or
what were its terms, and there are no facts found from which
such an agreement could be inferred. The respondents no doubt
recognized that the delays were not due to the fault of the appel-
lants: they made no claim for liquidated damages, and they
made no attempt to take the work out of the hands of the
appellants, as they could have done if the appellants had been
at fault. But that is no ground for inferring an agreement to
terminate the contract and proceed on some different basis.
The appellant's case must rest on frustration, the termination
of the contract by operation of law on the emergence of a funda-
mentally different situation. Using the language of Asquith L.J.
{as he then was) which I have already quoted,'' the question is
whether the causes of delay or the delays were '' fundamental
""enough to transmute the job the contractor had undertaken
"into a job of a different kind, which the contract did not con-
'" template and to which it could not apply.'' In most cases the
time when the new situation emerges is clear; there has been
some particular event which makes all the difference. It may
be that frustration can oecur as a result of gradual change, but,
if so, the first question I would be inclined to ask would be when
the frustration occurred and when the contract came to an end.
It has been assumed in this case that it does not matter at what
point during the progress of the work the contract came to an
end, and that, whatever the time may have been, if the contract
came to an end at some time the whole of the work must be paid
for on @ quantum meruit basis. I do not pursue this matter
because the respondents have admitted that if there was frustra-
tion at any time the appellants are entitled to the sum awarded.
But, even so, I think one must see whether there was any time
at which the appellants could have said to the respondents that
the contract was at an end, and that if the work was to proceed
there must be a new contract, and I cannot find any time from
first to last at which they would have been entitled to say that
the job had become a job of a different kind which the contract
did not contemplate. There is a difficulty about a party being
entitled to go on and finish the work without raising the question
that a new agreement is necessary, and then maintain that
frustration occurred at some time while the work was in progress,
17 [1949] 2 K.B. 632, 667.
723
:
H. L. (E.)
:
1956 |
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
Counc.
Lord Reid.
724
Ho. (ey
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
0.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRIOT
CoUNCIL.
Lord Reid.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
but again I do not pursue that matter because it does not arise
in view of the course this case has taken.
In a contract of this kind the contractor undertakes to do
the work for a definite sum and he takes the risk of the cost being
greater or less than he expected. If delays occur through no
one's fault that may be in the contemplation of the contract, and
there may be provision for extra time being given: to that extent
the other party takes the risk of delay. But he does not take the
-risk of the cost being increased by such delay. It may be that
| delay could be of a character so different from anything contem-
plated that the contract was at an end, but in this case, in my
opinion, the most that could be said is that the delay was greater
in degree than was to be expected. It was not caused by any new
and unforeseeable factor or event: the job proved to be more
onerous but it never became a job of a different kind from that
contemplated in the contract.
Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town Trustees 1§ appears to me
to be a very special case, and it must be read in light of the
development of the law in later cases. I agree with your Lord-
ships' comments on it and I can get little assistance from it for
the decision of the present case. I agree that this appeal should
be dismissed.
Lorp Rapvcuirre. My Lords, I agree that this appeal fails. Of
the two main grounds upon which the appellants rely the shorter
is that which concerns the question whether their building
contract was made subject to a condition as to the availability of
adequate supplies of labour and material by incorporating in its
terms the relevant part of a letter from the appellants to the
respondents dated March 18, 1946. I will deal with that point
first. But at the outset I must remark that if I thought, as I do
not, that the appellants were right in their argument that such a
condition was incorporated, I should not necessarily conclude
from that that they were entitled to succeed in their appeal.
For their success would depend upon a further question: What
significance should be attached to the words of the condition as
part of the whole contract and what legal consequences should
flow from them? As I believe that your Lordships are at one
in thinking that the incorporation claimed never took place, I do
not think that I need say anything more with regard to this
further question except that it is itself a difficult one upon which
some difference of view has already shown itself in the courts.
