The two-stage approach to sentencing for murder under s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) — first assessing whether the level of culpability warrants life imprisonment, then considering whether subjective circumstances justify a lesser sentence under s 21(1) — remains permissible after Markarian and Muldrock. A personality disorder that is causally connected to the offending but involves only a 'relatively limited impairment' of decision-making may carry limited weight in reducing culpability, particularly when considered against the scale of the offender's reckless indifference and the enormity of the resulting harm. Sentencing reasons should be read as a whole; the sequence in which matters are addressed does not of itself reveal error.
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