When fixing a minimum non-parole period under s 90(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) as part of a mandatory life sentence for murder, the court exercises a discretionary judgment informed by ordinary sentencing principles, having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender. The 14-year maximum is not reserved for the worst conceivable case of murder. A ground of appeal asserting the minimum period is 'manifestly excessive' is misconceived as a matter of law in this context; the correct approach is to demonstrate error in the exercise of discretion. Intellectual disability is relevant to moral culpability and the weight to be given to general deterrence, but does not necessarily require a minimum term at the lower end of the range where the offender is found to have had sufficient appreciation of the moral wrong of the conduct.
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