18 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
[His Lordship stated the facts and continued:] These are
the circumstances in which it has to be decided whether the
second paragraph of this letter formed a qualifying condition
incorporated into the building contract. As the formal agree-
ment of July 9 was evidently intended to sum up everything
that had emerged from the preceding negotiations, it is necessary
for the appellants to show that that agreement somehow carried
into its terms the stipulation contained in that second paragraph.
Nor did their argument before your Lordships proceed on any
other basis.
It is put in two ways. I do not agree with either of them.
On the contrary, I agree with the way that this question was
disposed of by Parker L.J. in the Court of Appeal: but, since
the appellants' argument on this point commended itself both to
the Lord Chief Justice in the Queen's Bench Division and to a
majority of the Court of Appeal on the occasion of each hearing,
it is only right that I should notice it with some particularity.
The formal agreement, as I have said, referred to and incor-
porated a number of the preliminary documents. These were
listed in clause (2) as follows: "' (a) the said tender; (b) the
'" drawings; (c) the general conditions of contract; (d) the specifi-
"cation; (e) the bill of quantities; (f) the schedule of rates and
"" prices (if any).''
Now, what was the '' said tender''? The. actual form of the
words is due to the only recital of the agreement, in which it is
stated that the employer "'has accepted a tender by the con-
'"' tractor for the sum of £92,425,'' ete. The first way that the
appellants put their case is that the tender referred to is the
whole offer made on March 18, and that this offer included the
second paragraph of the covering letter which was intended as a
qualification of the terms of the form of tender.
My Lords, I think that this argument is a misreading of what
the appellants and respondents intended by the formal agree-
ment. Certainly all the other documents incorporated by clause 2
are separate named documents which the parties were at some
pains to identify by their respective signatures. Everything
points to the "' said tender '' being, similarly, the document called
form of tender which the appellants had signed on March 18 and
forwarded by their letter. Nothing else in fact could properly
be referred to as a ''tender'': for there is a contradiction in
terms in speaking of a letter which states that '' our tender '' is
enclosed as if it were itself part of that very tender. As I see
it, the truth of the matter is that in forwarding their tender the
725
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DistRicr
CoUNCIL.
Lord Radcliffe.
726
A Da(B)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CouNCIL.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
appellants proposed a qualification of the expected contract which
the respondents did not accept and to which the appellants did
not themselves return. I do not think it unfair to add the point
that if they had, their stipulation could hardly have been left in
its existing form which is at once sweeping and inconclusive.
The alternative argument rests upon the fact that the appendix
to the form of tender had had written in it by the appellants
a reference to the letter of March 18. But I do not see how
this can avail them with regard to the second paragraph of that
letter. For the whole purpose of the appendix was to provide
a list of materials and goods that were to rank in allowing
variations of the contract sum. In so far as parts of the letter
did refer to prices of materials and goods, as indeed some did,
I think that it would be correct to say that those passages formed
part of the form of tender and, as such, might have been
incorporated in the formal agreement. I say '' might have been,"''
because I think that the arbitrator's finding that the later
schedule of prices supplied on May 20 was intended to constitute
appendix I of the tender must mean that the original reference
to the letter of March 18 ceased to have any contractual signific-
ance by the time that the formal agreement was made. But,
however that may be, I think it plain that the reference in the
appendix could only bear upon matters relating to the prices
of materials and goods, and could not possibly have been under-
stood by the parties as bearing upon the general question of the
availability of supplies of labour and material. The context of
the appendix makes it impossible to suppose that the reference
was intended to introduce the letter of March 18 as a whole.
If the second paragraph of that letter did not form part of the
contractual arrangements, the appellants' right to claim any
payment beyond the original contract sum rests upon the argu-
ment that at some date before completion the original contract
became frustrated by the continued shortage of the necessary
supplies of labour and material, and that as from that date the
building work was carried on under a new working arrangement,
which admitted of further payment. The supplemental award of
the arbitrator was drawn up on the basis that this argument
succeeded. Despite his findings I think that the law is against
the appellants on this point and that the award in their favour
cannot be sustained.
