Lewis v Chief Executive Department of Justice and Community Safety and Sentence Administration Board of the ACT

(2013) 280 FLR 118; [2013] ACTSC 198

Supreme Court of the ACT

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Interrogate

Catchwords

1. Administrative Law
2. › Delegation
3. › Retrospective delegation
4. › Whether retrospective delegation is invalid
5. › Whether invalid delegation validated by s 242(1) of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT)
6. › Carltona principle
7. › Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 242
1. Administrative Law
2. › Natural justice
3. › Content of natural justice requirement
4. › Sentence Administration Board
5. › Whether personal service of notice required
6. › Whether presence of accused at inquiry required
7. › Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 66, 68, 69
1. Administrative Law
2. › Validity of meetings
3. › Effect of invalidity of meeting of Sentence Administration Board
4. › Whether resolutions valid regardless of meeting's invalidity
1. Constitutional Law (Cth)
2. › Territories
3. › Australian Capital Territory
4. › Separation of powers
5. › Whether judicial power of ACT courts is judicial power of the Commonwealth
6. › Whether ACT Legislative Assembly exercises Commonwealth legislative power
7. › Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth), ss 34, 48A
8. › Australian Constitution, ss 71, 122

Quick Take

The power of the Sentence Administration Board to cancel periodic detention under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) is not an exercise of judicial power and does not impair the institutional integrity of the ACT Supreme Court. The exercise of judicial power is complete upon sentencing; the administration of the manner in which a sentence is served is an executive function. The Kable doctrine does not extend to invalidate laws that confer power away from courts onto executive bodies, at least where the conferral does not involve government interference with judicial orders. The current state of authority does not support the proposition that Chapter III separation of powers applies to the ACT as a self-governing territory.