A sentencing judge must explicitly engage with and resolve the question of whether and to what extent an offender's intellectual disability reduces moral culpability; it is insufficient merely to note the disability and its relevance to general deterrence, specific deterrence, and special circumstances without addressing moral culpability. Where an offender has cognitive ability and executive functioning skills inferior to 95-99% of the population, with a full-scale IQ in the range 68-76, this substantially lessens moral culpability, renders the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence, and reduces the significance of retribution and denunciation. Such circumstances, combined with harsh conditions of incarceration and rehabilitation needs, may justify reducing the non-parole period to 40% of the head sentence.
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