Before I refer to the facts I must say briefly what I understand
to be the legal principle of frustration. It is not always
expressed in the same way, but I think that the points which are
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
relevant to the decision of this case are really beyond dispute.
The theory of frustration belongs to the law of contract and it is
represented by a rule which the courts will apply in certain
limited circumstances for the purpose of deciding that contractual
obligations, ex facie binding, are no longer enforceable against
the parties. The description of the circumstances that justify -
the application of the rule and, consequently, the decision whether
in a particular case those circumstances exist are, I think,
necessarily questions of law.
It has often been pointed out that the descriptions vary from
one case of high authority to another. Even as long ago as 1918
Lord Sumner was able to offer an anthology of different tests
directed to the factor of delay alone, and delay, though itself a
frequent cause of the principle of frustration being invoked, is only
one instance of the kind of circumstance to which the law attends
(see Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co.?*). A full current
anthology would need to be longer yet. But the variety of
description is not of any importance so long as it is recognized
that each is only a description and that all are intended to express
the same general idea. I do not think that there has been a
better expression of that general idea than the one offered by Lord
Loreburn in F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mezican
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd.?° It is shorter to quote than to
try to paraphrase it: ''. . . a court can and ought to examine the
"contract and the circumstances in which it was made, not of
"course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether
"or not from the nature of it the parties must have made their
'bargain on the footing that a particular thing or state of things
'would continue to exist. And if they must have done so, then
'""a term to that effect will be implied, though it be not expressed
"'in the contract. . . . no court has an absolving power, but it
'' can infer from the nature of the contract and the surrounding
'circumstances that a condition which is not expressed was a
'foundation on which the parties contracted.'' So expressed,
the principle of frustration, the origin of which seems to lie in the
development of commercial law, is seen to be a branch of a wider
principle which forms part of the English law of contract as a
whole. But, in my opinion, full weight ought to be given to the '
eé
requirement that the parties '' must have made "' their bargain
on the particular footing. Frustration is not to be lightly invoked
as the dissolvent of a contract.
19 [1919] A.C. 485, 457-460. 20 [1916] 2 A.C. 897, 403.
727
Ee Te (E3)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DIstTrRicT
CouNCIL.
Lord Radcliffe.
728
HL. (B)
1956
DavIs
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DIstTRIcT
COUNCIL.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956]
Lord Loreburn ascribes the dissolution to an implied term of
the contract that was actually made. This approach is in line
with the tendency of English courts to refer all the consequences
of a contract to the will of those who made it. But there is
something of a logical difficulty in seeing how the parties could
even impliedly have provided for something which ex hypothesi
they neither expected nor foresaw; and the ascription of
frustration to an implied term of the contract has been criticized
as obscuring the true action of the court which consists in
applying an objective rule of the law of contract to the contractual
obligations that the parties have imposed upon themselves. So
long as each theory produces the same result as the other, as
normally it does, it matters little which theory is avowed (see
British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas
Ltd.,24 per Viscount Simon). But it may still be of some
importance to recall that, if the matter is to be approached by
way of implied term, the solution of any particular case is not
to be found by inquiring what the parties themselves would have
agreed on had they been, as they were not, forewarned. It is
not merely that no one can answer that hypothetical question:
it is also that the decision must be given "' irrespective of the
'"individuals concerned, their temperaments and failings, their
'' interest and circumstances "' (Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steam-
ship Co, Ltd.**). The legal effect of frustration '' does not depend
''on their intention or their opinions, or even knowledge, as to
''the event.'' 2° On the contrary, it seems that when the event
occurs "' the meaning of the contract must be taken to be, not
'"'what the parties did intend (for they had neither thought nor
'' intention regarding it), but that which the parties, as fair and
'"" reasonable men, would presumably have agreed upon if, having
""such possibility in view, they had made express provision as
'"to their several rights and liabilities in the event of its occur-
"rence '' (Dahl v. Nelson,** per Lord Watson).
