Where the Crown case against an accessory after the fact to murder relies on an intermediate fact (such as driving the principal from the scene) as the sole basis for proving the accessory's knowledge, the majority view (Price J and Davies J) is that this intermediate fact constitutes an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, not merely on the balance of probabilities. However, Hoeben CJ at CL held the balance of probabilities sufficed where the intermediate fact was not an element of the offence but merely a circumstance relevant to establishing knowledge. On sentencing for accessory after the fact, where the accessory's offending consisted of a single act (one false alibi) covering two murders, the level of accumulation should reflect that the accessory's criminality cannot be equated with the principal's commission of two separate murders.
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