Where coincidence evidence is adduced under s 98 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in a case where identity is not in issue but the occurrence of the offence is disputed, the correct path of reasoning requires the jury to reason from the similarity of accounts given by different witnesses to the improbability that such similar accounts would be given coincidentally, and thence to the conclusion that the accounts are true. A direction that requires the jury first to accept both accounts and then to conclude they are not coincidental reverses the reasoning process and constitutes an irregularity amounting to a miscarriage of justice. Where a dissentient juror is discharged and it cannot be affirmatively established that all subsequent verdicts were unanimous, a risk of substantial miscarriage of justice is made out under s 53C of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW).
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