By this time it might seem that the parties themselves have
become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons should
be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there rises the figure
of the fair and reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair
and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the
anthropomorphic conception of justice, is and must be the court
itself. So perhaps it would be simpler to say at the outset that
21 [1952] A.C. 166, 184. 23 [1996] A.C. 497, 509.
22 [1926] A.C. 497, 510; 42 T.L.R. 24 (1881) 6 App.Cas. 38.
359.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 729
frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without ) H. L. (f.)
default of either party a contractual obligation has become]} — j95¢
incapable of being performed because the circumstances in whic
performance is called for would render it a thing radically different gormucron
from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haee i Lrp.
foedera veni. It was not: this that I promised to do. Hance
There is, however, no uncertainty as to the materials upo URBAN
i em op DIstTRIcT
which the court must proceed. The data for decision are, o Councin.
"the one hand, the terms and construction of the contract, rea
+
ue . <a : Lord Radcliffe.
in the light of the then existing circumstances, and on the othe —=
"hand the events which have occurred '' (Denny, Mott ¢ Dickson
Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd.,?> per Lord Wright). In the
nature of things there is often no room for any elaborate inquiry.
The court must act upon a general impression of what its rule
requires. It is for that reason that special importance is neces-
sarily attached to the occurrence of any unexpected event that,
as it were, changes the face of things. But, even so, it is no
hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls th
principle of frustration into play. There must be as well sucl ¥
_a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing
undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that
contracted for.
I am bound to say that, if this is the law, the appellants' case
seems to me a long way from a case of frustration. Here is a
building contract entered into by a housing authority and a big
firm of contractors in all the uncertainties of the post-war world.
Work was begun shortly before the formal contract was executed
and continued, with impediments and minor stoppages but with-
out actual interruption, until the 78 houses contracted for had
all been built. After the work had been in progress for a time
the appellants raised the claim, which they repeated more than
once, that they ought to be paid a larger sum for their work than
the contract allowed; but the respondents refused to admit the
claim and, so far as appears, no conclusive action was taken by
either side which would make the conduct of one or the other a
determining element in the case.
That is not in any obvious sense a frustrated contract. But
the appellants' argument, which certainly found favour with the
arbitrator, is that at some stage before completion the original
contract was dissolved because it became incapable of being
performed according to its true significance and its place was
25 [1944] A.C. 265, 274-275.
730
H. L. (E.)
1956
DAVIS
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
District
CouNcIn.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956]
taken by a new arrangement under which they were entitled to
be paid, not the contract sum, but a fair price on quantum meruit
for the work that they carried out during the 22 months that
elapsed between commencement and completion. The contract,
it is said, was an eight months' contract, as indeed it was.
Through no fault of the parties it turned out that it took 22
months to do the work contracted for. The main reason for
this was that, whereas both parties had expected that adequate
supplies of labour and material would be available to allow for
completion in eight months, the supplies that were in fact avail-
able were much less than adequate for the purpose. Hence, it
is said, the basis or the footing of the contract was removed before
the work was completed; or, slightly altering the metaphor, the
footing of the contract was so changed by the circumstance that
the expected supplies were not available that the contract built
upon that footing became void. These are the findings. which
the arbitrator has recorded in his supplemental award.
In my view, these are in substance conclusions of law, and
I do not think that they are good law. All that anyone, arbitrator
or court, can do is to study the contract in the light of the cireum-
stances that prevailed at the time when it was made and, having
done so, to relate it to the circumstances that are said to have
brought about its frustration. It may be a finding of fact that
at the time of making the contract both parties anticipated that
adequate supplies of labour and material would be available to
enable the contract to be completed in the stipulated time. I
doubt whether it is, but, even if it is, it is no more than to say
that when one party stipulated for completion in eight months,
and the other party undertook it, each assumed that what was
promised could be satisfactorily performed. That is a statement
of the obvious that could be made with regard to most contracts.
I think that a good deal more than that is needed to form a
'' basis '' for the principle of frustration.
