The materiality requirement for procedural fairness breaches, as stated in SZMTA and Nathanson, applies in the VCAT context: an applicant must demonstrate that the breach deprived them of a realistic possibility of a different outcome. The passage in Nathanson stating that an applicant need not 'articulate a specific course of action' does not relieve the applicant of the obligation to demonstrate materiality; it merely establishes that where a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or submissions on a relevant issue, there will generally be a realistic possibility of a different outcome. However, where an applicant is given repeated opportunities to identify what arguments they would have advanced and declines to do so, the breach will not be shown to be material.
The full text is available to signed-in members, including the 3 later cases that cite this judgment.
1 of the 3 citing cases carry a classified treatment. How each court treated it is available to signed-in members.