The element of subjective foresight of probability of serious injury (or danger of serious injury) in the offence of reckless conduct endangering a person under s 23 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) cannot be inferred beyond reasonable doubt merely from the objective dangerousness of the conduct; there must be evidence, whether from admissions, interview answers, or circumstances, from which the inference of actual subjective foresight at the time of the conduct can properly be drawn. Where the accused's interview contains no acknowledgment of such foresight and the questions asked did not address it, the evidence may be insufficient. Where the principal offender's recklessness cannot be established, it will ordinarily be impossible to establish recklessness on the part of a secondary party acting in concert.
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