The justice of the arbitrator's conclusion depends upon the
weight to be given to the fact that this was a contract for specified
work to be completed in a fixed time at a price determined by
those conditions. I think that his view was that, if without
default on either side the contract period was substantially
extended, that circumstance itself rendered the fixed price so
unfair to the contractor that he ought not to be held to his original
price. I have much sympathy with the contractor, but, in my
opinion, if that sort of consideration were to be sufficient to
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 731
establish a case of frustration, there would be an untold range H. L. (B.)
of contractual obligations rendered uncertain and, possibly, 1956
unenforceable.
Davis
Two things seem to me to prevent the application of the prin- Conrracrors
ciple of frustration to—this_case. ( Oneois that the cause of the Lrp.
delay was not any new state of things which the parties could Pease
not reasonably be thought to have foreseen. On the contrary, UrBan
the possibility of enough labour and materials not being available Couman,
possibility of enoug our a aterials not being availa Counc.
was before their eyes and could have been the subject of special_
contractual stipulation. It was not made so. -The other thin
is that, though timely completion was no doubt important to both
sides, it is not right to treat the possibility of delay as having the
same significance for each. The owner draws up his conditions
in detail, specifies the time within which he requires completion,
protects himself both by a penalty clause for time exceeded and
by calling for the deposit of a guarantee bond and offers a certain
measure of security to a contractor by his escalator clause with
regard to wages and prices. In the light of these conditions the
contractor makes his tender, and the tender must necessarily take
into account the margin of profit that he hopes to obtain upon his
adventure and in that any appropriate aliowance for the obvious
risks of delay. To my mind, it is useless to pretend that the
contractor is not at risk if delay does occur, even serious delay.
And I think it a misuse of legal terms to call in frustration to get
him out of his unfortunate predicament.
The arbitrator had put upon him the duty of making further
findings of fact '' relevant to the application of the principle in
"the case of Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town Trustees.?® "'
This may have been hard upon him, for it implies that that
decision can be ascribed to one ascertainable principle. In my
opinion, it cannot. The judgment of the Court of Appeal applied
a different principle of law from that upon which the trial judge's
questions to the jury (and their answers) were based; and the
judgment of the Divisional Court was more or less evenly balanced
between the two. According to the findings of the jury taken
together, the case was one in which all the work done by Bush
had been done under the original contract; the contract was such
that it carried an implied term that the Whitehaven trustees
should give possession of the whole site without delay; the delay
which had taken place changed the conditions of the contract to
such an extent that the '' special provisions '' precluding Bush
d Radcliffe.
26 29 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
732
es)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DisTRIoT
CoUNCIL.
Lord Radcliffe.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
from making any complaint of delay could no longer be applied,
and Bush was entitled to damages for breach of contract arising
from the trustees' failure to keep the implied term, the damages
being represented by the additional cost of the work to him over
and above the contract price. It may be difficult to say by what
principle of law the '' special provisions'' of the contract became
inapplicable while the contract itself remained enforceable; but
I suppose that judge and jury had in mind that the parties by
their conduct had waived the enforcement of the particular clause.
There is nothing out of order in such a finding, so long as the
facts proved are clear enough to warrant it, though normally one
would expect them to include some discussion, oral or written,
between the parties. I daresay that everyone felt that rough
justice had been done.
The Court of Appeal, however, decided the case upon a basis
which had only a slight resemblance to the findings of the jury.
By ignoring all the findings except that which related to the
change in the "' conditions of the contract,'' and by treating that
as if it applied to the contract as a whole and not merely to what-
ever was to be understood by the words "' special provisions,''
they arrived at a new view of the facts upon which they thought
that a case of frustration could be made out. At some time,
apparently unknown to and unmarked by the parties concerned,
the original contract had disappeared with all its incidents and
obligations and in its place had been set up the legal relationship
expressed in Bush's claim (though he had not made it) to be paid
on the basis of a '' quantum meruit.'' I should have thought
that it would have been much simpler to say, had the findings of
the jury warranted it, that the parties had abandoned the original
contract by mutual consent and substituted for it a new contract
containing the substance of the old terms but a reasonable price
clause instead of the former fixed price. But that is not frustra-
tion; it is fulfilment with variations.
