Where discreditable conduct evidence is admitted under s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) to prove a pattern or system of conduct (such as money laundering), the trial judge's obligation under s 34R(1) to identify impermissible uses does not necessarily extend to a specific warning against bare propensity reasoning under s 34P(1)(a), provided the permissible use is clearly identified and the mode of reasoning engaged is conceptually distinct from propensity reasoning. The obligation under s 34R(1) is dictated by the circumstances of the case and the real issues at trial. Additionally, where an accused denies knowledge and the truth lies between two mutually exclusive alternatives, rejection of the denial is capable of proving the converse.
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