The majority (Dolphin PJ and Calligeros DPJ) held that the first instance decision erred in law by treating the combined operation of s 7(5)(b) of the RTW Act (authorised break at place of employment) and the definition of 'place of employment' as sufficient to establish that employment was a 'significant contributing cause' of the injury under s 7(2)(a), without conducting the separate evaluative exercise that provision requires. The majority held that where a worker is injured at home by a hazard (a pet fence) that was not peculiar to the work or occupation but common to private life, and where there may have been mixed purposes for the activity during which the injury occurred, all relevant facts must be weighed — including the private nature of the hazard, the reasons for working from home, and the employer's practices — rather than reasoning circularly from the breadth of the 'place of employment' definition. Crawley DPJ dissented, holding that the temporary and private nature of the hazard was irrelevant and the first instance decision correctly applied the law to the facts. The matter was remitted for redetermination.
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