My Lords, I think that Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town
Trustees ?® may be worth remembering as an instance of what
can happen to a case during its passage through successive courts,
but I do not think it worth recording as an exposition of any
principle of law. In that regard the editors of the Law Reports,
who ignored it, showed a sounder judgment than Mr. Hudson, who
enshrined it. In so far as it applied the principle of frustration
to the facts of the case, the principle was in my view misapplied.
26 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
A.C. . AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
In so far as the judgments of the Court of Appeal contain general
statements as to the law of frustration, I think that the subject
has been so fully explored in later cases of higher authority that
the particular exposition is of no real value. I am sincerely sorry
if our decision embarrasses builders, who may in some cases have
found in the second volume of Hudson on Building Contracts a
way of mitigating the risks of tenders to which the law did not
truly entitle them. But, in my view, their safety lies in the
insertion of explicit conditions in any fixed price contracts they
may undertake; it does not lie in an appeal to the principle of
frustration.
Lorp SoMERVELL oF Harrow. My Lords, I agree that the
words on which the appellants seek to rely in the letter of March 18
were not incorporated in the contract.
I have had the advantage of reading the opinion which has
just been read by my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid. I
agree with him that it is desirable to decide what is the proper
basis of "' frustration.'' I also agree with his conclusion on that
matter and I should add nothing except the possibility of confusion
if I sought to restate it in my own words.
I therefore turn to its application to the issues in the present
appeal. As the senior member of the Court of Appeal which
remitted the case to the arbitrator, I would like to express my
regret that we did not give more assistance to enable him to dis-
tinguish the "' facts '' from his conclusion on them. Fortunately,
one or two questions put to counsel in the course of the argument
showed that there was now no conflict as to relevant facts.
Contracts to be performed in futuro are based on expectations.
If each party is equally well informed as to the data on which
expectations must be based, it may be said that these expectations
are the '' basis' or '' footing '' on which the contract is made.
It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that if such expecta-
tions are not realized the '' basis ''' has gone and the contract is
frustrated. As Lord Sumner said in Larrinaga & Co. v. Société
Franco-Américaine des Phosphates de Medulla?*: "In effect
'* most forward contracts can be regarded as a form of commercial
'' insurance, in which every event is intended to be at the risk of
'one party or another.'' Later he said **: '' No one can tell
'" how long a spell of commercial depression may last ; no suspense
27 (1928) 92 L.J.K.B. 455, 464; 39 28 92 L.J.K.B, 455, 465.
T.L.R. 316.
A.C. 1956. 48
733
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
CounNcIL.
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lyrp.
o.
FAREHAM
URBAN
DISTRICT
COUNCIL.
Lord Somervell
of Harrow.
HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
'can be more harassing than the vagaries of foreign exchanges,
'but contracts are made for the purpose of fixing the incidence
''of such risks in advance, and their occurrence only makes it
''the more necessary to uphold a contract and not to make them
''the ground for discharging it.''
Under the present contract, was the risk of shortage of skilled
labour fixed on the appellants? A builder who undertakes to
finish a building by a certain day is, on the face of it, plainly
taking such a risk. There are provisions in the present contract
which re-enforce this construction, were it necessary to do so.
With regard to prices of certain materials and rates of wages
there are what are called escalator clauses. The appellants
were not prepared to take the risk of increases in these matters.
