1Short title
This Act may be cited as the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1956.
Bills and explanatory statements from legislation.nt.gov.au; second reading speeches from the NT Parliamentary Record (Territory Stories). Links open the official source in a new tab.
This Act was passed before the online parliamentary record we can search begins (1978). Any explanatory memorandum or second reading speech for its bill is in the printed parliamentary papers and Hansard.
Explanatory material and speeches for the bills of later Acts that amended this Act, newest first. They explain the amendment, not necessarily the provision you are reading.
This Act may be cited as the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1956.
The Wrongs Ordinance 1955 is repealed.
This Ordinance binds the Crown.
Subject to this Part, on the death of a person after the commencement of this Ordinance all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him survive against his estate or, as the case may be, for the benefit of his estate.
This section does not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on the ground of adultery.
(1) Where a cause of action survives under this Part for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of that person:
do not include exemplary damages;
(b) in the case of a breach of promise to marry, are limited to such damage, if any, to the estate of that person as flows from the breach of promise to marry; and
(c) where the death of that person has been caused by the act or omission which gives rise to the cause of action:
(i) shall be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to his estate consequent upon his death, except that a sum in respect of funeral expenses may be included; and
(ii) do not include damages for the pain or suffering of that person or for any bodily or mental harm suffered by him or for the curtailment of his expectation of life; and
(iii) shall be calculated without reference to the future probable earnings of the deceased if he had survived the consequences of the act or omission and without allowance being made for the loss of his earning capacity that relates to a period after his death.
(2) However, if a person commences an action for damages for personal injury arising from a dust disease and dies as a result of the disease before the action is determined, the exclusion of damages for pain or suffering, bodily or mental harm or curtailment of expectation of life (subsection (1)(c)(ii)) does not apply.
(3) Subsection (2) extends to an action that remains undetermined at the date of commencement of that subsection even though the (former) plaintiff has, as at that date, already died.
In this section:
dust disease means a pathological condition of the lungs, pleura or peritoneum that is attributable to dust.
No proceedings are maintainable in respect of a cause of action in tort which, by virtue of this Part, has survived against the estate of the deceased person unless:
proceedings against him in respect of that cause of action were pending at the date of his death; or
the cause of action arose not earlier than 12 months before his death and proceedings are taken in respect of the cause of action not later than 12 months after his executor or administrator took out probate or letters of administration or within such further period as the Supreme Court, on an application made, either before or after the expiration of that period, allows.
The fact that the cause of action arose earlier than 12 months before the death of the deceased person is not, of itself, a bar to the maintenance of proceedings in respect of a cause of action referred to in subsection (1) where the court in which the proceedings are taken is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable to allow the proceedings to continue.
Subsection (2) does not affect the operation of any law, other than this section, relating to the limitation of actions.
Where damage has been suffered by reason of an act or omission in respect of which a cause of action would have subsisted against a person if that person had not died before or at the same time as the damage was suffered, there shall be deemed, for the purposes of this
Part, to have been subsisting against him before his death such cause of action in respect of that act or omission as would have subsisted if he had died after the damage was suffered.
The rights conferred by this Part for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rights conferred on the dependants of deceased persons by the
Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Ordinance 1974 and so much of this Part as relates to causes of action against the estates of deceased persons applies in relation to causes of action under that
Ordinance as it applies in relation to other causes of action not expressly excepted from the operation of section 5.
The rights conferred by this Part for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons and the obligations continued or created under or by virtue of this Part against the estates of deceased persons are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rights conferred or obligations created by or under Part V of the Motor Vehicles
Ordinance 1949, or that Ordinance as amended from time to time.
In this Part:
parent and child have the same meanings as they have in the Compensation (Fatal Injuries)
Ordinance 1974; and
the reference to "the judgment first given" shall, in a case where that judgment is reversed on appeal, be construed as a reference to the judgment first given which is not so reversed, and, in a case where a judgment is varied on appeal, be construed as a reference to that judgment as so varied.
This section applies where damage is suffered by a person as a result of a tort (whether an offence or not).
Judgment recovered against a tort-feasor liable in respect of the damage is not a bar to an action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint tort-feasor in respect of the same damage.
If more than one action is brought in respect of the damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered, or for the benefit of the estate, or of a spouse, de facto partner, sibling, half-sibling, parent or child, of that person against tort-feasors liable in respect of the damage (whether as joint tort-feasors or otherwise):
the sums recoverable under the judgments given in those actions by way of damages do not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given; and
in any of those actions other than that in which judgment is first given, the plaintiff is not entitled to costs unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action.
A tort-feasor liable in respect of the damage may recover contribution from any other tort-feasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor or otherwise, but no person is entitled to recover contribution under this section from a person entitled to be indemnified by him in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.
Where the tort causing the damage was, or the torts causing the damage were, committed by a spouse or de facto partner of the person suffering the damage and some other person, that other person may recover contribution as mentioned in subsection (4) from a spouse or de facto partner, as if a spouse or de facto partner had been liable to the person suffering the damage.
In proceedings for contribution under section 12 the amount of the contribution recoverable from a person is such as is found by the court to be just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage, and the court has power to exempt a person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from a person shall amount to a complete indemnity.
Nothing in this Part:
applies with respect to a tort committed before the commencement of this Ordinance;
affects any criminal proceedings against a person in respect of a wrongful act; or
renders enforceable an agreement for indemnity which would not have been enforceable if this Part had not been enacted.
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