The Court held that breaching a family violence restraining order is inherently serious for the purposes of a spent conviction application under s 45 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), even where the breach conduct does not itself fall within the definition of 'family violence' in s 5A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), and even where the order was made on an interim or no-admissions basis. While leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was dismissed because the strong public interest in general deterrence of deliberate, repeated and persistent breaches of FVROs outweighed the identified but contingent and speculative adverse effects on the appellant's employment, such that the Magistrate's refusal to make spent conviction orders did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. The Court confirmed that a spent conviction order is not precluded for FVRO breaches but emphasised the exceptional character of the discretion and the need for cogent reasons demonstrating desirability from both the offender's and the community's perspective.
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