The parties also directed their minds to the possibility of the
work not being completed in the specified time. The appel-
lants were to pay so much per week in damages. Extra
time could, however, be allowed if there was delay by strikes
or if the work was stopped by order of the surveyor. This
is to me a somewhat obscure clause, but it is sufficient that
there was an exception clause for delay which did not cover
shortage of labour, and provided only for relief from penalties
and not for any extra cost that the delay might cause the
appellants. The shortage of skilled labour, as is shown by the
admitted figures set out in the points of claim, was very substan-
tial. Evidence was called, which may not have been admissible,
to show that the expectations were based on statements on behalf
of the Government as to the probable availability of skilled labour.
A party contracting in the light of expectations based on data of
that or any other kind must make up his mind whether he is
prepared to take the risk of those expectations being disappointed.
If not, then he will refuse to contract unless protected by some
specific provision. There is no such provision here. The appel-
_ lants took the risk under the contract, and it seems to me quite
impossible to maintain that the contract did not apply in the
situation as it remained, the expectations on which the estimate
was based not having been realized.
But for the decision in Bush v. Whitehaven Port and Town
Trustees *® I doubt if the issue of frustration would ever have
been raised. I will give my reasons as shortly as I can for think-
ing that that case should not hereafter be citable as a decision
29 2 Hudson's Building Contracts, 4th ed., 122.
A.C. AND PRIVY COUNCIL.
relevant to the law of frustration. The case was fully examined
by Cohen L.J., as he then was, in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co.
Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works.*° The plaintiffs' claim was for
extra expenses incurred on work and labour in that the defendants
had not made the site on which the plaintiffs were to do the work
available as required. The delay was substantial and turned a
summer contract into a winter contract. The defendants relied
on an exception clause providing that a failure to make the site
available when required should not "' vitiate or affect the con-
" tract."' I think that the jury took the view, whether sound in
law or not, that the delay was so great that it ought not to be
covered by the exception and that the defendants should be treated
as in breach. It is the form of two of the questions left to the
jury that led the courts to deal with the case as one of frustration.
The first two questions and answers were as follows: '' (1) Was
"it the duty of the defendants under the contract to be in a
'position at the commencement of and at all times during the
"" contract to give the contractor the use of so much of the site
'" of the works as might, in the opinion of the engineer, be required
""to enable the contractor to commence and continue the execu-
'"tion of the works in accordance with the contract? A. Yes.
'"* (2) Was the contract made upon the basis that the defendants
'"" would be in a position to act as aforesaid? <A. Yes.'' I doubt
if this second question was a proper question to put. It was in
any event liable to mislead. '* Basis'' may mean no more than
."
'" expectation. If it means more, it is difficult to reconcile
questions (1) and (2) with giving any effect to the exception clause.
The fifth question is also difficult: '' Were the conditions of the
'" contract so completely changed, in consequence of the defen-
'' dants' inability to hand over the sites of the work as required,
'"as to make the special provisions of the contract inapplicable?
'""A. Yes.'' This does not suggest that the contract is gone
altogether but only that the special provisions are inapplicable.
The jury, in my view, tookithese words as referring to the excep-
tion. Question 8 was as to the "' damage suffered,'' and the jury
awarded £600 over and above the contract price.
It appears that Lord Esher had some doubt whether the
answer to the fifth question should be taken as a binding finding.
Findings by juries on mixed questions of law and fact are not
precedents. That is, no doubt, why the case was not reported in
any law report. I doubt myself, with respect, whether on the
30 [1949] 2 K.B. 682.
735
H. L. (E.)
1956
Davis
CONTRACTORS
Lrp.
v
FAREHAM
URBAN
District
C
/OUNCIL.
Lord Somervell
of
Harrow.
736 HOUSE OF LORDS [1956 |
H. L. (E.) findings of the jury taken with the terms of the contract it was
1956 possible to treat it as a frustration case. I am clear that it cannot
be regarded ag a precedent in the law of frustration as applied to
Enc aen building or any other contracts.
Lrp. I would dismiss the appeal.
Pisesch Appeal dismissed.
URBAN
piers Solicitors: Blakeney & Marsden Popple & Co.; Kingsford,
aa Dorman & Co. for Blake, Lapthorn, Roberts & Rea, Portsmouth
HG: