The Supreme Court held that the adverse effect inquiry under s 45(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) is confined to effects on the offender personally and does not extend to adverse effects on the offender's employer, the employer's business, or third parties. The Court confirmed that an extensive traffic infringement history — here, 35 infringements over 25 years including 22 speeding offences — can preclude satisfaction of both the s 45(1)(a) precondition (unlikely to reoffend) and the s 45(1)(b)(ii) precondition (previous good character), even where the offender demonstrates significant professional standing and potential employment consequences. While the Magistrate below erred by requiring the appellant to demonstrate that adverse effects 'would necessarily' flow from the conviction rather than assessing potential adverse effects, this error did not occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice given the failure to satisfy the statutory preconditions.
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